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Preface
How do genes interact with the environment? How does the environment actually
enter the body to affect the genes? When we perceive the environment, bits of infor-
mation are encoded within the brain as memory, which consists of a series of neural
connections, a brain code (see Chapter 9). When perception occurs, the new sensory
input interacts with existing memory and creates new memory.
Primitive memory formed by trial and error died with the organism. With the
evolution of complex brains, however, memory in the form of brain codes acquired
the ability to skip from one brain to another, first by imitation as a shortcut to trial
and error, and later, with language, as knowledge and information. When memory
achieved portability, it became memes, bits of replicating information (see Chapters
8 and 9). Memes, like genes, undergo Darwinian evolution in a complex relationship
with genes. In our time, it is the gene × meme × environment interaction that is
fundamental in understanding mental health and illness.
This book integrates the concepts of genes and memes in understanding men-
tal illness as a final common pathway brain dysfunction. The brain dysfunction is
manifested by the symptoms and signs of mental illness that are determined by both
genes and memes.
In Part I. What is Mental Illness? An Epigenetic Model, we consider the current
model of mental illness based on gene × environment interaction and stress. The
concept of epigenesis – how genes are switched on or off by the environment –
is discussed. I introduce the concept of memes as perception and memory, neural
entities introduced from the environment and interacting with genes and existing
memes, and build a case for gene × meme × environment interaction model of
mental illness.
In Part II. Evolution and Mental Health: Genes, Memes, Culture, and the
Individual, we discuss and integrate the basic concepts of genetics, evolution, and
memes and how learning led to the emergence of memes. We then examine how
memes are actually stored in the brain, and how they evolve within the brain as well
as outside the brain as elements of culture. We discuss beneficial, symbiotic, and
pathogenic memes and how the latter may enter the brain “under the radar.” I dis-
cuss mental health and mental illness in the light of gene × meme × environment
interaction and propose that mental health is achieved when a democracy of memes
representing the self (selfplexes) is achieved in the brain.
vii
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In Part III. Principles of Diagnosis and Treatment of Mental Illness, I propose
a new psychiatric diagnostic scheme based on gene × meme interaction, epigen-
esis, and the concept of final common pathway brain dysfunction with replication
of pathologic memes. I propose that the diagnostic scheme should be multiaxial,
and that Axis I should be for phenomenological, neurophysiomemetic diagnosis
based on a continuum of brain function while Axis II should be for genetic and
neuroscience diagnosis. I then discuss existing and to-be-developed techniques for
making a memetic diagnosis. I propose that effective treatment for mental illness
should be geared toward both genes and memes, and discuss memetic therapeutic
approaches.
Memetic therapy may be broad-spectrum or specific. I discuss existing psy-
chotherapies from a memetic perspective as well as the need for novel meme-
oriented therapies. Virtual reality therapy utilizing avatars (virtual image of oneself
with desirable attributes) is a promising novel technique.
Prevention is of utmost importance as vulnerable individuals could be identified
in early childhood and immunization against toxic memes may prevent an epigenetic
cascade toward mental illness. Education plays a crucial role in strengthening the
meme-filtering, meme-sorting, and other meme-processing skills.
In Part IV. Specific Psychiatric Syndromes, I discuss specific proposed Axis I
(neurophysiomemetic) psychiatric syndromes under the categories of (1) attention-
cognition spectrum syndromes (delirium, dementia, attention deficit and impulse
control syndromes, obsessions, compulsions), (2) anxiety-mood spectrum syn-
dromes (anxiety, panic, phobias, acute stress disorder (ASD), PTSD, borderline,
mania, dependent traits and personality, avoidant traits and personality, depression-
neurotic and major depressive syndrome, adjustment disorders), (3) reality per-
ception spectrum syndromes (imagination, dissociation, conversion, somatoform,
misattribution somatization, psychosis), (4) pleasure spectrum syndromes (sub-
stance use/abuse, addictions to substances, beliefs, fanaticism), (5) primary memetic
syndromes (eating disorders, factitious disorders, malingering, meme-directed
destructive behaviors). We focus on the memetic diagnosis, gene–meme inter-
action in development, and genetic–memetic treatment for each category. In the
last chapter, Future Challenges, I briefly discuss the testable hypotheses deriv-
able from our model of gene × meme × environment interaction, and the need to
develop new techniques in memetic diagnosis and treatment as well as their ethical
considerations.
The seemingly perennial dichotomy of mind and body becomes irrelevant with
the concept of memes – there is no single mind but a sea of memes in the brain.
What is perceived as my mind at a particular time is but a large wave crashing on
the shore of my consciousness.
This work is intended to integrate the seemingly disparate languages and meth-
ods of biological and social sciences around the indivisible organism, the patient. It
is intended to stimulate thinking and hopefully innovations among psychiatrists,
physicians of other specialties, health-care professionals, psychologists, sociol-
ogists, anthropologists, and others who are interested in human behavior and
emotions.
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1.1 The Evolution of the Concept of Mental Illness
Alienists used to treat mental illness and those afflicted were considered “alienated”
or strange. There have been essentially two lines of thought concerning the causes
of mental illness: alien and endogenous. The alien causes may be a possession of the
gods or the devil, or, more recently, microorganisms such as bacteria and virus. The
endogenous causes may be an imbalance of the body fluids – the Hippocratic blood,
phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile (thence the term, melancholia) or the modern
version of an imbalance among serotonin, norepinephrine, and dopamine. It is also
generally accepted that severe environmental factors such as extreme heat or cold
can cause mental aberrations such as delirium.
Certain types of mental dysfunction, such as maladaptive patterns of behavior
and neurosis, have been also attributed to faulty learning or bad modeling.
Experimental “neuroses” and “learned helplessness” have been produced in animals
by confusing rewards or inescapable punishment (Saunders et al., 1995; Seligman,
1972).
Mental illness is known to run in families. With the advent of biological psychi-
atry, it was hoped, in the latter part of the twentieth century, that the etiologic genes
of mental illness would be discovered. In fact, the diagnostic and statistical manual
for mental illness adopted by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980 (DSM
III) was based on the research diagnostic criteria (Feighner et al., 1972) that were
designed to isolate “pure cultures” of psychiatric illness for biological research.
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At the time DSM III was introduced, the catecholamine theory of affective
disorders (Schildkraut, 1965) was the prevailing theory of mood disorders, chlorpro-
mazine the most commonly used antipsychotic, and the Human Genome Project was
yet not even a gleam in anyone’s eyes. Exciting developments have since occurred
in molecular biology and genetics and the Human Genome Project has been com-
pleted ahead of schedule (2003). Psychiatric research, at least in part fostered by the
rigorous diagnostic criteria of DSM III and its slight modification, DSM IV (1994),
has made breathtaking advances, taking full advantage of these and other develop-
ments during the Decade of the Brain, including neuroimaging techniques. On the
strength of these developments, a new theoretical model of psychiatric illness has
emerged that is open and evidence based.
Many putative genes that code for vulnerability for psychiatric syndromes are
evolutionarily conserved. This explains why schizophrenia which is associated with
low fertility rates in the afflicted has not become extinct. Crow (1997a, b, 2000,
2007) and Mitchell and Crow (2005) postulate that vulnerability to schizophrenia
may be the price that Homo sapiens had to pay for the development of language,
i.e., the speciation of humans from their ancestral apes involves the same genes that
caused the left hemispheric dominance and language. Crow proposes that there are
gradations in the genetic predisposition to psychosis, across diagnostic categories of
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
Certain genes that endow vulnerability to anxiety, for example, the short allele of
the serotonin transporter promoter gene (more of this below), may confer sensitivity
to the “smoke detector” of anxiety activation (Nesse, 2001) and be evolutionarily
adaptive when humans dwelled in caves in fear of predator animals. In the modern
world, however, such sensitivity to anxiety would be dysfunctional for the individual
and thus be considered a psychiatric syndrome.
1.2 Gene-Environment Interaction and Brain Morphology
and Function
The genes coding for predisposition to various psychiatric syndromes are currently
being defined using various techniques including linkage studies and genome scan.
As far as psychiatric diagnosis goes, current state of affairs can be summarized as
follows: For each diagnostic category, there are many susceptibility genes, and a sin-
gle gene or a few genes may code for the susceptibility for many different disorders.
On the basis of genetic studies, Kendler et al. (1998) proposed that psychosis be
reclassified as: (1) classic schizophrenia, (2) major depression, (3) schizophreniform
disorder, (4) bipolar-schizomania, (5) schizodepression, and (6) hebephrenia.
What seems clear is that psychiatric disorders are syndromes, phenomenological
convergence of a number of different genetic-pathophysiologic pathways. An anal-
ogy might be hypertension. Hypertension is a syndrome that has definable signs and
complications that can be treated with “antihypertensive” drugs. Hypertension, how-
ever, is pathophysiologically heterogeneous – it may be nephrogenic, cardiogenic,
neurogenic, endocrine, secondary to familial hyperlipidemia, stress-induced, etc.
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1.3 Gene–Environment Interaction: Serotonin Transporter Gene
as an Exemplar
A single gene that codes for the vulnerability to multiple psychiatric (and medical)
conditions is the serotonin transporter gene (SERT) and its promoter region poly-
morphism (5-HTTLPR). SERT is highly evolutionarily conserved and regulates the
entire serotoninergic system and its receptors via modulation of extracellular fluid
serotonin concentrations. DNA screens of patients with autism, ADHD, bipolar dis-
order, and Tourette’s syndrome have detected signals in the chromosome 17q region
where SERT is located (Murphy et al., 2004). 5-HTTLPR polymorphism consists
of short (s) and long (l) alleles, and the presence of the short allele tends to reduce
the effectiveness and efficiency of SERT. The short allele has been identified as
the underlying variation for the risk for the above disorders as well as anxiety,
increased neuroticism scales, smoking oticism, smoking behavior, negative mood,
social behavior, especially to reduce negative mood and feel stimulated, difficulty in
quitting smoking, social phobia, major depression, and irritable bowel syndrome
(Hu et al., 2000; Lerman et al., 2000; Lotrich and Pollock, 2004; Yeo et al.,
2004).
Why does a single gene code for so many vulnerabilities? One simple answer
may be that the gene codes for one or more basic evolutionarily adaptive predis-
positions that, in combination with other factors, may determine the development
and severity of a psychiatric syndrome. When we look at the list of vulnerabilities
above, it seems clear that there is a continuum, from anxiety to adaptive/maladaptive
behavior to phobia to major depression, and/or to physical symptoms. The concept
of endophenotype is useful in understanding traits associated with syndromes (e.g.,
eye-tracking abnormality in schizophrenics and relatives) (Gottesman and Gould,
2003) and might provide clues to a genotypic diagnosis.
Pezawas et al. (2005) showed that the short allele carriers show reduced gray
matter in limbic regions critical for processing of negative emotion, particularly
perigenual cingulate and amygdala. Functional MRI studies of fearful stimuli show
a tightly coupled feedback circuit between the amygdala and the cingulate, impli-
cated in the extinction of negative affect. Short allele carriers showed relative
uncoupling of this circuit and the magnitude of coupling inversely predicted almost
30% of variation in temperamental anxiety. They also show increased amygdala
activation to fearful stimuli (Bertolino et al., 2005; Hariri et al., 2002). Thus, this
gene seems to increase the affected individual’s brain’s sensitivity to negative affect
and anxiety (Gross and Hen, 2004). What other factors, then, may further predispose
the individual for a major depression?
Caspi et al. (2002, 2003) have shown, in an elegant longitudinal study, that stress
during the most recent 2 years in adulthood and maltreatment in childhood inter-
acted with the 5-HTTLPR status. Individuals with two copies of the short allele who
also had the stressors had greatest amount of depressive symptoms and suicidality
than heterozygous individuals, and those with only the long alleles had the least
amount of depression. The short allele carriers have been shown to have more neu-
roticism scores on Eysenck personality inventory, and those with both short allele
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Differences in processing of emotional stimuli between s allele carriers (darker arrows) and
homozygous l allele carriers (lighter arrows). Negative emotional stimuli are evaluated by the
amygdale after preliminary analysis in the ventral visual pathway (not shown). Carriers of the s
allele have markedly reduced positive functional coupling between the rostral anterior cingulate
(rACC) and the amygdala, which results in a net decrease in inhibitory feedback from the cau-
dal anterior cingulate (cACC), via connections between rACC and cACC (short upward arrows).
Brain volume was also substantially reduced in s allele carriers in the rACC and, to a lesser extent,
the cACC and amygdala. The consequence of these genotype-based alterations is an emotional
hyperresponsivity to negative affective stimuli in s allele carriers (large dark cloud) compared
with individuals lacking this allele (small light cloud), which may be related to an increased risk
of developing depression. As found in a previous study, functional coupling between the vmPFC
(light circle on left) and the amygdala was also increased in s allele carriers. (From Hamann, 2005,
reprinted with permission)
and high neuroticism were at higher risk of developing lifetime depression (Munaro
et al., 2005).
Studies in monkeys have shown that the anxiety-enhancing effect of the short
allele is mitigated with good mothering in infancy (Barr et al., 2004; Suomi, 2003,
2005).
5-HTTLPR may also determine response to drugs. Depressed individuals with
the short allele were found to respond better to antidepressants that are both sero-
tonergic and noradrenergic (i.e., mirtazapine) rather than serotonin-specific reuptake
blockers. On the other hand, individuals with the long allele may have more side
effects with exactly those drugs that are more effective for those with the short allele
(Murphy et al., 2004). Diet deficient in the serotonin precursor, tryptophan, has been
shown to induce depression in healthy women with the 5-HTTLPR s/s regardless of
family history of depression, while those l/l were resistant to depression regardless
of family history of depression. Those with l/s without family history of depression
were intermediate between l/l and s/s in depressive mood with tryptophan depletion,
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while l/s with family history of depression showed depressive response like the s/s
(Neumeister, 2003; Neumeister et al., 2006, 2002, 2004a, b).
Thus, 5-HTTLPR short allele, in conjunction with childhood stress, confers
an individual with the trait to respond to later stress with increased anxiety and
neuroticism, which, in turn, predisposes the individual for later major depression,
suicidality, and psychophysiologic disorders. Other gene–environment interactions
predisposing to trait and disorder have been reported, including type 4 dopamine
receptor gene (D4DR) and novelty seeking and ADHD (Ebstein et al., 1997;
Keltikangas-Jarvinen et al., 2003), monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) and antisocial
personality (Caspi et al., 2002; Craig, 2005), and dopamine transporter gene (DAT1)
and ADHD (Brookes et al., 2006). The Val66Met allele of the brain-derived neu-
rotrophic factor (BDNF) gene causes reduced dendritic branching in hippocampus,
impaired contextual fear conditioning, and increased anxiety that is less sensitive
to antidepressant treatment. There are alleles of the glucocorticoid receptor gene
found in the normal population, which confer a higher sensitivity to glucocorticoids
for both negative feedback and insulin reponsiveness or glucocorticoid resistance
and an association with an increased likelihood of depression in several alleles and
increased response to antidepressants in one of them (McEwen, 2007).
FKBP5 polymorphism (a glucocorticoid receptor-regulating gene) has also been
shown to interact with childhood abuse in increasing the risk of PTSD in an urban
general hospital population (Binder et al., 2008).
1.4 Emerging Model of Mental Illness: Gene × Meme
Interaction
It seems clear, then, that modern model of psychiatric and medical illness must be
based on gene × environment interaction. This model posits that the “vulnerability
gene” has evolutionarily adaptive function as evidenced by its very conservation.
It holds that there are critical interactions between the genotype and early environ-
ment in forming a personality trait which may in turn be adaptive or maladaptive at
the individual level, e.g., anxiety-prone, exploratory, attention fluctuating, hypervig-
ilant, etc. Kandel showed how environment (and learning) modifies gene expression
(Kandel, 1979, 1998).
Recent and current stress may play the role of tipping the balance from a trait to
a syndrome that has a course of its own.
How do environment and stress affect the genes exactly? To be precise, except in
a few extreme cases of physical stress, environment and stress affect human beings
only when they are perceived. As we have seen, the serotonin transporter promoter
gene polymorphism may affect how the same stimulus may be perceived – as threat-
ening or non-threatening – and may in turn result in activation or deactivation of
genes. The fact that a recent meta-analysis failed to show a significant interaction
between the serotonin transporter promoter polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) and stress
in the risk of depression (Risch et al., 2009) highlights that the interaction is not a
simple gene × stress, but rather mediated by the individual traits and percepts.
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When a sensation from a sensory organ reaches the brain, it is processed against
existing templates formed by both genetic predisposition and memory, the output
of this process constitutes perception. The templates and the percept are memes as
we will discuss in the next chapter. In sum, environment affects and interacts with
genes through memes in the course of development, and mental health and mental
illness are the outcomes of this interaction.
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Since Selye’s work on the role of stress on the activation of the adrenal cortex
and the general adaptation syndrome (Selye, 1956), there has been an explosion
of knowledge concerning the effects of stress on the organism in such fields as
neuropsychoendocrinology and neuropsychoimmunology.
2.1 Stress, Aging, and Disease
Classically, stress response is the “fight–flight” reaction to a threatening stimulus
such as a dangerous animal, mugger, or approaching fire. It is accompanied with
the activation of the autonomic nervous system and hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis. The organism needs the normal stress response to survive such danger
situations, and inadequate or excessive adrenocortical and autonomic response is
deleterious for health and survival. The active process by which the body responds
to stresses and maintains homeostasis has been termed allostasis (achieving stability
through change) (Sterling and Eyer, 1988). The term allostatic load or overload has
been introduced by McEwen to denote the wear and tear and resulting pathophys-
iology from insufficient management of allostasis either due to too much stress or
inappropriate stress response (McEwen, 1998).
When the stress is of short duration, and the behavioral, endocrine, and auto-
nomic responses have been successful in warding off the danger situation, the
organism may be strengthened by the stress experience. On the other hand, if the
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stress is prolonged and/or the organism is unable to master it (allostatic overload),
there may be serious health consequences.
Sapolsky et al. proposed the glucocorticoid cascade hypothesis of stress and
aging (Sapolsky et al., 1986). Aging animals have impaired ability to terminate
the secretion of adrenocortical stress hormones at the end of stress, which may be
due to the degeneration of negative feedback neurons. These neurons may further
degenerate due to the toxic effects of excessive glucocorticoids, resulting in a feed-
forward cascade with potentially serious pathophysiological consequences in the
aged subject.
Epel and her colleagues found that perceived stress and chronicity of stress in
healthy premenopausal women were significantly associated with higher oxidative
stress, lower telomerase activity and shorter telomere length, which are known deter-
minants of cell senescence and longevity in peripheral blood mononuclear cells.
They found that women with the highest levels of perceived stress had shorter telom-
eres on average by the equivalent of at least one decade of additional aging (Epel
et al., 2004).
The role of stress in various disease conditions from cancer to cardiac disease
has been elucidated in numerous publications – as of this writing, there were more
than 18,000 PubMed publications for stress and cancer, and more than 32,000 pub-
lications on stress and heart disease. As for the stress and the brain, there were more
than 30,000 PubMed publications.
Posttraumatic stress disorder and acute stress disorder are results of massive
identifiable stress and are manifested by emotional and behavioral symptoms. As we
have seen, however, stress plays a prominent role in depression and anxiety, and, in
fact, most psychiatric conditions are either precipitated by or contributed by stress.
Even exacerbations of schizophrenia, often thought to be primarily biological, are
induced by emotional stress (Marom et al., 2005).
2.2 Stress, Memes, and the Brain
Stress has been shown to change both the structure and function of the brain.
When a stimulus arrives at a sensory cortical area such as the visual cortex,
auditory cortex (Wernicke’s area), and/or the somatosensory postcentral gyrus and
the thalamus, the neural impulses are projected to the association cortices resulting
in a perception. Perception is determined by both genetically determined circuitry
and neural projections determined by learning and memory formation, i.e., memes
(see Section 2.5 and Chapter 8).
Then the cortical impulses constituting the percepts are projected to the amyg-
dala, the hippocampus, and other limbic structures, all of which are interconnected
with each other. Amygdala has a very tight feedback loop with the anterior cin-
gulate gyrus which is connected with the thalamus, neocortex, and the entorhinal
cortex. The negative feedback from the anterior cingulate reduces amygdalar acti-
vation. Stressful perceptions stimulate amygdala and result in the autonomic and
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HPA activation. In memetic terms, the perceived human face (meme) arising in the
primary visual cortex and arriving at amygdala may be elaborated into a smiling
human face, the attribute meme of “smiling” coming from the anterior cingulate
gyrus after processing of the original stimulus.
Hippocampus plays an important role in shutting off the HPA activation – any
damage or atrophy of the hippocampus attenuates this resulting in a prolonged HPA
activation to stress (McEwen, 2007). Longitudinal studies on aging in human sub-
jects revealed that progressive increases in salivary cortisol during a yearly exam
over a 5-year period predicted reduced hippocampal volume and reduced perfor-
mance on hippocampal-dependent memory tasks (Lupien et al., 1998). Initially,
it was thought that aging in hippocampus was associated with a loss of neu-
rons, but subsequent studies on animal models of aging confer greater importance
to a loss of synaptic connectivity or impairment of synaptic function (McEwen,
2007).
Neural regeneration is now known to occur in the brain, particularly in hippocam-
pus. Certain types of acute stress and many chronic stressors suppress neuroge-
nesis or cell survival in the dentate gyrus of the hippocampus. Glucocorticoids,
excitatory amino acids acting on NMDA receptors, and endogenous opioids
mediate the suppression (Gould et al., 1997). Stress also affects the shape and
abundance of dendrites in the hippocampus, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex.
Generally, stress results in retraction and simplification of dendrites. In memetic
terms, stress memes tend to disconnect incoming memes from existing memes
(memories).
Puberty seems to be a particularly vulnerable period for the effect of stress on
the brain. Stress in peripubertal rats resulted in a stunting of growth in parts of the
hippocampus and a sustained down-regulation of the hippocampal glucocorticoid
receptor (GR) gene expression, resulting in deficits in the shut-off of the HPA acti-
vation. Daily infusions of corticosterone during puberty resulted in a reduction of
both hippocampal volume and the number of neurons in parts of the hippocampus,
while it produced only reduction in volume but not in the number of neurons in
adults (McEwen, 2007).
Corticosteroids released by HPA activation interact with many chemicals and
neurotransmitters in the hippocampus, including serotonin, endorphins, GABA-
benzodiazepine receptors, and glutamate and other excitatory amino acids. Chronic
stress in rats releases glutamate and affects the neural cell adhesion molecule
(NCAM, PSA-NCAM). Chronic stress also releases the tissue plasminogen
activator (tPA), an extracellular protease and signaling molecule, that is involved
in the loss of spines and NMDA receptor subunits in the hippocampus (McEwen,
2007).
Neurotrophic factors such as brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) play a
role in dendritic proliferation. BDNF knockout mice exhibit a paucity in dendrites
and no further reduction in hippocampal dendritic length with chronic stress, while
wild-type mice show reduced dendritic length with chronic stress. On the other
hand, overexpression of BDNF prevents stress-induced dendritic reductions and an
antidepressant-like action on forced swimming test in mice (Govindarajan et al.,
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2006). Both stress-induced increases and decreases of BDNF expression have been
reported, which may reflect that BDNF synthesis may be triggered by stress to off-
set the depletion of BDNF caused by stress. BDNF and corticosteroids may oppose
each other, with BDNF reversing the corticosteroid-induced reduction in hippocam-
pal neuronal sensitivity. BDNF may facilitate meme introduction, replication, and
synthesis.
Corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) plays an important role in mediating stress
in the brain. It regulates the ACTH release in the pituitary and also acts on the
amygdala that controls the behavioral and autonomic responses to stress including
the release of tPA that plays an important part in anxiety. When CRF is injected into
the brain, it produces arousal and increased responsiveness to stressful stimuli that
seem to be independent of the pituitary adrenal axis and can be reversed by specific
and selective CRF antagonists. Such antagonists also reverse behavioral responses
to stressors. An interaction between the norepinephrine and the CRF systems seems
to occur both at the locus ceruleus and the amygdala. Noradrenergic neurons arising
from the locus ceruleus are concerned with behavioral arousal and anxiety. CRF
neurons seem to activate locus ceruleus. Norepinephrine, in turn, may stimulate
CRF release in the paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus, the bed nucleus of
the stria terminalis, and the central nucleus of the amygdala. Such a feed-forward
system was hypothesized to be particularly important in stress situations where an
organism must mobilize not only the HPA but also the central nervous system. Such
a positive feedback system that accelerates anxiety response, however, might be
particularly vulnerable to dysfunction (Koob, 1999).
Prefrontal cortex and amygdala are also affected by stress. Chronic stress in rats
causes dendritic shortening in the medial prefrontal cortex but dendritic growth in
the neurons in amygdala and in the orbitofrontal cortex. Glucocorticoids have been
shown to produce retraction of dendrites in medial prefrontal cortex. Behaviorally,
chronic stress remodeling of the prefrontal cortex impairs attention set shifting
(McEwen, 2007). Chronic stress enhances amygdala-dependent unlearned fear and
fear conditioning (Conrad et al., 1999). Chronic stress also increases aggression
through hyperactivity of amygdala.
The amygdala exerts a regulatory influence on the stress response and is itself
affected by stress. The serine protease tissue plasminogen activator (tPA), a key
mediator of dendritic spine plasticity, is required for stress-induced facilitation of
anxiety-like behavior. In the tPA knockout mice, repeated stress did not cause a
reduction in the spine density (Bennur et al., 2007). BDNF may also play a role in
amygdala in enhancing anxiety and increasing dendritic density.
All the brain structures mentioned, the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and hip-
pocampus, are closely interconnected and influence each other. Inactivation of
amygdala blocks stress-induced impairment of hippocampal memory long-term
potentiation (LTP) and spatial memory (Kim et al., 2005). Stimulation of medial
prefrontal cortex reduces responsiveness of central amygdala output neurons and
thus the prefrontal cortex plays an important role in fear extinction. Amygdala–
hippocampus connections are required for the processing of emotional memories
with contextual information (McEwen, 2007).
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2.3 Role of Stress and Nurturing in Development: Epigenesis
Development is considered to be epigenetic, i.e., it occurs as an interaction between
genes and environment. The phenotypic expression of a gene, i.e., whether it will
be turned on or off in the life of an organism, depends on the organism’s interac-
tion with the environment. Stress figures in prominently in this epigenetic model of
development. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the effect of childhood stress
on the serotonin transporter promoter gene (5-HTTLPR) has been demonstrated
and that noxious effects may be mitigated by good mothering in childhood at least
in monkeys. But how exactly does stress affect the genes?
In a series of experiments, Szyf et al. (2007), Unterberger et al. (2006), Weaver
(2007), and Weaver et al. (2007) studied the effects of different maternal behavior
in rats. Maternal behavior in rats affects the neural systems that tonically inhibit
corticotrophin-releasing factor (CRF) synthesis and release in the hypothalamus
and amygdala, which in turn activate central norepinephrine in response to stress.
Glucocorticoids initiate tonic negative feedback inhibition over CRF synthesis and
release and thus dampen HPA responses to stress. This glucocorticoid negative feed-
back is, in part, mediated by glucocorticoid receptors (GR) which are found in many
brain areas including hippocampus.
As adults, the offspring of high licking and grooming (LG) mothers show
increased hippocampal GR expression and enhanced glucocorticoid feedback sen-
sitivity by comparison to adult animals reared by low-LG mothers. Thus, adult
offspring of high-LG mothers show decreased hypothalamic CRF expression and
more modest HPA responses to stress. Eliminating the difference in hippocampal
GR levels abolishes the effects of early-life experience on HPA.
In essence, the experience of high licking by the rat pup is a meme that forms neu-
ral connections as perception that in turn activates existing memes and the ensemble
of memes increases hippocampal GR expression.
In addition to alterations in hippocampal GR expression, enhanced maternal
LG behavior over the first week of life is associated with increased hippocam-
pal neuronal survival, synaptogenesis, and improved cognitive performance under
stressful conditions. Behaviorally, such pups become “neophilic” rats that are more
exploratory in novel environments and less emotionally reactive. On the other hand,
the pups with lower LG during their first week of life develop a “neophobic”
phenotype with increased emotional and HPA reactivity and less exploration of a
novel situation (McEwen, 2007).
When the pups of high-LG mothers were bred by low-LG mothers, and pups
of low-LG mothers were bred by high-LG mothers (cross-breeding), the gene
expression and stress response patterns followed what was expected of the early
experience, i.e., the fostering mother’s care, not the biological mother, determined
the degree of gene expression and stress response.
How could the behavior of the caregiver cause a stable change in gene expression
in the offspring long after the caregiver is gone? Szyf et al. propose an epigenetic
mechanism in which the maternal behavior of the caregiver triggered an epigenetic
change in the brain of the offspring.
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2.4 Environment Changes Epigenome
The epigenome consists of the chromatin and its modifications and a covalent DNA
modification through methylation. The DNA is wrapped around a protein-based
structure termed chromatin. The basic building block of chromatin is the nucleo-
some, which is formed of an octamer of histone proteins. There are five basic forms
of histone proteins. The histones are extensively modified by methylation, phospho-
rylation, acetylation, and ubiquitination, and such modifications play an important
role in defining the accessibility of the DNA wrapped around the nucleosome core.
The specific pattern of histone modifications forms a “histone code,” that determines
the parts of the genome to be expressed at a given point in time in a given cell type
(Jenuwein and Allis, 2001; Taverna et al., 2007). Thus a change in histone config-
urations around a gene will change its level of expression and could switch a gene
between functionality and “silence.”
In addition to chromatin, the DNA molecule itself is modified by methylation
of the cytosine rings in the dinucleotide sequence CG in vertebrates (Razin, 1998;
Razin and Kantor, 2005) (Fig. 2.1). In the vertebrate genome, DNA methylation
occurs in different patterns in different cell types. Since DNA methylation is part
of the chemical structure of the DNA itself, it is more stable than other epigenetic
markers. It is generally accepted that DNA methylation plays an important role in
regulating gene expression. The methylation of DNA in distinct regulatory regions
is believed to mark silent genes. Epigenomic screening of human chromosomes sug-
gests that a third of the genes analyzed shows inverse correlation between the state
of DNA methylation at the 5′ regulatory regions and the gene expression (Eckhardt
et al., 2004, 2006; Lesche and Eckhardt, 2007). Aberrant silencing of tumor sup-
pressor genes by DNA methylation seems to be a common mechanism in cancer
(Baylin, 2001; Rountree et al., 2001).
Fig. 2.1 The reversible DNA methylation reaction. DNA methyltransferases (DNMT) catalyze
the transfer of methyl groups from the methyl donor S-adenosylmethionine to DNA releasing
S-adenosylhomocysteine. Demethylases release the methyl group from methylated DNA as either
methanol or formaldehyde. (From Szyf et al., 2007, reprinted with permission)
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The DNA methylation pattern is established during early development and
is maintained faithfully through life. It was long believed that DNA methyla-
tion pattern could be altered only during cell division when new unmethylated
DNA is synthesized and serves as a substrate for maintenance DNA methyltrans-
ferase (DNMT). There is evidence, however, that DNMT exists in post-mitotic
cells and that DNMT levels in neurons change in certain pathological conditions
such as psychosis (Veldic et al., 2005). DNA methylation pattern probably repre-
sents a balance of methylation and demethylation in response to physiological and
environmental signals.
The epigenome consisting of both histone configurations and DNA methylation
status determines the accessibility of the transcription machinery (Szyf et al., 2007)
and thus determines which genes are accessible for transcription (see Figs. 2.1, 2.2,
Fig. 2.2 Two mechanisms of silencing gene expression by DNA methylation. An expressed gene
(transcription indicated by horizontal arrow) is usually associated with acetylated histones and is
unmethylated. An event of methylation would lead to methylation by two different mechanisms.
The methyl group (CH3) interferes with the binding of a transcription factor which is required for
gene expression resulting in blocking of transcription. The second mechanism shown in the bottom
right is indirect. Methylated DNA attracts methylated DNA binding proteins such as Me CP2,
which in turn recruits co-repressors such as SIN3A, histone methyltransferases such as SUV39
that methylates histones and histone deacetylases (HDAC), which remove the acetyl group from
histone tails. Methylated histones (K9 residue of histone tails) recruit heterochromatin proteins
such as HP1, which contribute to a closed chromatin configuration and silencing of the gene.
(From Szyf et al., 2007, reprinted with permission)
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Fig. 2.3 Behavioral gene programming by maternal care. The sequence of events leading from
maternal licking and grooming behavior to epigenetic programming of the GR exon 1, pro-
moter CBP, a HAT (cAMP recognition element-binding protein, CREB), M, methylated CG, Ac,
acetylated H3-Histone. (From Szyf et al., 2007, reprinted with permission)
and 2.3). Inaccessible genes are, therefore, silent whereas accessible genes are tran-
scribed. In addition, another level of epigenetic regulation by small, non-coding
RNAs (microRNAs) has recently been described (Bergmann and Lane, 2003).
Returning to the mechanisms of early experience affecting stress responsiv-
ity, maternal programming of individual differences in gene expression and stress
responses in the rat seems to involve modifications of epigenetic mechanisms,
including DNA methylation and histone modification of a nerve growth factor
inducible protein A (NGFI-A) transcription factor binding site on a brain-specific
GR promoter. Increased maternal LG behavior during the first week of life
causes DNA demethylation, increased histone acetylation and NGFI-A binding, and
increased hippocampal GR expression (Weaver et al., 2006). Thus, the NGFI-A
binding site on the hippocampal GR promoter is methylated and hypoacetylated in
offspring of low-LG mothers and demethylated and hyperacetylated in offspring of
high-LG mothers.
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Weaver et al. also report that the central infusion of the histone deacetylase
inhibitor trichostatin A (TSA) eliminated the maternal effect on histone acetyla-
tion, DNA methylation, hippocampal GR expression, and HPA responses to stress
in the adult offspring of low-LG mothers (Weaver et al., 2004). On the other hand,
central infusion of the adult offspring of high-LG mothers with a methyl donor,
L-methionine, a precursor to S-adenosylmethionine, resulted in increased methyla-
tion of the NGFI-A binding site on the hippocampal GR promoter, decreased GR
expression, and increased HPA responses to stress (Weaver et al., 2005).
The difference in the methylation status between the offspring of high- and low-
LG mothers emerged over the first week of life, was reversed with cross-fostering,
and persisted into adulthood. Weaver et al. have also shown that maternal care
early in life affected the expression of hundreds of genes in the adult hippocampus
(Weaver et al., 2006).
Physical environment, including environmental chemicals and toxins which
interact with the epigenetic machinery during this critical period might also have a
profound impact on behavior later in life by interfering with the maternal care-driven
epigenetic programming.
The epigenetic gene expression determined by the quality of maternal care dur-
ing the first week of life seems to be potentially reversible as there is a dynamic
equilibrium in methylation–demethylation reactions (Szyf et al., 2007).
The epigenetic reversal caused by TSA infusion discussed above was reported
to be accompanied with a behavioral change so that the stress response of the
TSA-treated adult offspring of low LG was indistinguishable from the offspring
of high LG.
Such reversal of methylation could be achieved also by neurotransmitter acti-
vation that eventually stimulates histone acetyltransferases. Szyf et al. hypothesize
that maternal care (LG) in early life elicits a thyroid hormone-dependent increase in
serotonin (5-HT) activity at 5-HT7 receptors, and the subsequent activation of cyclic
adenosine 3′, 5′ monophosphate (cAMP) and cAMP-dependent protein kinase A
(PKA), which is accompanied by increased hippocampal expression of NGFI-A
transcription factor which, in turn, binds to the GR exon 17 promoter region. NGFI-
A interacts with the transcriptional coactivator and histone acetyl transferase CREB
binding protein (CBP). Signaling pathways that result in increased cAMP also acti-
vate CBP. Recruitment of CBP to the GR exon 17 promoter in response to maternal
care could explain the increased acetylation and demethylation observed in offspring
of high-LG (Szyf et al., 2007).
How does licking by mother or foster-mother affect the pup’s neurotransmitter
levels and gene methylation status in many parts of the brain? The perception of
licking by the pup results in memes, i.e., new neural connections and potentiation
of existing ones that may represent, in homo sapiens terms, “I am loved.” It is these
patterns of neural connections (memes) that affect other neural connections to result
in neurotransmitter release and affect genes. The affected genes, in turn, affect the
individual’s perceptual bias and interpretation of life experiences in the future, and
thus stress vulnerability or resilience.
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Behavioral interventions which lead to firing of neurons and consistent and
repetitive activation of signaling pathways might also lead to a change in DNA
methylation of specific genes in the adult brain. In addition, drugs, both recre-
ational and therapeutic, may alter DNA methylation patterns of genes in the
brain. Vaproic acid, a mood stabilizer and anticonvulsant, is a histone deacetylase
(HDAC) inhibitor and triggered replication-independent DNA demethylation in tis-
sue culture, and inhibited DNA methylation in animal brain (Detich et al., 2003;
Milutinovic et al., 2007; Tremolizzo et al., 2002).
2.5 Memes and Epigenesis
How does stress actually work? What is the allo in allostasis? We often talk about
stress as though it is an obviously definable condition. In cases of physical stress,
such as extreme heat or cold, or physical trauma, the physiologic demand may be
direct and obvious, although these are also accompanied by meanings that may not
be so obvious. In cases of psychological stress, however, the exact mechanism by
which stress enters the body has not been well explained.
Perception obviously underlies all stress but why are certain percepts stressful
to some but not others? Why do some neutral percepts, such as advertising jingles,
sometimes recur in one’s mind and cause annoyance?
Perceiving involves an integration of sensory impulses with an existing informa-
tion base (memories) in the brain (see Chapter 9 for further discussion on this topic).
Such an integration creates a percept, a bit of information that interacts with other
information in the brain. Often such percepts are replicas of information from other
brains or sources of information such as books, DVDs, etc.
Richard Dawkins coined the term, memes, to denote such bits of information that
replicate themselves (Dawkins, 1976). Memes are created, stored, and replicated not
only in human brains but also in computers, and replicated by copiers, fax machines,
printers, and stored in books, DVDs, and other media (see Chapter 8, Chapter 9, and
Chapter 10 for how memes rose, how they evolved, and exactly where they reside).
Perceiving may then be considered to be an act of meme infusion into the brain
or meme creation making use of sensory input. Memes enter the brain through the
vehicle of sensations. The perception of a stressful situation is the introduction of
stress-response inducing memes. For this to occur, there has to be an interaction
between the newly introduced meme and the preexisting memes, and the interaction
must lead to an activation of the limbic system (resulting in emotional memes).
Is maternal behavior a meme when all she is doing is what comes instinctually?
It is a meme generated by the mother either pre-programmed by genes or learned by
observation of others or both. It is, however, the meme of being cared for, or licked,
experienced by the pup that has long-term consequences – it is introduced into the
pup through maternal behavior, and now resides in the pup as a meme, having caused
gene modification and modification in the brain to interpret new experiences against
the new template.
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2.6 Stress Awakens Dormant Memes Resulting in Mental Illness
How does the concept of the meme clarify stress? The environment consists of
memes and potential memes like a culture medium in a petri dish. The culture
medium consists of molecules, some of them nutrients, some of them toxins, and
others inert. Some enter the organism and become part of it or give it energy. Others
may simply enter and stay without much effect. Under certain conditions, such as
an increase in the concentration of the toxic molecules, some such molecules will
penetrate the protective barrier of the organism and cause a reaction in the host – per-
haps an immune reaction that gets rid of the toxic molecule, or the organism may
succumb to the toxin. The shape and nature of the toxic molecule play important
roles in whether it enters the host, and what happens afterwards. So with memes.
The shapes and other characteristics of the vehicles of memes are physical in nature
such as printed words, spoken words, melodies, rhythm, scenes, movements, facial
expressions, touch, etc.
Memes contain various specific sensory components that can be identified and
analyzed. For example, the news of the death of a loved one may be introduced
into the brain in different memetic vehicles, e.g., as a phone call, a letter, a news
item on TV, etc, which cause different patterns and sequence of brain activation and
thus affective arousal. Thus, the sound of a phone call may reverberate (replicate)
repeatedly in the brain while a visit by a friend bearing the news may be soon for-
gotten. Stress thus may be definable through an analysis of the types and quantities
of memes and their vehicles that invade the brain.
While memes enter the brain through physical sensations, memes are bits of
information, and like all information, a meme can be transcribed and translated
into different languages and physical sensations. In the brain, memes are functional
neuronal clusters (neural cliques) with specific long-term potentiation. Meme repli-
cation occurs in the brain when a meme-containing neuronal cluster is reinforced
by stimulation, which may in turn infect other clusters to change configuration
(see Chapter 9).
I noted in the previous section that stress changes the structure and function of
the brain in various ways. The stress response in the brain may be seen to be a result
of replications of stress memes triggered by the introduction of new stress memes.
Memes are above all replicators. The invader in the culture medium analogy is a
replicating virus. The stress memes interact with resident stress memes in the brain,
which will tend to cause a cascade of stress meme replication. Counterbalancing
this tendency is the host immune response, the negative feedback loop to amygdala
from the cortex that may be effective in shutting off the stress response – if the pro-
tective memes are prepared and abundant. Chronic stress diminishes the number of
hippocampal neurons and causes an attenuation of the hippocampal dendritic con-
nections resulting in a disconnection between long-term memory (resident memetic
store that may attenuate the stress response) and current stress meme infusion, a
favorable circumstance for invasion of new memes.
The arousal and activation associated with acute stress may create a condition
for heightened receptivity for meme infusion from the outside, while the deleterious
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effects of chronic stress on the brain serve to protect the stress memes from resi-
dent protective memes. Dormant stress memes, however, may be activated by the
incoming stress memes, especially as the protective memes are attenuated.
Recognizing memes as independent replicators whose only concern is replication
of themselves regardless of consequences to the host organism can explain why
allostatic overload occurs so easily in human beings, whose brains are particularly
favored by memes (see Chapter 9 for a discussion of the mechanisms of meme
replication in the brain).
To summarize so far, we may conceptualize mental illness as a final common
pathway dysregulation syndrome of normal brain function. In the course of devel-
opment, particularly in critical periods in early life, genes are turned on or off
depending on stress or nurturance, giving rise to vulnerability to stress in later
life. Stress is introduced into the brain as memes that interact with resident memes
resulting in acute arousal that serves the adaptive fight/flight reaction and receptiv-
ity to introduction of memes. Chronic stress attenuates memory function causing
a disconnection between new memes and resident protective memes that are nor-
mally dominant. The new memes may then interact with dormant or suppressed
resident memes to stimulate their replication. Thus, pathogenic, hitherto suppressed
memes may become dominant. In such an allostatic overload situations, dysregu-
lation of brain function may result in a psychiatric syndrome, in which there may
be an unchecked replication of pathologic memes. But how do we acquire the resi-
dent memes in the first place? From the culture medium, which will be the topic of
discussion in the next chapter.
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In the previous two chapters, we discussed a new model of mental illness based
on gene × meme interaction. We visualized the individual organism as being in a
petri dish surrounded by a medium of molecules representing memes. We examined
how stress memes may awaken dormant memes resulting in mental illness. In this
chapter, we will examine the petri dish as a container of cultural memes that affect
mental health and illness.
3.1 Culture and Presenting Symptoms
It is well known that psychiatric syndromes are influenced by culture and cultural
change, both in geographic and temporal senses. For example, waxy flexibility of
catatonia and psychogenic fainting have diminished over time in Western cultures
(van der Heijden et al., 2005) while previously rarely recognized conditions such as
anorexia, fibromyalgia, and drug addiction have become commonplace.
For the same psychiatric condition, such as depression or schizophrenia, differ-
ent symptomatic presentations depending on culture have been noted. For example,
depressed Latinos presented with somatic symptoms much more than otherwise
demographically matched Anglo-Americans whether they lived in North America or
in their native lands (Escobar et al., 1983; Stoker et al., 1968). It has been reported
that South American Indians who practice witchcraft often have hallucinations of
“jungle spirits” and saints (Murphy, 1982). In fact, any clinician dealing with men-
tal illness would note that religious delusions and hallucinations are common among
the religious patients, while more persecutory delusions and hallucinations of
non-religious objects, such as animals and space aliens, are more common among
the nonreligious.
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3.2 Culture-Specific Psychiatric Syndromes
There are culture-specific psychiatric syndromes that seem to be confined to geo-
graphic areas, such as koro, characterized by the patient’s intense preoccupation of
retraction of his penis and that he will die. This syndrome is endemic in Malaysia
and Indonesia. Epidemics of koro have been reported affecting hundreds or thou-
sands of people (Jilek and Jilek-Aall, 1977; Tseng and Streltzer, 1997). Latah, seen
in Southeast Asian women, is characterized by a startle response in which they
lose control, mimic others around them, and blindly obey commands. Ataques de
nervios, a condition seen in Puerto Ricans, is characterized by anxiety, dissociation,
and loss of control (Cintron et al., 2005; Guarnaccia, 1993; Oquendo et al., 1992).
Culture-specific syndromes seem to incorporate endemic memes and are readily
accepted in the specific culture.
3.3 Enculturation and Memes
Culture is considered to consist of explicit and implicit patterns of behavior acquired
and transmitted by symbols constituting distinctive achievement of human groups.
The core of culture is considered to be traditional ideas and values (Tseng and
Streltzer, 1997). Enculturation is a process through which the traditional ideas and
values take up residence in the brain of the individual through repeated pattern
formation in the neural networks, resulting in the formation and strengthening of
certain synaptic and dendritic connections (see Chapter 9). Tseng and Streltzer note
that the organization of culture has its psychobiological correlates in the organiza-
tion of the brain, the microanatomy of individual neurons, and thus the organization
of neural networks (Tseng and Streltzer, 1997).
In the previous chapter, I likened environment to a petri dish, and the nutrients
and toxins that may enter the organism to memes. Culture, consisting of symbols –
language, artifacts, rules, is then a pool of memes. Memes enter the brain and take
up residence in the brain through long-term potentiation of neural network patterns.
Endemic (cultural) memes introduced in childhood are strongly potentiated as they
are repeatedly introduced during a period when the filtration system for meme intro-
duction is immature. Eventually, existing memes contribute to the formation of the
filtration system which filters out new memes that may conflict with or contradict
the pre-existing potentiated memes.
3.4 Memes for Being Ill
Within the meme pool (culture) of most geographic areas, there are memes for being
“crazy” or “insane” as well as memes for anxiety and dysphoria. This is no wonder
as many memes started out as imitations (see Chapter 8). Imitating the crazy one is
surely the best way to be crazy, and imitating the one recognized as not feeling well
is a good way of communicating that you are not feeling well. In isolated cultures,
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certain unusual (for other cultures) memes denoting such states have evolved, such
as koro, latah, and ataques de nervios.
New memes or ways of expressing an internal state do arise and may become
fashionable, such as some cases of fibromyalgia, “burn-out,” and multiple chemical
sensitivity (Eriksen and Ursin, 2004).
As we saw in the previous chapter, sustained stress, by attenuating the connection
to memory and thus dominant resident memes, provides the brain with favorable
conditions for new meme infusion from the outside without normal filtration. Such
unchecked infusion of new stress memes may interact with dormant pathogenic
memes hidden in the brain, stimulating their replication. A contributing factor may
be that chronic stress causes sensitization to bodily dysphoric sensations (Eriksen
and Ursin, 2004), which may in turn stimulate the pathogenic memes.
An example of such pathogenic memes may be depressive memes. Memes such
as “I am worthless,” “I am a bad person,” “Nobody loves me” exist in many indi-
viduals, but are not prominent (reinforced) in everyday life. Such memes are not
uncommonly introduced in childhood by adults, peers, and by exposure to per-
sons who are despised (empathy is a form of imitation, and thus leads to memes).
Conversely, protective memes such as “I am loved (by parents, friends, spouse),”
“I am competent,” and “I am good” are introduced to varying degrees during a
person’s development.
We can now state that the resident memes, both protective and pathogenic, are
memes the brain acquired from the meme pool that we call culture. The cultural
environment in which the person grew up provided the individual with the memes
that reside in the person’s brain. Some of these memes were repeatedly introduced
and were attached to positive emotions becoming dominant part of the personality,
others may have been introduced repeatedly but consciously suppressed, become
attached to negative emotions, and stayed in a dormant, repressed state within the
brain. It is these repressed memes attached to unpleasant affect that chronic stress
permits to multiply and reach consciousness.
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We have so far developed an epigenetic model of mental illness based on gene ×
meme interaction. Important in the equations are the nature of genes themselves
(e.g., polymorphisms) and the culture that forms the meme pool in early life as
well as childhood stress memes. Adult stress conditions result in an influx of new
stress memes that may stimulate the replication of dormant pathogenic memes, as a
carcinogen may trigger the uncontrolled growth of a cancer-prone (e.g., BRCA gene
activated) cell. We will examine two stress conditions that affect large populations
and consider the gene × meme interaction that may result in mental illness.
4.1 Migration
When an individual emigrates to another country, there is usually a change in culture
(meme pool) to which the person has to adapt (stress).
In a classic 1932 study in Minnesota, Odegaard found a much higher inci-
dence of state hospital admission for schizophrenia among the Norwegian immi-
grants as compared to native born, and even compared to Norwegians in Norway
(Odegaard, 1932). More recent study in The Netherlands showed an increased risk
of schizophrenia and other psychosis in immigrants from Morocco, Surinam, and
Dutch Antilles but not in those from Turkey or western Europe (Schrier et al.,
2001; Selten et al., 2001). There was an increased risk of psychosis among immi-
grants, especially in those from East Africa (Zolkowska et al., 2001). It is generally
accepted that highest rates of psychosis occur in immigrants who are socially and
economically disadvantaged and have poorer housing, less educational, and employ-
ment opportunities. A recent finding by Patino et al. indicates that there was a
fourfold increase in the risk of psychotic symptoms in children who had a history of
both immigration and family dysfunction (Patino et al., 2005).
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Ndetei reviewed the phenomenology of mental illness of different cultural groups
(Ndetei, 1988). The role of migration in West Indian immigrants to England has
been studied extensively. West Indian patients admitted to a mental hospital in
England and normal West Indians with no history of mental illness both shared a
fundamentalist acceptance of the god and the devil having a personal control of
one’s health and disease as well as beliefs in the existence of ghosts and spirits of
the dead. In the patients, religious delusions and persecutory delusions were com-
mon, i.e., an exaggeration of commonly held beliefs (memes). Some patients also
had grandiose delusions of having special powers to help others, again congruent
with the widely held belief in magic. West Indians in a mental hospital in London
were found to have an excess of paranoia, somatic, and persecutory symptoms irre-
spective of actual diagnosis compared to English patients. The delusions found in
West Indians were predominantly paranoid in nature (77%), and the hallucinations
were predominantly auditory (92%) (Tewfik and Okasha, 1965).
Most of the West Indians who emigrated to England are descendents of slaves
brought to the West Indies from West Africa. Thus, the West Indian culture contains
a mixture of memes from traditional African culture and European cultures. There
are also mutations such as the West Indian version of Pentecostal Christian beliefs
to which some 25% of the Jamaican population subscribe. The traditional African
beliefs include beliefs in witchcraft and evil spirits.
In Africans living in Africa, e.g., Sudan, Guinea Coast, and Congo, there is
widespread belief in witchcraft that did not seem to be altered significantly by levels
of education and Westernization (Ndetei, 1988). Even Christians returned to the tra-
ditional belief/behavior when under stress. This may indicate that the witchcraft and
evil spirit memes may have lain dormant in the brains in which Western or Christian
memes became dominant, but that the dormant memes awakened and multiplied
under conditions of stress.
According to traditional African beliefs, health signifies peace with the spirits of
ancestors and supernatural beings. When sick, they often go to the Western doctor
for treatment of the illness, but also to the witch doctor to divine the cause of the
disease. This practice may cut across educational and socioeconomic levels.
Ndetei states that any actions, beliefs, traditions, and cultural ways of thinking
of many Africans are based on local laws of causality, i.e., every misfortune or
disease is the doing of witches or evil people. Thus it makes sense to feel paranoid,
i.e., an external agent is responsible, when one feels dysphoria. Since such external
spirits exist, it is also natural to hear them in the form of auditory hallucinations.
In memetic terms, brains infected with memes like witches and evil spirits are at a
higher risk of paranoid forms of psychosis under stress.
The impact of migration on the individual would be different between voluntary
migrants and involuntary ones. The voluntary immigrants who choose to migrate
would have had increased and regular contact with the new culture (memes) to
prepare for the migration, usually for economic or educational advancement, i.e.,
the infusion of the new memes would be gradual and in harmony with existing
memes because of the positive affect attached to the new memes. Further, the
voluntary immigrants are more likely to be either better educated, from a higher
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socioeconomic class, or novelty-seeking. Involuntary migration, as in refugees,
exiles, and slaves, on the other hand, is often sudden and associated with negative
affect. The exposure to the new culture and memes is unprepared and may result in a
“culture shock.” The loss of familiar culture (re-enforcing meme pool) and cultural
identity (influx of memes contrary to dominant memes in the brain) may cause an
acute grief reaction and has been called cultural bereavement (Bhugra and Becker,
2005; Eisenbruch, 1984).
Even among voluntary immigrants, the degree of acceptance by the new land
and the degree of discrepancy between expectations and achievements play a role
in the stress level and thence the risk of mental illness. High ethnic density (thus
re-enforcing meme pool for familiar memes) may have a protective effect. Bhugra
observed that there may be particular difficulties for individuals who migrate from
a collectivistic or socio-centric societies, and who themselves are socio-centric, into
individual or ego-centric societies (Bhugra and Becker, 2005). Obviously, there
would be memetic conflict between the dominant socio-centric memes in the brain
and the incoming ego-centric memes from the newly dominant meme pool.
While migration is generally stressful in the sense that there is an adaptational
demand to a new location and culture, it is not universally pathogenic. For some
groups of immigrants same or lower rate of psychiatric illness compared to indige-
nous people have been observed. For example, the East Asians (East Indians and
Pakistanis) in England had similar or lower rates of psychosis compared to native-
born English (Bhugra, 2000; Cochrane, 1977). This finding may be attributed to the
increased social support in these groups. Social support in these groups may be in
the form of frequent access to familiar meme pools from the original culture, and
gradual and, therefore, filtered introduction of new memes.
People who emigrate might also be more sturdy individuals who are unafraid of
change, and some such individuals may already harbor memes of the new culture
through active exposure to books, films, etc. (Cochrane, 1979).
So far, we discussed the interaction of resident memes with stress that increases
the risk of psychosis in some immigrants. What might be the role of genes in this
interaction?
One hypothesis is that persons with genes associated with a higher risk for
schizophrenia, i.e., eccentric, asocial, or unstable personalities, may be more pre-
disposed to emigrate. The fact that many psychotic symptoms seen in immigrants
do not seem to be “core symptoms” of schizophrenia but rather exaggerations of
memes of culture of origin, tend to cast doubt to the completeness of this explana-
tion. On the other hand, the so-called core symptoms, e.g., Schneiderian first-rank
symptoms such as auditory hallucinations, have been reported to vary depending on
culture (Ndetei, 1988). Therefore, given genetic vulnerability to psychosis, whether
in native land or new land, the memes denoting psychosis (or memes that tell you
how to be “crazy”) may proliferate under stressful conditions.
An intriguing finding in monkeys may be relevant. Male rhesus monkeys
leave their maternal group when they reach adolescence and roam in bands of
male-only groups. The serotonin transporter promoter polymorphism discussed in
Chapter 2 seems to determine the age of such departure. Those with the short
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alleles of 5-HTTLPR tended to leave the maternal troop earlier than those with
the long alleles. Those with the short alleles tend to be antisocial, aggressive,
and stress-sensitive, and also have lower levels of the serotonin metabolite, 5-
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA), in the cerebrospinal fluid (Trefilov et al., 2000).
Another study found that males with low central serotonin levels (and therefore low
5-HIAA) delay migration if they stayed until adolescence and show high levels of
violence and premature death, but those that survive achieve higher dominance rank
in the new troop (Howell et al., 2007). Perhaps, some humans who migrate might
also be genetically more prone to be adventurous, more stress-sensitive, but can be
more sturdy and achieve mastery if they survive the initial adjustment.
While there is clearly a higher rate of psychosis among immigrants, the rate
of depression and anxiety seems lower, especially among the Asian immigrants to
England. This might be due to resident memes that cause reluctance to express dys-
phoria or due to fatalistic memes or external locus or control that may be protective
(Bhugra, 2004). Existing memes may also influence immigrants to express dyspho-
ria as somatic symptoms rather than emotional suffering (Iwata et al., 2002; Ndetei,
1988). In other words, it is possible that there is a greater prevalence of memes
denoting or describing depressive states in the Western culture so that the immi-
grants’ expression of depressive memes may be smaller in comparison even in those
whose brains may be experiencing a depressive state. On the other hand, there may
be more memetic expression of somatic discomfort.
In summary, migration serves as an example of stress that may differentially
affect different individuals depending on several factors. One is clearly the genetic
composition of the individual and the early memetic environment that may have
predisposed the individual to be stress-sensitive or stress resistant. Another factor
is the memes that the individual has absorbed in early life, memes for expressing
dysphoria and memes for being “crazy,” and overarching memes that explain nature
and misfortune. Then the degree of conflict or congruence between the pre-existing
memes and the new meme pool of the new land would play a role, as well as the
degree of support or filtering available from the sub-meme pool in the immigrant
community playing a protective role.
4.2 Natural Disasters
Natural disasters such as tsunamis, floods, and hurricanes are well known to cause
depression and posttraumatic stress disorders. However, not everyone who has been
exposed to such disasters develops psychiatric syndromes. Kilpatrick and colleagues
recently reported an association among the serotonin transporter promoter gene
polymorphism (5-HTTLPR), the amount of exposure to disaster, and social sup-
port in the risk of development of depression and PTSD (Kilpatrick et al., 2007).
They studied 589 victims of the 2004 Florida hurricane through interviews and DNA
analysis to determine the extent of stressful exposure to the disaster, symptoms of
depression and PTSD, and social support. Social support during the 6 months before
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
References 33
the hurricanes was assessed, consisting of emotional (e.g., “someone available to
love you and make you feel wanted”), instrumental (e.g., “someone available to help
you if you were confined to bed”), and appraisal (e.g., “someone available to give
you good advice in a crisis”) aspects. In this study, the prevalence of post-hurricane
PTSD was 3.2% and the prevalence of post-hurricane major depression was 5.6%.
Low social support was associated with both PTSD and major depression and high
hurricane exposure was associated with PTSD but not major depression. The sero-
tonin transporter genotype by itself was not associated with the risk of PTSD or
depression, but the short allele of 5-HTTLPR in interaction with the degree of expo-
sure to stress and lack of social support increased the risk of depression and PTSD.
This genotype-by-environment effect was found in both males and females.
Though no specific memetic data are available, this study shows the power of
social support whose effect is largely memetic (someone to love you, make you feel
wanted, give good advice, etc.) that may attenuate or exacerbate the stress of natural
disasters.
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Part II
Evolution and Mental Health: Genes,
Memes, Culture, and the Individual
In Part I, we focused on mental illness and how genes, memes, stress, and culture
interact in the development of vulnerability or resistance to mental illness. In Part
II, we will examine in some detail how memes arose in the course of evolution,
how they are stored in the brain and externally, and how they are evolving. Here,
I redefine the meme as a brain code, which is replicated both inside and outside of
the brain. I then describe an integrated model of mental health and illness based on
gene x meme x environment interaction.
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We are composed of genes and memes. We inherit genes from our parents, and
by extension, our ancestors, human and pre-human. Memes are mostly information
from our cultural environment that are also inherited from our parents, and ances-
tors. Some memes are introduced into the environment from other cultures or de
novo by creative persons. Memes are dispersed in the environment around us, like
chemicals in a petri dish. Some of the memes forcibly penetrate our brains, others
are passively absorbed by our brains. This chapter discusses the broad concepts of
cultural inheritance and meme’s role in it.
5.1 Like Parent, Like Child
What do we inherit from our parents, other than money for those who are lucky?
Like father, like son is a commonly accepted idea as is the saying, “the baby has
her mother’s eyes and her father’s mouth.” Physical characteristics are obviously
passed on to the next generation, much of the time according to Mendelian genetics
as discussed in the next chapter. But what about behavior and psychology?
“Like father, like son” may mean both physical characteristics and behavior, e.g.,
if the father is a drunkard, then the son might also be one, too. Does this mean that
the father’s habit of driving while intoxicated will pass on to the child as well? What
are the cultural influences for such situations? Would the son be a drunkard and drive
while intoxicated if he became a Muslim and forswore drinking alcohol? Would he
want to or be able to stop drinking given his inherited genes from father?
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Even for inheritance of property, the rules are not as simple as might be supposed.
For example, males historically inherited larger portions of the parents’ property in
most Western and Eastern cultures, and they still do under Islamic law where the
sons get exactly double of what the daughters get. Just how the property was to be
divided among heirs was complex depending on culture, for example, the spouse
vs. the eldest son vs. the male and female siblings. The net result of just which
property (for example, the house and the car) will go to whom and how much of the
money would go to whom is, therefore, a result of a complex set of rules that are
specific to the situation and culture. And these rules are passed on from generation
to generation unless a cultural change occurs.
5.2 How Does Culture Affect Behavior?
It is generally believed that individuals learn to absorb and adapt to the cul-
tural norms through learning, mostly following the reward–punishment paradigm
of operant conditioning and the development of representations of cultural values
transmitted through parents – the superego.
Culture consists of not only values but also language, modes of dress, food, and
recreational activities. Such cultural items are passed on from generation to gener-
ation mainly through imitation and identification. For example, longer hairdo for
women, men wearing trousers and not skirts. Culture does change – either through
exposure to other cultures, or through mutation. Thus sushi became a popular food
in the West, and most Japanese wear Western attire. Through mutation, the Greek
era became eorthe in old English, then earth today (Merriam-Webster). Our ances-
tors walked and ran, then rode horses, and now we ride automobiles, ships, and
airplanes.
5.3 Memes and Cultural Change
How exactly does culture mutate? Certainly, horses did not mutate into automobiles,
and kimonos did not mutate into Western suits. In fact, horses and kimonos still
exist side by side with automobiles and Western suits. What changes is inside our
brains – what is accepted as desirable or preferable. What changes is the brain’s
reaction to the cultural information, e.g., kimono and Western suit, what has been
perceived. “Sushi is delicious, and eating it is good” defeats the once prevalent idea,
“Eating raw fish is disgusting.” Richard Dawkins coined the term Meme to denote
the elements of cultural information that is largely transmitted through imitation
(Dawkins, 1976, 2006). As discussed earlier, memes, like genes, are replicators,
i.e., they are copied by brains and transmitted to others by means of behavior and
language, and nowadays by electronic means and by computers, and reside in books,
DVDs, and computer hard drives as well as in human brains. See Chapter 8 for
further discussion on this topic.
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5.4 Memeplexes
Individuals are immersed in the cultural environment consisting of memes. The
culture medium in a petri dish affects the bacterial colony in it through the chem-
ical molecules that may be nutrients or poisons. In the same way, the memes
in our environment are introduced into our brains by absorption, diffusion, or
forced penetration as by incessant TV advertisements or roadside billboards. The
term, memeplex, denotes a complex of memes that tend to travel together and
co-evolve. A memeplex conjures up often multimodal images and sounds, for
example, national anthem, Mona Lisa, self, Christmas. Memeplexes have survival
advantage just as multicellular organisms do. Consider the strength of the memeplex
“National Anthem” to the meme “national.” National anthem is copied (sung) each
time there is a ceremony, including the opening of sporting events.
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This chapter is a review of basic genetics as a preliminary for discussion of
evolution.
6.1 Human Genes
In the previous chapter, we discussed how we inherit cultural heritage through
memes. In this chapter, we will examine how our physical characteristics are inher-
ited. We know now that genes are the basis of hereditary transmission and that
they are double-helix DNA strands consisting of four nucleotides, thymine, gua-
nine, cytosine, and adenine. All of the some 30,000 human genes have now been
mapped.
All our genes are in the 23 pairs of chromosomes that exist in every cell of our
body (except for sperms and eggs that have half the number of chromosomes).
The chromosomes consist of 22 pairs of autosomes and two sex chromosomes,
XX or XY. The reproductive cells, eggs and sperms, have only one half of the
chromosomes, and thus a sperm can have only one X or Y.
Genes have been discussed and argued over long before it was known that they
consisted of DNA. Hippocrates, for example, believed in hereditary material accu-
mulating throughout life and that strong impressions, i.e., acquired characteristics,
could be transmitted to the offspring. An illustration is his famous defense of a
woman who gave birth to a black child as, he believed, she was very impressed with
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an African man (Hippocrates). The idea that acquired characteristics are genetically
transmitted was considered to be a well-established fact until the nineteenth century.
6.2 Mendelian Genetics
Gregor Johann Mendel (1822–1884) was an Austrian Augustinian monk who is
considered to be the father of modern genetics (Bardoe, 2006). He studied the inher-
itance patterns of specific aspects of the pea plant and discovered that they followed
simple mathematical rules. Mendel came to the conclusion that the hereditary deter-
minants were particulate in nature called genes. He believed that each gene consists
of a pair of alleles that may be dominant or recessive. Only the dominant allele is
expressed as the phenotype unless there are two recessive alleles. Mendel published
his work in 1866 as Experiments on Plant Hybridization in the Proceedings of the
Natural History Society of Brünn. His discoveries, however, remained unrecognized
until after his death, when in 1900 they were “rediscovered” by Hugo De Vries, Carl
Correns, and Erich Von Tschermak.
Now it is known that a heterozygote carrying a copy of both a dominant and
a recessive trait may result in a phenotype that contains both traits to a greater or
lesser extent.
6.3 Genes and Mutation
The function of genes is to tell the cells of the offspring how to build a body that
resembles the parents. As an offspring requires the contribution of genes from two
parents, there is inevitably a recombination of the genes, and the offspring is never
an exact copy of the parent. In addition to such recombinations, mutations occur
that may change the offspring drastically.
The genetic code is the set of rules by which information encoded in genetic
material (DNA or RNA sequences) is translated into proteins. The code maps
trinucleotide sequences called codons that specify a single amino acid to be
produced.
Mutation is a change in the genetic code, which may occur simply by acci-
dent or by influences such as chemicals and radiation (see Figs. 6.1 and 6.2). Extra
nucleotides may be inserted into a DNA sequence (Insertion) or segments of DNA
may be deleted. There may be a frame shift, i.e., the sequence of the codon may
be altered by insertion or deletion so that the resulting protein, if it exists, would
be incorrect. Substitution is a mutation in which there is a substitution of one base
for another, e.g., A for G, CTGGAG for CTGGGG. Substitution may result in a
codon that produces a different amino acid resulting in a small change in the pro-
tein produced. An example is the sickle cell anemia caused by a substitution in
the beta hemoglobin gene that alters a single amino acid (valine for glutamic acid)
resulting in Hemoglobin S. Substitution may change a codon that encodes the same
amino acid, resulting in no change in the protein produced (silent or synonymous
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Fig. 6.1 Human chromosomes in Down’s syndrome, which results from trisomy of chromosome
21. (Figure from http://ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/publicat/primer/fig6.html)
mutation). At times, an amino acid-coding codon may change to a single “stop”
codon, causing an incomplete protein which may not function correctly.
A single nucleotide polymorphism, or SNP (pronounced snip), is a DNA
sequence variation occurring when a single nucleotide (A, T, C, or G) in the genome
differs between members of a species or between paired chromosomes in an individ-
ual. For example, two DNA fragments from different individuals, AAGCCTA and
AAGCTTA, contain a difference in a single nucleotide, i.e., there are two alleles,
C and T, for this gene. Almost all common SNPs have two alleles. SNPs may occur
within coding sequences of genes, noncoding regions of genes, or between genes.
Missence mutation refers to a substitution of a single nucleotide that results in
the production of a different amino acid and, therefore, a different protein (or in
some cases, no protein). When an amino acid is replaced by another of very sim-
ilar chemical properties, the protein may still function normally (neutral or quiet
mutation). Some amino acids may be encoded by more than one codon (degenerate
coding), in which case a mutation in one codon would not result in any change in the
protein, which would be a synonymous mutation. Some missence mutations cause
serious diseases, e.g., epidermolysis bullosa, sickle cell disease, and some forms of
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.
An illustration of Mendelian genetic transmission of a human disease caused by
a single nucleotide mutation is sickle cell anemia. Sickle cell anemia is caused by a
mutation in the beta hemoglobin gene (HBB) located on the short arm of chromo-
some 11. The 17th nucleotide of this gene is changed from codon GAG that codes
for glutamic acid to GTG, which codes for valine, so the amino acid in position 6 is
incorrectly substituted (see Fig. 6.3).
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Fig. 6.2 Gene mutations
This mutation results in production of abnormal Hemoglobin S, which tends
to stick together and form long, rigid molecules. The rigid HbS molecules bend
red blood cells into a sickle (crescent) shape. These abnormal cells die prema-
turely, which may lead to anemia. The sickle-shaped cells can also occlude small
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Fig. 6.3 Chromosome 11
and HBB. (From
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/gene=hbb)
Fig. 6.4 Genetics of sickle
cell disease
blood vessels, causing pain and tissue damage (http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/gene=hbb)
(Figs. 6.4 and 6.5).
Sickle cell anemia is a Mendelian autosomal recessive disease, and one quarter
of the offsprings of carrier parents are expected to be affected. Sickle cell trait is
a heterozygous form of this illness with variable severity of symptomatology. The
sickle cell gene is quite common in sub-Saharan Africa where malaria is prevalent
(Makani et al., 2007). This is no wonder as sickle cells are resistant to malarial
infection, and thus confers protection against it (Timmann et al., 2007).
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Fig. 6.5 Sickle cells
6.4 Sex-Linked Genes
The genes that reside in the sex chromosomes, X and Y, not only cause sexual
differentiation but also may be associated with disease. The genes in the Y chromo-
somes can only be manifested in males – only a few genes in the Y chromosomes
have been identified, one of them the testis-determining factor that causes the male
phenotype to develop. Even one X-linked recessive trait will be expressed in a
male (lacking another X chromosome that might carry the dominant trait) but
in a female only if she carries another X chromosome with the same recessive
trait.
An example of sex-linked condition is red-green color blindness, which is an
X-linked recessive trait. Thus, the children of a color-blind father (X′Y) and a carrier
mother (X′X) would result in X′X′, X′X, YX′, and YX, so that 50% of the male
children and 50% of the female children would be color blind. On the other hand,
if the father is not color blind (XY) and mother is a carrier (X′X), then the children
would be XX′, XX, YX′, and YX, i.e., 50% of the male children and no female
children would be phenotypically color blind (Wiggs, 2000).
If the father is color blind (X′Y) and mother is not a carrier (XX), then none of
the sons would be color blind, while 50% of the daughters would be carriers.
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6.5 Polygenic Inheritance
Many genetic traits and conditions such as size, intelligence, and behavioral dispo-
sitions in humans and animals are determined by the interaction of many different
genes as well as with environment as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. One gene makes
one protein but the effects of the proteins usually interact. The term, epistasis, is used
to denote the interference of one gene in the expression of another.
There are many genes that have more than two alleles, such as the ABO blood
type in humans. Multiple alleles result from different mutations of the same gene.
Human ABO blood types are determined by alleles, A, B, and O. Both A and B
alleles are codominant over O. Thus, AA and AO types produce A antigen, BB and
BO produce B antigen, AB produces both A and B antigens, and OO type produces
neither antigen.
Polygenic traits are usually expressed as a gradation of small differences
(continuous variation) rather than discrete characteristics as in simple Mendelian
inheritance. Such variations usually result in a bell-shaped curve, as in height,
weight, skin color, etc. Traits showing continuous variation may be controlled by
two or more separate gene pairs. The inheritance of each gene in such polygenic
inheritance does follow Mendelian rules (Farabee, 2001).
Fig. 6.6 Structure of a gene
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6.6 How Do Genes Work?
Genes are segments of the chromosome that contain strands of DNA that make
messenger RNAs (ribonucleic acid, mRNA). Genes are associated with a promoter,
the DNA region that is usually upstream to the coding sequence. The promoter binds
and directs RNA polymerase (RNAP, RNApol) to the correct transcriptional start
site and thus permits the initiation of transcription. Through this process, a copy of
RNA complementary to the DNA template is produced.
Of particular interest is polymorphism of gene promoters such as the serotonin
transporter promoter gene (5-HTTLPR) mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2.
RNA polymerase can also elongate the mRNA chain by adding nucleotides to
it. The mRNA leaves the nucleus of the cell and becomes ribosomal RNA (mRNA)
that makes a protein using the amino acids presented to it by the transport RNA
(tRNA). The only function of genes is to make proteins.
However, not all the DNAs that make up the chromosome are genes. There are
large portions of the DNA that do not code for proteins, and even in a gene, there are
Fig. 6.7 DNA and RNA. (This image is in the public domain because it contains materials that
originally came from the National Institutes of Health)
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segments that do not make proteins. That segment of the gene that is expressed to
make proteins is called an exon, and the silent portion is called an intron (Fig. 6.6).
The DNA that does not produce proteins has been called collectively “junk DNA.”
Even when a DNA has made an RNA, some portions of the RNA may not get
translated into protein (untranslated RNA, UTR) (Fig. 6.7).
It turns out that such “junk DNA” and UTR are not junk at all, but seem to have
important functions in regulating the genes and, even at times, reverse engineering
the genes (Andolfatto, 2005; Lolle et al., 2005).
Each cell has the entire DNA code, but cells in different tissues are differ-
ent and serve different functions, i.e., only certain genes are activated and others
are not. What activates the specific genes to make specific cells? It seems the
DNA produces cell type-specific noncoding RNA that attracts molecules called
epigenetic activators, which, in turn, bind to DNA elements in the target gene, acti-
vating or silencing it (Beisel et al., 2002; Brene et al., 2000; Sanchez-Elsner et al.,
2006).
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7.1 In the Beginning . . .
In the beginning, there was the Big Bang. Then the universe inflated, after which
there was only hot plasma of quarks and gluons and other relativistic particles.
Particle and antiparticle pairs were continuously formed and destroyed in extreme
heat. A small excess of quarks and leptons over antiquarks and antileptons resulted
in the predominance of matter over antimatter. At about 10–6 s, quarks and glu-
ons combined to form baryons such as protons and neutrons. As the temperature
dropped with continuing expansion of universe, no new proton–antiproton or
neutron–antineutron pairs could be formed, and a mass annihilation of particle and
antiparticle occurred (Kolb and Turner, 1990). In 3 min, the universe was filled with
light (photons), and with continued cooling of the universe in the span of 380,000
years, protons became hydrogen by acquiring an electron, photons were decoupled
from matter to fly away eventually becoming the microwave background of today.
Aggregates of molecules of hydrogen and helium became densely packed with grav-
ity, finally igniting nuclear fusion, forming stars. In about a billion years after the
Big Bang, quasars and galaxies began to form. Large populations of stars were born,
aged, and died, in spectacular explosions as supernovae, or shrinking into a black
hole. Heavier elements including carbon and metals were created in the nuclear
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furnace of stars and then scattered in space when the stars went supernova. From
the debris of exploded stars, the cosmic dust, new stars were born and new galaxies
were formed, continuing the process of cosmic evolution (Bertschinger, 1998).
According to Smolin, black holes may produce other universes, just as our uni-
verse seems to have started from a black hole through the Big Bang (Smolin, 1999).
In this multiverse theory, there would be many universes, some of which may be
adapted to multiply and eventually to produce life, and others would simply shrink
back into a black hole and give rise to another universe.
In our universe, by around 9 billion years, or 4,500 million years ago (MA), a
small, insignificant planet was formed of cosmic dust in the gravitational system of a
medium-sized star called the sun in an outer spiral of the milky way galaxy, an ordi-
nary galaxy among billions (Wikipedia, 2008; Wright, 2004). Early earth was very
hot and the atmosphere was composed of hydrogen and helium, much of which flew
away escaping earth’s gravity. Volcanic activity spewed out gasses that formed the
bulk of atmosphere, including H2O, CO2, SO2, CO, S2, Cl2, N2, H2, NH3 (ammo-
nia), and CH4 (methane). As the earth cooled in the Archean period some 3,800
million years ago (MA) to 2,500 MA, H2O congealed into water; oceans, continen-
tal plates, and rocks were formed. Some of the H2O on the surface of the planet was
broken up by ultraviolet rays to form oxygen in the atmosphere.
The atmosphere of the primitive earth was a strongly reducing one, in which
glycine was synthesized from formaldehyde and hydrogen cyanide. Adenine was
synthesized through hydrogen cyanide polymerization. Various nucleotides may
have been formed catalyzed by metals and clay in various parts of the earth includ-
ing volcanic vents, and some might have also been formed outside earth but arrived
in meteorites and comets. So there were places on earth teeming with molecules
ready for the next phase of earth’s evolution – life (Fig. 7.1).
Perhaps, on a dark and stormy night about 3.5 billion years ago, in the pools
of hot soup consisting of water, ammonia, and other organic molecules that were
all colliding with each other, copies of some molecules were formed in the mix.
Such molecules may have been lowly clay or simple linear polymers (Cairns-Smith,
1982). Some such molecules, particularly those consisting of RNA, found them-
selves inside spontaneously formed vesicles whose walls consisted of phospholipids
(Hanczyc and Szostak, 2004). Such vesicles may spontaneously bud and divide, and
those replicating molecules that were kept together in such vesicles and divided had
a survival advantage, eventually resulting in stable cells (Fig. 7.2). The RNA in
some such vesicles may have attracted the right chemicals to build a cell wall. Some
RNA probably formed DNA, a reverse process of modern RNA being copied from
DNA. Even a single DNA-containing replicating cell so formed could be the origin
of all cells as it gave rise to more cells, most of them identical, but some not, due
to copying errors. Copying errors gave rise to variation in the offspring cells that in
turn had variation.
Some such cells happened to incorporate chemicals within the cell that were able
to capture the photons to store energy – photosynthesis by cyanobacteria, which
contributed to a change in the composition of the earth’s environment by adding
more oxygen to it.
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Fig. 7.1 Steps in possible prebiotic syntheses of adenine from HCN. (a) The formation of the
HCN tetrane. (b) The conversion of HCN tetramer to AICN. (c) The formation of purines from
AICN or from its hydrolysis product 4-amino-imidazole-5-carboxamide (III). From (Orgel, 2004)
Fig. 7.2 Giant phospholipid vesicles were labeled with two different domain-specific dyes.
A fission sequence triggered by heating the vesicles was captured by two-photon microscopy.
(From Baumgart et al., 2003, reproduced with permission from Nature)
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7.2 In a Changing, Hostile World
As we have seen, the atmosphere of early earth was frankly toxic, but perhaps such
a hot atmosphere bombarded by meteorites and infused with gasses and debris from
constant volcanic activity might have produced just the kind of mixing and shaking
and turmoil to produce the beginnings of life. But life must have been hard for the
self-replicating cells, and above all unpredictable. Many replicating molecules and
protocells must have been formed, had a brief existence, and then perished in the
changing, toxic environment. This constant churning of emergence and destruction
of replicating entities resulted in the survival of those that could adapt to the con-
stantly changing environment. Thus arose an algorithm that is evolution (Dennett,
1995), i.e., replicate with errors (variation), and those that can adapt (survive and
replicate) in a changed environment will prevail. Evolution is based on survival of
the most stable, in which survival of the fittest is a special case (Dawkins, 1976)
(See Tables 7.1 and 7.2).
As Dennet states, algorithms are blind – there is no meaning or direction, just a
procedure – in this case, the procedure by which variants that can best replicate in
changed environment will survive and replicate again. At this point, it is important
to recognize that what is survived is not the cell itself, but the replicators, the infor-
mation that makes the cell the way it is, i.e., the gene. When we speak of variation,
we are really referring to variations in the genetic information. DNA arose from
RNA; cells from protocells. Multicellular organisms arose through this algorithm
as replication with variation. Replication is more efficient when cells cooperate and
effectuate a division of labor – obtaining and storing energy on one hand and replica-
tion on the other. Ancient bacteria invaded some cell lines, became incorporated into
the cells, and became mitochondria with their own DNA. When such cells divided,
they carried the genes (information) for both the original cell (in the nucleus) and
the mitochondria (in the cytoplasm where mitochondria reside). Cells and bodies are
survival machines for the genes, Dawkins calls evolution a means of perpetuating
the selfish gene (Dawkins, 1976). This blind procedure, evolution, may lead to many
different directions, some fertile, others blind alleys. This procedure, over eons of
time, can produce exquisite intricacies in structure as well as complexities that are,
in retrospect, functional but stupid, such as the human eye. But we are getting ahead
of our story.
7.3 The Selfish Gene
Richard Dawkins clarified the fundamental principle of inheritance of living things
in his 1976 landmark book, The Selfish Gene. Life as we know it began with naked
RNAs that obtained clothes (cell walls), then DNAs arose with instructions for
building cells that multiplied. Dawkins saw that all living things are vehicles for
strands of DNA with instructions to preserve themselves through the copying pro-
cess called reproduction. We are all vehicles of genes, and the genes’ only interest
is their own survival and replication.
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It should be clearly stated here that the teleologic figure of speech commonly
adopted in discussions of evolution is just that – figure of speech for convenience.
Genes do not have any “desire” to replicate or “intention” to survive. It is just that
in the course of time, natural laws have it that replicating genes and organisms (or
packets of tissue containing genes) that happen to be sturdy (better containers) tend
to survive and multiply with the result that “genes that build better vehicles survive
and multiply.”
For genes to be successful, they require three characteristics: longevity, fecundity,
and copying fidelity. In other words, the organism (vehicle) must live long enough
to reproduce, and reproduce in large quantities, and the copies must resemble the
original.
A severe constraint is placed on the replicating genes by the environment. The
environment surrounding the genes (and the vehicles for them, the organisms) con-
sists of other genes and their vehicles, nutrients, toxins, and other hazards. When
the resources (e.g., food) are scarce, which was the state of affairs much of the time,
then there is naturally competition among the organisms to obtain the resources for
survival. From the selfish gene’s point of view, then, all other genes that are not like
themselves are rivals.
Another resource that is an object of severe competition is a mate for reproduc-
tion, as without it, the genes would perish. Organisms better built to find a mate will
make more of their own.
From the selfish gene’s point of view, altruism is not a problem at all. When
particular genes are widely distributed in a group of organisms (vehicles), the act
of one vehicle signaling others of danger, even if it risks sacrifice of that particular
individual, results in the preservation of large numbers of others that contain the
same selfish genes (Fig. 7.3).
Fig. 7.3 A phylogenetic tree of living things, based on RNA data and proposed by Carl Woese,
showing the separation of bacteria, archaea, and eukaryotes. Trees constructed with other genes are
generally similar, although they may place some early-branching groups very differently, thanks to
long-branch attraction. The exact relationships of the three domains are still being debated, as is
the position of the root of the tree. It has also been suggested that due to lateral gene transfer, a tree
may not be the best representation of the genetic relationships of all organisms. For instance some
genetic evidence suggests that eukaryotes evolved from the union of some bacteria and archaea
(one becoming the nucleus and the other the main cell). [Image from Wikimedia, public domain]
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7.4 Wonderful Random Errors
Fidelity of copying, a requisite of successful genes, results in the same gene with the
same instructions for building the organism. If this fidelity were perfect, then there
would be only single-celled organisms inhabiting the earth!
Fortunately for us, nature provided errors for gene replication. Errors in copying
resulted in variation and diversity. These errors arose from several factors: pure
random statistical errors that occur in any copying process, due to bombardment by
waves and particles such as photons, electromagnetic, thermal, and cosmic rays, and
other molecules and atoms. Many organisms thus formed by inexact copying were
incompatible with life or replication, but some survived, perhaps by dumb luck. And
then, the environment changed!
As we know, the earth’s crust and atmosphere changed rather drastically over the
eons of earth’s existence (see Table 7.1). Cells that emerged and replicated in the
Archean eon could hardly survive in the oxygen-rich atmosphere of the Proterozoic
eon. But the few cells with the errors in DNA so that they could survive in the toxic
oxygen atmosphere did survive, and some formed aggregates (e.g., green algae) that
resulted in better protection and efficiency in metabolism. Thanks to the random
errors, there was variation in the offspring, and the process of evolution of life had
begun.
Evolution is, then, the survival of the genes through mutation that are adapting
to the demands of changing environment. See Tables 7.1 and 7.2 for an overview of
evolution through time on planet earth.
7.5 Wonderful Invention of Sex
A wonderful but puzzling invention relatively early in the course of evolution is sex.
From a purely multiplication point of view, sexual reproduction is inefficient, i.e.,
takes up more energy, slow, and yields less numbers of offsprings compared to asex-
ual reproduction. For example, half of the population (males) does not reproduce
directly. Then, why is sex?
The most primitive organisms known to undergo meiosis and to reproduce sexu-
ally are protists, the primitive unicellular eukaryotes that arose early in Proterozoic
eon (1800 MA). Protists still exist, including those that cause malaria. Perhaps sex
originated when some parasites exchanged their genes with the host for transmission
and propagation with the host’s offspring (Hickey, 1982).
In prokaryotes such as bacteria and archaea that lack a nucleus, genes are typ-
ically stored in a single large, circular chromosome, sometimes supplemented by
additional small circles of DNA called plasmids, which usually consist of only a few
genes. Plasmids are easily transferable between individuals. For example, the plas-
mids may contain genes that encode for antibiotic resistance. They can be passed
between individual cells, even those of different species, via horizontal or lateral
gene transfer. Some organisms may have ingested another whose genes may have
been incorporated into the host genome.
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What is the advantage of such lateral gene transfer? Such newly incorporated
genes may have provided survival advantage, i.e., sturdiness, resistance to other par-
asites. Sex seems to have been optional for most protists with asexual reproduction
as needed.
Sex may have arisen as a form of vaccination. Eukaryan fusion sex may have
arisen from prokaryan unilateral sex-as-infection (Sterrer, 2002). In prokaryotes,
the single circular chromosome is haploid. Their “sex” is unilateral, a donor such
as plasmids and bacteriophages penetrates the organism and becomes a genetic
symbiont (Snyder and Champness, 1997). It has been reported that in some gram
positive bacteria, those lacking a certain plasmid secrete pheromone-like chemi-
cals that attract donors that contain the plasmid and induce conjugation (Dunny
et al., 1995). The relationship between the bacteria and their genetic symbionts
ranges from antagonistic to mutualistic. Such a symbiont may kill its bacte-
rial host and infect new bacteria laterally, or become integrated into the host’s
chromosome and be passed on vertically by the replicating host while provid-
ing immunity to superinfection by another symbiont of the same type (Sterrer,
2002).
In fact, the emergence of eukaryotes may be due to an infection of bacteria by
archae, the prokaryote single cell organism whose genome resembles that of the
cellular nucleus. Archae survives even in the present in extreme environments (such
as in geysers above 100◦C) like those of ancient times (Lopez-Garcia and Moreira,
2006). Alternate theories concerning the origin of cell nucleus include viral infec-
tion theory, and exomembrane theory postulates that the nucleus developed when
the intracellular elements developed a second membrane enclosing it (de Roos,
2006).
When a symbiont genome became integrated with the host genome in the
nucleus, “safe sex” emerged as “reciprocal vaccination.” If a mating resulted in
additive resistance, then there would have been selective advantage to such diploid
heterozygotes (Sterrer, 2002).
With the emergence of multicellular eukaryotic organisms, sex served as recipro-
cal vaccination of two conspecific genomes. Meiosis and recombination developed
as a mechanism of keeping the symbionts in check by breaking them up into frag-
ments and preventing their assembly into large pieces that may return to their
original virulence. In order to benefit from the vaccination, the offsprings had to
go through the “bottleneck” of having single-celled parents (Maynard Smith and
Szathmary, 1995).
The “safe sex” between two complete genomes in eukaryotes marks the distinc-
tion between self, mate, and foreign; self being an identical genome. “Mates” are
nonidentical but compatible genomes that carry complementary resistance genes,
considered to be the origin of mate selection for heterozygosity (Reusch et al.,
2001).
Once sex has been invented, there are other reasons why sex is maintained in spite
of its costs. One is that sex provides the means for efficient removal of deleterious
genes through meiosis and recombination. Diploid organisms can repair a mutated
section of the DNA through homologous recombination as there are two copies of
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the gene in the cell and one copy is presumably not damaged. Sex also mixes up
genes and facilitates the creation and propagation of genes for advantageous traits.
The “Red Queen” hypothesis (Bell, 1988) proposes that sex creates unique geno-
types that may be better adapted to changing environment, i.e., like the red queen in
Through the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll, you have to keep on running (adapt-
ing) to remain in the same place (maintain the organism’s niche vis-a-vis coevolving
organisms such as parasites in the changing environment).
Infection of organisms by others resulting in the infusion and incorporation of
new information in the form of genetic instructions seems to have given rise to the
wonderful complexity of sex, whose function is to constantly mix up and create new
information. This process led to the evolution of most extant living things including
ourselves.
7.6 Darwin and Natural Selection
Charles Darwin (1809–1882) proposed the theory of evolution based on careful
observation of geologic and biologic evidence in his book, The Origin of Species
(1859).1 Darwin was an English naturalist who first studied medicine at Edinburgh
University, then theology at Cambridge.
The captain of the expedition ship, HMS Beagle, committed suicide during her
first voyage and Captain Robert FitzRoy took over. For the second voyage, FitzRoy
decided he needed a “gentleman companion” and hired young Darwin in that capac-
ity. The second voyage of HMS Beagle lasted 5 years though originally planned for
two and carried out detailed surveys sailing across the Atlantic Ocean and around
the coasts of southern South America, Tahiti, and Australia, circumnavigating the
earth. Darwin collected and studied fossils, plants, and animals during the voyage
that formed the basis of his theory of evolution and natural selection. Darwin pub-
lished his journal written during the voyage, The Voyage of the Beagle, which earned
him a name as a naturalist.
In The Origin of Species, he proposed on the basis of his careful observations and
other scientific evidences that all species of life evolved over time from common
ancestors through the process of natural selection. Alfred Russel Wallace, a natu-
ralist working in Borneo, had similar ideas and communicated them with Darwin,
which resulted in a joint publication of Wallace’s paper and an abstract of Darwin’s
forthcoming book. It was Darwin’s book, however, that eventually revolutionized
science and formed the foundation of biology by providing a unifying principle.
Darwin explored human evolution and sexual selection in The Descent of Man, and
Selection In Relation to Sex (Darwin, 2002–2008; van Wyhe, 2008).
1 The original 1859 full book title was On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or
the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, which was changed to The Origin of
Species in the 1872 edition.
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
7.6 Darwin and Natural Selection 59
Natural selection is the mechanism Darwin proposed in 1859 through which there
was a gradual change in the phenotype of some members of the species that was bet-
ter adapted to a changing environment. Eventually, the gradual change was enough
that interbreeding between the changed and unchanged phenotype did not occur, and
thus a new species would emerge. Darwin described natural selection as an analogy
to artificial selection, in which humans systematically and selectively breed animals
with traits desirable to humans until such traits became defining traits of the brood.
At the time of Darwin’s writing, there was no general theory of inheritance and
genetics. It was not until the twentieth century that the works of Gregor Mendel,
who was a contemporary of Darwin but whose works lay in obscurity, would be
rediscovered (1900 by Hugo de Vries and Carl Correns), and molecular genetics
would emerge with the discovery of DNA as genes (1943 by Oswald Avery) and
the structure of DNA as double helix (1953 by James Watson and Francis Crick).
The discovery and elucidation of the DNA-based molecular mechanisms of genetic
inheritance gave rise to modern evolutionary theory. See Figures 7.5 and 7.6.
Darwin’s illustrations of beak variation in the finches of the Galápagos Islands
hold 13 closely related species that differ most markedly in the shape of their beaks.
The beak of each species is suited to its preferred food, suggesting that beak shapes
evolved by natural selection (Fig. 7.4).
Fitness is a central concept of natural selection. Though Darwin’s term, survival
of the fittest, implies individual survival, natural selection is in fact based on repro-
ductive success. The phenotypes that lead to most number of offsprings will prevail.
In addition to natural selection, Darwin described sexual selection as a means of
gradual accentuation of traits that do not have survival advantage, for example, pea-
cock’s tail. Sexual selection is based on advantages in competing for a mate for
reproduction.
Fig. 7.4 Darwin’s Finches.
Journal of researches into the
natural history and geology of
the countries visited during
the voyage of HMS Beagle
round the world, under the
command of Captain Fitz
Roy, R.N. 2nd edition. From
Darwin’s 1845 book, “Voyage
of the Beagle” this image is in
the public domain because its
copyright has expired in those
countries with a copyright
term of life of the author plus
100 years or less [from
Wikimedia]
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Fig. 7.5 An overview of the
structure of DNA
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Fig. 7.6 Chemical structure of DNA. The backbone of the DNA strand is made from alternat-
ing phosphate and sugar residues. The sugars are joined together by phosphate groups that form
phosphodiester bonds between the third and fifth carbon atoms of adjacent sugar rings. These
asymmetric bonds mean a strand of DNA has a direction. In a double helix the direction of the
nucleotides in one strand is opposite to their direction in the other strand. The asymmetric ends of
DNA strands are referred to as the 5′ (five prime) and 3′ (three prime) ends. One of the major dif-
ferences between DNA and RNA is the sugar, with 2-deoxyribose being replaced by the alternative
pentose sugar ribose in RNA. The DNA double helix is stabilized by hydrogen bonds between the
bases attached to the two strands. The four bases found in DNA are adenine (A), cytosine (C), gua-
nine (G), and thymine (T). These bases are classified into two types; adenine and guanine are fused
five- and six-membered heterocyclic compounds called purines, while cytosine and thymine are
six-membered rings called pyrimidines. A fifth pyrimidine base, called uracil (U), usually takes
the place of thymine in RNA and differs from thymine by lacking a methyl group on its ring.
Uracil is not usually found in DNA, occurring only as a breakdown product of cytosine [From
Wikipedia]. Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms
of the “GNU Free Documentation License,” Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free
Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts.
A copy of the license is included in the section entitled “GNU Free Documentation License” [From
Wikimedia]
George C. Williams first explicitly advocated the gene-centric view of evolution
in his 1966 book Adaptation and Natural Selection. He proposed an evolutionary
concept of gene in which natural selection favored some genes over others.
Richard Dawkins argued in The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976) and The Extended
Phenotype (Dawkins, 1982) that the gene is the only replicator in living systems.
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He argued that only genes transmit their structure largely intact and are potentially
immortal through the copying process. Therefore, genes are the units of selection.
Dawkins redefines the word “gene” to mean “an inheritable unit” instead of the
generally accepted definition of “a section of DNA coding for a particular pro-
tein.” Dawkins describes the idea of gene-centric selection in River Out of Eden
by describing life as a river of compatible genes flowing through geological time.
Scoop up a pail of genes from the river of genes, and we have an organism serving
as temporary survival machines for the genes. A river of genes may fork into two
or more branches representing noninterbreeding species as a result of geographical
separation.
In gene-centric view of evolution, a gene need not have a function in the con-
struction of the phenotype as long as the organism will keep on reproducing the
vessels for the gene. The so-called junk DNA may be an example. “Junk” DNA
does not contain instructions for protein coding, but they may be critically impor-
tant to an organism’s evolutionary survival by affecting others that do or by affecting
the stability of the chromosome itself. In one study with the fruit fly (Drosophila
melanogaster), the “junk DNA” regions, which account for about 80% of the fly’s
total genome, were found to be evolving more slowly than expected due to natural
selection pressures on the nonprotein-coding DNA to remain the same over time.
The “junk” regions also exhibit an unusually large amount of functional genetic
divergence between different species of Drosophila. This implies that, like evolu-
tionary changes to proteins, changes to these “junk” parts of the genome also play
an important role in the evolution of new species. The largest differences between
major species groups including fruit flies, reptiles, and mammals seem to be the
amount of “junk” DNA rather than the number of genes (Andolfatto, 2005).
7.7 Somatic Evolution
We have seen that our bodies may be conceptualized as temporary containers for
genes that attain immortality through replication. To be precise, however, it is the
cells in our bodies that contain the genes. It is natural, then, to expect evolutionary
processes occurring at the cellular level. Indeed, such somatic evolution plays an
important role in both disease and health.
Somatic evolution of neurons is an extremely important topic for our purposes
and will be discussed in Chapter 8.
Somatic evolution has been extensively studied in cancer. Some cells undergo
mutation that increases cell growth and others may have already mutated oncogenes
in them. For example, the human colonic epithelium is renewed every 3–5 days. For
such a high rate of turnover, there are large numbers of cells undergoing mitoses and,
therefore, large number of mutations. Cancers develop through genomic instability,
which generates diversity, from which clonal evolution may occur. In colorectal
cancers, three identifiable processes involved in generating diversity at the genetic
or epigenetic level have been reported (Boland and Goel, 2005). Colorectal cancers
may have chromosomal instability (CIN), microsatellite instability (MSI), or the
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CpG island methylator phenotype (CIMP). Each of these processes is reported to
be associated with a unique mutational or epigenetic “signature” identifiable in the
tumor cells.
After acquiring somatic mutations for cell growth, some of the cancer cells may
evolve to escape from the control of the microenvironment that is designed to keep
them in place through various messenger systems. Not all mutated cells can do this,
some may undergo enhanced proliferation without escaping environmental control.
For example, the prevalence of small thyroid tumors in postmortem examination
of people between the ages of 50–70 was 36%, while the incidence of clinically
apparent thyroid cancer in age-matched population was 0.1% (Harach et al., 1985).
Most cancer cells are aneuploid (abnormal number of chromosomes), which is
often manifested by the gain or loss of a whole of parts of chromosomes. Tumor
cells often have excess chromosomes, often 60–90 per cell. There may be other
chromosomal abnormalities such as deletions, inversions, duplications, and translo-
cations. Such chromosomal abnormalities often result in loss of heterozygosity of
particular genes. In an average tumor, about 25–30% of the normal alleles are lost,
in some cases as high as 75% (Lengauer et al., 1998). The loss of these alleles,
especially those of tumor suppressor and cell–cell adhesion control genes, may ben-
efit the rapidly replicating clonal populations of tumor cells as they allow cells to
rapidly adapt to the changing microenvironment (Smalley et al., 2005).
The effects of environmental evolutionary pressure on tumor cells have been
demonstrated in experimental models. The sequential passage of melanoma cells
through a reconstituted basement membrane (which mimics invasion into the dermal
microenvironment) or in serum-free media selects for clones that are tenfold more
invasive, metastatic and grow more rapidly in both serum-free and growth factor-
depleted media (Kath et al., 1991). The selected invasive melanoma cells required
continuous evolutionary pressure to maintain their phenotype and reverted to the
parental phenotype when the environmental stimuli were removed. Although the
effects of environmental selection pressure pushed the parent cells toward a more
aggressive phenotype, it seems that these changes were not fixed.
It appears that the tumor cell clones that manage to escape their local environ-
ment have lost strong cell to cell contact with their neighbors and are no longer
dependent on exogenous environmental cues to regulate their behavior (Smalley
et al., 2005). In most cancers, a critical first step in this local escape seems to be a
downregulation of E-cadherin expression or function. In melanoma, the first step in
the transformation is the escape from keratinocyte control. As keratinocytes regu-
late melanocyte growth very tightly, loss of keratinocyte–melanocyte interaction at
an early stage permits the earliest rounds of clonal expansion. E-cadherin inactiva-
tion or loss is required for escape of the earliest tumor cells from the primary focus
(Hirohashi, 1998). Melanoma cells also undergo a cadherin switch and upregulate
expression of N-cadherin (Hsu et al., 1996). There is evidence that the upregulation
of N-cadherin rather than loss of E-cadherin is more important for the invasive and
metastatic behavior of cancer cells. Upregulation of N-cadherin results in a num-
ber of survival advantages, such as reducing the rate of apoptosis, and less strong
cell–cell adhesion thereby permitting greater mobility.
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Immunocytes that are important in resistance to invading organisms through the
production of antibodies have been demonstrated to evolve through clonal selec-
tion. The enormous diversity in antibody-producing cells is achieved by a variety of
mechanisms including somatic recombination and mutation (Edelman, 1994).
7.8 Universal Darwinism
The process of evolution by natural selection is not unique to living things, though
Darwin first proposed it as an explanation of how species evolved from common
ancestors over time. To the extent that environment changes and entities (organic or
nonorganic) arise and disintegrate, natural selection takes place so that entities that
are better adapted to the changing environment will tend to become more numer-
ous. This principle has been applied to quantum physics to explain the emergence
of classical reality from quantum reality (Ollivier et al., 2004; Zurek, 2007). In
quantum wave function, decoherence resulting from interference from outside (e.g.,
observation) gives rise to existence of individual particles, the location of which is
statistical, i.e., many possible realities. Among all such possible realities, only those
that can interact with the environment and decohere (i.e., become real) can produce
information progeny.
Darwinian natural selection has been proposed as the mechanism by which the
current universe evolved from many possible universes that evolved from a series
of bouncing black holes that gave rise to daughter universes (Smolin, 1999, 2004,
2006). Smolin states that the physical processes that strongly influence the number
of black holes produced are nucleosynthesis, galaxy formation, star formation, stel-
lar dynamics, supernova explosions, and the formation and stability of neutron stars.
Through the process of such cosmic evolution, our universe may have developed
complexity enough to produce civilizations like ours.
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8.1 Evolution of Complex Organisms
In the course of evolution, complex organisms arose as effective survival machines
for genes. This is not to say that complex organisms replaced simple ones; rather the
building of complex structures turned out to be another successful path of survival.
Thus humans and bacteria coexist and are both successful, so far.
Once cells aggregated and formed cooperating complex structures, the genes for
the structures coevolved to meet the demands of changing environment. Thus the
structures changed with time, attaining greater complexity. The evolution of such
complex organs as the mammalian eye is thus a result of eons of gradual modifi-
cations of primitive light-sensitive collection of cells – and it turns out the eye is
a result of design compromises because it started out from a transparent organism
and thus the retina being inside out was not a problem in the beginning, but now is!
(Nesse and Williams, 1994). The marvels of evolution have been achieved through
laborious work of cranes rather than miraculous “sky hooks” (Dennett, 1995).
Sometimes the cranes would put up pillars on the wrong side of the skyscraper,
and the whole edifice would fall, the end of an evolutionary line. Evolution occurs
through trial and error, with successful trials continuing the line.
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8.2 Trial and Error
Trial and error is a basic process of evolution and occurs from the beginning in
the sense that replication with variation is in fact trial and error. Trial and error
became more organized, however, when cells acquired mobility. In plants, increased
photosynthetic cell replication on the side facing the sun provided survival advan-
tage. Eventually, movements of the multicellular organisms we call animals became
directed and the incipient forms of sense organs and nervous systems appeared as
it is more advantageous for the animal to move in the direction of food. In order to
find food, it developed sensors that describe the state of the external environment in
all directions (sense organs) and information channels for communication between
these sensors and the motor apparatus, i.e., the nervous system.
Early nervous system was quite primitive. Sense organs simply distinguished a
few situations to which the animal must respond differently. During the process
of evolution the sense organs became more complex and transmitted an increas-
ing amount of information about the external environment. The motor systems also
made increasing demands on the nervous system for coordination. Special forma-
tions of nerves appeared – nerve centers which convert information received from
the sense organs into information controlling the organs of movement, i.e., the brain.
8.3 Learn or Perish
As the primitive brain evolved, it developed the capacity to store prior experience
as a shortcut to trial and error. If you have already done the trial and error, then
you can cut down on the error rate by remembering what worked. This storage of
past experience, memory, will be discussed in the next chapter; we will focus on
learning itself for the present. It is important to remember, however, that learning
and memory form an intrinsic whole.
At a very basic level, experience modifies organisms through habituation and
sensitization. Repeated neutral stimulus results in habituation, i.e., a reduction in
the animal’s reaction to it. On the other hand, repeated noxious stimulus may cause
sensitization, i.e., an exaggeration of response. Phenomena like learning has been
demonstrated even in bacteria (Bruggeman et al., 2000). By studying the sea snail,
Aplysia californica that has only 6 motor neurons and 24 sensory neurons, Kandel
and colleagues demonstrated long-term habituation and sensitization at the level of
a single synapse in response to repeated stimuli, mediated by functional changes in
calcium channels and neurotransmitter release (Kandel, 1979).
Associative learning increasingly conferred serious survival advantage to those
who were good at it. Both classical (Pavlovian) conditioning and operant
(Skinnerian) conditioning are forms of associative learning. As with the Pavlovian
dog who associated the ringing of the bell with food and salivated, animals increased
the efficiency of finding food and avoiding danger through association of stimuli.
In operant conditioning, animals who became ill with certain vegetation learned to
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avoid plants that had similar shapes and learned through experience what fruits were
good to eat and what sorts of animals were easier to hunt. Such survival advantage
selected for animals with better and better capacity for learning, i.e., better equipped
brains.
As the brain became more complex with better capacity for association and mem-
ory storage, a new type of learning began to appear. Why go through the process of
strenuous trial and painful error yourself if you can watch others? Why not just imi-
tate the behavior of the successful one? Of course, the animals did not reason this
out, it just happened that animals that happened to imitate the successful ones were
able to survive better and reproduce better.
8.4 Imitation, Shortcut to Learning
Imitation occurs in nature at the gene level without necessarily involving the brain.
Nonpoisonous mushrooms that resemble poisonous ones are not readily eaten by
animals and thus have a survival advantage. So with nonpoisonous snakes that
resemble poisonous ones.
Female fireflies of the Photuris species imitate the flash of other species of fire-
flies to lure the males and eat them. Furthermore, by eating them, they acquire
chemicals from the victims that render them less attractive to their own predator
spiders (Eisner et al., 1997).
Cephalopods such as octopuses and squids can imitate the coloring of their sur-
roundings to blend in and avoid predators. Unlike the mushrooms and snakes that
resemble the poisonous ones from the beginning, the cephalopods’ imitation proba-
bly involves rather sophisticated brain activity (Wood and Jackson, 2004). Songbirds
imitate their parents and “learn” to sing. Monkeys are of course well known for their
imitations of humans. With songbirds and primates, the brain is clearly in charge in
imitative learning. With the development of complex nervous systems, imitation
became the basis of many repertoires of behavior that are added to those inherently
encrypted in the genes.
Before imitation, the only way a new behavior could be passed on from one
generation to another was purely by mutation, i.e., if the new behavior happened
to be based on a mutation that passed on to the offspring. No learned behavior,
such as those acquired by conditioning, could be passed on. With imitation, new
generations can learn behaviors from their elders. Imitation, then, may be seen to
be a new mode of cross-generational informational transmission that complements
traditional genetic transmission.
Imitation replicates the behaviors and emotional expressions that are generated
by another organism’s experience, i.e., memory. Through imitation, memory is
replicated in another brain. For example, monkey A happens to crack a nut with
a stone, memory is formed, and remembers the action and uses a stone the next
time he obtains a nut. Monkey A’s son, monkey B, observes his father successfully
cracking a nut with a stone, forms a memory of it, and when he (monkey B) obtains
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a nut, he copies his father’s behavior that was stored in his own brain and cracks the
nut with a stone.
Social learning is, of course, not based solely on imitation, though trying out what
someone else does form its foundation. It is also not necessarily cross-generational –
in fact, imitating peers is the norm both in humans and animals. For example, a
young female Japanese macaque discovered that she could wash the sand grains off
her sweet potatoes in water, and this behavior spread throughout the troop (Heyes
and Galef, 1996). Chimpanzees learn from others how to insert stalks and twigs into
an ant nest and harvest them to eat (Goodall, 1964; Sugiyama, 1995).
At a certain level of complexity of the brain, ideas or concepts arose. An idea is a
brain code based on processed memories, i.e., an abstract meme. Ideas can be com-
municated to another either through imitation, emotional expression, or other means
of communication. For example, an animal may cry out at the sight of a predator,
and others who have not seen the predator may get the idea that there is danger
and flee. Some ideas spread, i.e., ideas became infectious, i.e., they replicated them-
selves in other brains as memes. Some ideas are gene derived within an individual’s
brain, others are memes from outside that took up residence in the individual’s
brain.
Eventually, with the advent of language, memes could be propagated
through words (which are themselves memes) instead of the action the words
represent.
8.5 Coevolution of the Brain and Memes
It is well known that humans have the largest brains among all animals. The brain
size of early hominids up to about 2.5 million ago was not much larger than present
day chimpanzees, but it grew rapidly with the transition from Australopithecus to
Homo. By about 100,000 years ago, human brain size achieved that of modern Homo
sapiens (Blackmore, 1999).
The modern human brain volume is approximately 1,350 cm3, about three times
the size of existing apes of comparable body size (Jerison, 1973). With this large
brain, humans have developed civilizations and technologies quite unlike any other
animal. Clearly, from the point of view of pure genetic survival, such large amount
of brain activity is quite unnecessary. Brain is an expensive organ to keep – it con-
sumes 20% of the body’s energy, weighing only 2% of the body’s weight. To quote
Steven Pinker, “Why would evolution ever have selected for sheer bigness of brain,
that bulbous, metabolically greedy organ? Any selection on brain size itself would
surely have favored the pinhead” (Pinker, 1994).
In addition to being expensive to maintain, the brain is an expensive organ to
build, requiring much resource during early life for myelination and growth, more
than tripling in size in the first few years. It is also a dangerous organ for reproduc-
tion as it is often too big for the birth canal. And it is getting bigger! What might be
the evolutionary selection pressures that resulted in the large brain?
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Susan Blackmore proposed that a turning point in evolution occurred with the
advent of memes, i.e., memes changed the environment in which genes were
selected, and that the direction of change was determined by the outcome of
memetic selection (Blackmore, 1999). She argues that genes were selected for big-
ger and bigger brains in humans because of the selective advantage of imitation, i.e.,
memes.
Blackmore suggests that there are three skills needed for imitation – making
decisions about what to imitate, complex transformation from one point of view to
another, and the production of matching bodily actions. The skills needed in imita-
tion, i.e., putting oneself in another’s shoes and then imagining oneself doing it to
achieve the same end, she argues, are exactly the skills needed in advanced social
skills known as Machiavellian intelligence or theory of mind (TOM). Machiavellian
intelligence involves the ability to manipulate and deceive others as well as to form
and dissolve alliances to achieve social or political success, and involves exactly the
skills of putting oneself in the other’s shoes and taking the other’s point of view, and
imagining what it would be like to be the other. This intelligence is most prominent
in humans, but has been demonstrated in other primates such as rhesus monkeys
(Chicago, 2007).
Homo habilis, which means “handy man,” some 2.5 million years ago first started
using stone tools. Tool making probably spread through imitation, with further
refinements and changes in styles, which also spread. With tool making, the bet-
ter imitators of better tool makers obviously had better chance of success. And
more successful imitators of more successful people had better chance of success
in survival and mating (Blackmore, 1999). The escalation in skills for making bet-
ter tools and the skills to imitate the successful ones who were skillful or had high
Machiavellian intelligence led to an escalation in increase in brain size in humans.
And with increased brain size came increased complexity both in tools and in social
structure, i.e., memes that are the basis of culture and civilization. Memes and genes
for brain size and complexity must have coevolved.
Another example of gene–meme coevolution is that of lactose absorption and
dairy farming. There is a correlation between lactose tolerance and history of dairy
farming in populations, i.e., over 90% of populations with history of dairy farm-
ing are lactose tolerant, while only about 20% of populations without the history
of dairy farming have sufficient lactase activity (Leland and Odling-Smee, 2000).
A population genetics analysis revealed that the allele for high lactase activity
depends on the probability that the children of the milk users will adopt the meme
for milk consumption (Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza, 1976). Furthermore, they found
a broad range of conditions under which the lactase allele does not spread in spite
of fitness advantage, demonstrating that memes complicate the genetic selection
process.
The “Machiavellian intelligence” or the “social brain” hypothesis posits that
large brains and distinctive cognitive abilities of humans have evolved through
intense social competition in which the competitors developed increasingly sophis-
ticated “Machiavellian” strategies as a means to achieve higher social and repro-
ductive success. A mathematical model was constructed in which genes control
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brains which invent and learn strategies (memes) which are used by males to gain
advantage in competition for mates. In that model, Gavrilets and Vose found that
the dynamics of intelligence had three distinct phases (Gavrilets and Vose, 2006).
During the dormant phase only newly invented memes were present in the pop-
ulation. During the cognitive explosion phase the population’s meme count and
the learning ability, cerebral capacity (controlling the number of different memes
that the brain can learn and use), and Machiavellian fitness of individuals increased
in a runaway fashion. During the saturation phase natural selection resulting from
the costs of having large brains checked further increases in cognitive abilities.
The results suggest that the mechanisms underlying the “Machiavellian intelli-
gence” hypothesis can result in the evolution of significant cognitive abilities on
the timescale of 10–20,000 generations. They showed that cerebral capacity evolves
faster and to a larger degree than learning ability. Their model suggests that there
may be a tendency toward a reduction in cognitive abilities driven by the costs of
having a large brain as the reproductive advantage of having a large brain decreases
and the exposure to memes increases.
Memes arose when genetic evolution reached a certain complexity of the brain
and facilitated the brain’s growth, which in turn helped the spread of memes.
The relationship between genes and memes is not, however, always facilitative.
Certain brains may be wired to reject memetic spread, and memes can interfere
with the spread of genes through such practices as celibacy, birth control, and
suicide.
From the gene’s point of view, our bodies are just vehicles or containers for
their perpetuation. From the meme’s point of view, our brains are just vehicles or
containers for their perpetuation. Genes have evolved to make better, sturdier, and
more efficient containers for themselves, and so have the memes in producing bet-
ter and bigger brains. Memes have, in addition, evolved a means of existing and
replicating outside of brains, in electronic media, books, DVDs, and computers.
Eventually, memes might not need brains at all to survive and replicate. Would this
mean the end of genes? Not necessarily. Genes are packets of information encoded
in DNA consisting of four nucleotides. Seen in this light, genes are nothing but
memes encoded in nucleotides. Although the concept of memes as we currently use
the term arose from imitative learning and storage and transmission of information
at a fundamental level, memes invented genes, invented bodies, brains, and comput-
ers. The evolution of memetic containers will go on, relentlessly trying out different
materials and forms.
8.6 Empathy and Mirror Neuron System
We saw in the previous section that what is required in imitation is an ability to put
oneself in the other’s shoes. When it comes to feelings, this is exactly what we call
empathy; empathy is imitation of another’s feeling. Empathy is usually achieved
through a reading of the other’s facial expression, body language, as well as verbal
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communication and an understanding of the person’s situation. What is the neural
substrate of empathy?
Mirror neurons were first described in the ventral premotor cortex of the rhesus
macaque brain and later in the inferior parietal lobule. These neurons fire when a
monkey performs a goal directed hand and mouth actions as well as when it observes
the same action being performed by others (Ferrari et al., 2003; 2005a; b). This mir-
ror neuron system (MNS) may form the neural substrate for understanding others’
actions as well as intentions via a simulation mechanism whereby observing others’
actions elicits neural activity in neurons that would be activated if the animals were
actually engaging in the same activity. Thus, the mirror neuron system may form
the basis of imitation in primates.
Mirror neuron system has been demonstrated in humans that encompasses the
pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus and adjacent ventral premotor cortex
and the anterior inferior parietal lobule (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004). The MNS, in concert with activity of the anterior insula and
amygdala, is considered to be involved in the decoding of others’ emotional states
(Carr et al., 2003; Gazzola et al., 2006; Lenzi et al., 2008; Schulte-Ruther et al.,
2007).
Observing facial muscles denoting a particular expression elicits firing of mir-
ror neurons that are fired when one has similar expressions oneself. The frontal
component of the MNS then modulates the activity of the amygdala and the limbic
system to match the expression through connection to anterior insula. MNS activity
in response to nonemotional stimuli has been associated with cognitive aspects of
empathy, such as perspective-taking abilities (Gazzola et al., 2006), as well as with
empathic concern (Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2006). As for emotionally laden stimuli,
personal distress and, to a lesser extent, perspective taking have been associated with
MNS activity in response to disgusted and pleased emotional expressions (Jabbi
et al., 2007). Emotional empathy and empathic concern have also been linked to
MNS activity in the right inferior frontal cortex while viewing angry and fearful
facial expressions (Schulte-Ruther et al., 2007).
It seems thus that, with the development of mirror neuron system, imitation
is built into the brain which reciprocally reinforces the theory of mind (TOM,
Machiavellian intelligence), or the ability to think and feel like the other.
8.7 Meme Generation and Meme Infection
We discussed how our brains may have evolved to accommodate increasing memes.
Are all memes in our brains then parasites? Not necessarily. Some memes obviously
arose de novo in certain individuals, then, spread through imitation, and in humans,
through symbolic communication, i.e., language. The mirror neuron system pro-
vides a direct example of how memes may arise in the form of motor expression
before they have been fully assembled with emotion and meaning, i.e., before con-
nections have been made with neurons in the limbic system and association cortices.
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The activity of the mirror neuron system may later be connected with the cortex and
the limbic system, especially if the activity is efficacious.
Some memes arose from plain trial and error – like the first monkey who hap-
pened to crack a nut with a stone. Then, “crack a nut with stone” meme spreads
throughout the troop by observation (infection).
Memes are essentially memories that skip brains and infect other brains. When
these memories are recalled and reassembled to meet current needs, we have infor-
mation. Existing information is compared with incoming information leading to
appropriate action.
Then, is all information memes? Yes to an extent. The “crack a nut with stone”
idea would be a successful meme within the monkey as it would be replicated
over and over again when he found a nut. If the “crack a nut with stone” idea
stayed in one monkey’s brain without being transmitted to other monkeys, it is not
a successful meme in terms of longevity across generations. On the other hand,
most likely, other monkeys would see the monkey cracking a nut and imitate it,
and then the meme would spread successfully horizontally. Just as certain RNA’s
and DNA’s are potential but not successful genes, memes may arise and fall with-
out ever becoming successful, success being defined as the ability to infect and
replicate.
Not only information about facts and behaviors but also emotions can be memes
as long as they can be remembered and transmitted. A recent finding from the
Framingham heart study social network is that happiness is contagious. In a 20-year
follow-up of nearly 5,000 people, clusters of happy and unhappy people were found
in the network. The clusters of happiness seem to result from the spread of happi-
ness and not just a tendency of happy people to associate with each other. According
to this study, a person’s probability of being happy is increased by 25% if a friend
who lives within a mile and becomes happy. Coresident spouses and siblings who
live within a mile, and next door neighbors had similar increases in probability to be
happy (by 8, 14, and 34%, respectively) (Fowler and Christakis, 2008). Happiness
spread even to people who were separated by three degrees of separation and not
even known to each other.
What exactly is meme contagion or infection? Does a meme physically enter the
brain of the host?
In a sense, the answer is yes. A meme is a packet of information, i.e., an
idea, emotion, or behavior, or a recipe to create the idea or emotion or behavior.
Information content should not be confused with the carrier or vehicle through
which it travels, which themselves are also memes. For example, the information
content of the meme of “love” is not the assemblage of the letters l-o-v-e (which are
themselves memes), but rather the idea that can be expressed as “amour,” “Liebe,”
“ ,” or “hluv.” Because we have in our brains the genetic and memetic appara-
tus to process memes that associate themselves with various forms of conveyance
(languages, images, sounds), we have the capacity to understand, empathize, and
influence other brains as they do ours.
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Information changes the brain just as a virus (a packet of DNA or RNA, genetic
code) changes a cell. The exact mechanism of meme-induced brain changes in the
form of memory will be discussed in the next chapter.
When you throw a pebble in a lake, waves are formed that cause all the water in
the lake to resonate without the pebble touching all the water molecules. Likewise,
a new meme may affect all brains exposed to it. Of course, you can create a counter-
wave in the lake to neutralize the pebble waves. The brains may also have counter-
memes that may already be there, or newly introduced.
As memes have discovered new carriers outside of the brain such as books,
computers, electromagnetic waves, DVDs, memes can now reside independently
of human brains. In fact, some such memes have flown out of the planet Earth in
space ships. Some such memes may infect nonhuman hosts in other planets and find
a separate path of evolution (Fig. 8.1).
Fig. 8.1 The Voyager Interstellar Record with 2 h of images and sounds of earth. A 33 rpm
grooved gold record 1977 (http://www.cedmagic.com/featured/voyager/voyager-record.html)
8.8 What Is a Meme?
A meme is memory that is transferred or has the potential to be transferred. The
transfer of a meme may be from one brain to another, from a brain to a medium
such as books, recordings, and digital media. Memes may be broadcasted, i.e., dis-
persed from the brain like seeds or spores. Memes are replicators. Replication occurs
either within the brain or outside the brain. Replication occurs in two forms: direct
replication as in being copied by a Xerox machine, or through transmission to other
brains and then to other brains, etc. Within the brain, replication may occur through
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direct contact with other neurons and conferring the memory to them, or through
reinforcement of the memory within the neuron which results in increased potential
for the meme to reach consciousness and thus to be broadcasted or transmitted to
other brains or media.
Memes need not be consciously transferred to be spread. Imitation is an example
in which memes are created by simple observation. Such memes created through
imitation may be either transmitted consciously in language or transmitted nonver-
bally through imitation by others. What is critical here is that the behavior that is
imitated is remembered, i.e., memory has been formed that is potentially transferred.
Since Dawkins described memes as an analog of genes, there has been confusion
concerning what the relationship between genes and memes is. Before the discovery
of DNA, genes were defined purely by the phenotype, e.g., genes for blue eyes, color
blindness. Now we know that strands of DNA make up the basis of protein synthesis
that underlies the phenotypes. There are, however, many strands of DNA that do not
produce protein (“junk DNA”) but are faithfully replicated and may affect other
DNA strands. DNA replication is dependent, however, on the phenotype’s success
in mate selection. Genes are a sequence of replicating nucleotides that carry both
the information and the machinery for replication.
Memory is the precursor and foundation of memes. Memory served to reduce
the error rate of trial and error. Out of memory arose ideas, interconnection among
neuronal clusters containing memories that facilitated learning. As the complexity
of the nervous system increased through evolution, imitation became a shortcut to
trial and error. When ideas and actions acquired the means of replication through
observation and imitation, they became memes, or replicating information. Memes
are encoded in the neurons of the brain as “brain codes” as will be discussed in
the last section of Chapter 9. As memory and ideas are interconnected, assemblies
of memories and ideas formed, which were more convenient to store and retrieve.
Some of these assemblies were particularly useful and thus tended to be imitated
or learned together. Such assemblies are sometimes called memeplexes. However, it
should be noted that when we talk of memes, much of the time we are talking about
memeplexes.
The advent of mirror neurons facilitated imitation and a new means of meme
manipulation – the Machiavellian intelligence. With the development of language
(which is nothing but new containers of memes), memes acquired the means of
spreading beyond the brain’s immediate proximity of time and space.
Memes, consisting of only information, did not possess the means of replication,
which has to be dependent on matter–energy-dependent processes (Crofts, 2007).
Memes, as pure information or code, were stored as memory, constructed as thought,
schema, knowledge, and emotion, emitted as sound, expression, and eventually in
language, none of which carried the machinery for replication. Of necessity, meme
replication was done by brains infecting other brains.
What, exactly, is meme replication? Karl Marx wrote Das Kapital, which gave
rise to the meme, communism. It spread from brain to brain, eventually resulting in
the meme taking over the governing structures of many countries during the twenti-
eth century. It also evolved differently in different locations, so that the communisms
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practiced in different countries, e.g., Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Hungary,
were very different. One can see that the complex memeplex that is communism
consisted of many memes, including ideas concerning economics, equality, fair-
ness, labor, profit, collectivism, ends justify means, authoritarianism, universalism,
nationalism, etc. Many of the component ideas were also mutually contradictory
while others were mutually reinforcing. Thus a meme complex can be replicated
in many different ways through component memes and may mutate rapidly while
maintaining the label and some vestiges of the original meme. Memeplexes often
organize people or groups of people for their perpetuation and replication – such
as political and religious organizations that reinforce the memes, and schools and
institutions to replicate themselves in fresh brains.
Memes have been likened to a virus, which can replicate only when it finds a
suitable cell. A meme, say an idea written in a book, does not enter the brain and
make books in the brain. Memes are more like prions. Once a prion is in contact
with a suitable protein, it changes the configuration of the existing protein, which,
in turn, changes the configuration of an adjacent protein. So does an infected brain
change adjacent brains through communication.
With the advent of computers and the information age, however, memes may
have acquired the material means of self-replication, i.e., memes no longer need
brains for actualization and replication. In fact, it may be that the achievement of
a certain level of information-processing capacity inevitably means the ability to
decode memes, regardless of their origin. This would be the hope if the Voyager
disk were to be understood by an intelligent being in another part of the galaxy.
It is also possible that memes may find that an efficient way of self-replication is
encoding themselves with nucleotides in a new environment!
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9.1 Storage of Memes as Memory
We have seen that genes have achieved immortality by developing perpetually
replicating bodies. Through the algorithm of Darwinian evolution, bodies better
suited for reproduction prevailed. A result of this evolution was the development
of the brain.
Bigger brains mean more capacity for learning and memory. If you remember
what was successful in your trial and error in a given situation, then you do not have
to repeat the cumbersome and often dangerous trial and error to know what to do
when a similar situation arises.
We discussed in the previous chapter that memory is the precursor and foun-
dation of memes, i.e., memes are portable memory, and interconnected, assembled
memories are memeplexes called ideas. Then, how is memory formed and stored in
the brain?
The exact mechanism of the formation and storage of memory at the neuronal
level has been elucidated recently through the works of Eric Kandel and others
(Kandel, 2006) and will be discussed below.
Memory may be classified as implicit or explicit, and short term or long term.
Implicit or procedural memory is the more fundamental form of memory, which is
not necessarily conscious and does not necessarily involve language. It occurs in all
animals. Explicit or declarative memory is subject to conscious recall and consists
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of personal experiences (episodic memory) and what we call knowledge (semantic
memory), e.g., what is your name, what is the capital of the United States. Both
types of memory may be short or long term.
9.1.1 Implicit Memory
9.1.1.1 Short-Term Memory
Kandel showed that learning takes place even at the level of a single synapse in
the sea slug, Aplysia californica (Kandel, 2001). Both habituation and sensitization
occur at the level of the single synapse to repeated stimuli. In the synapse between a
sensory neuron and a motor neuron, habituation causes the sensory neuron to release
less and less amounts of the neurotransmitter, glutamate. In sensitization, it releases
more glutamate.
In sensitization, Kandel et al. discovered that serotonin-releasing interneurons
play a role, modulating the synaptic strength. The interneurons have synapses both
at the cell body and the presynaptic terminal of the sensory neuron. When serotonin
is released at the synaptic cleft, it enters a receptor and activates cyclic AMP, which
in turn activates protein kinase A. Protein kinase A then enhances the release of
glutamate.
9.1.1.2 Long-Term Memory
In long-term memory, there is, in addition to enhanced release of neurotransmit-
ter, anatomical change in the presynaptic neuron, i.e., it grows more terminals and
forms more synaptic connections. The mechanism of long-term memory formation
involves genetic engineering.
Kandel and colleagues showed that genes encoding for protein synthesis at the
synapse were turned on in Aplysia when new synaptic connections were made
(Kandel, 2006).
Repeated stimuli activate serotonin release by interneurons which, in turn, acti-
vates cyclic AMP in the sensory neuron which, in turn, activates protein kinase
A, which moves into the nucleus together with MAP kinase which it recruited
(see Fig. 9.1). In the nucleus, the kinases activate a gene regulatory protein, CREB,
which binds to a promoter gene. There are two forms of CREB protein, CREB-1 and
CREB-2. CREB-1 activates gene expression and CREB-2 suppresses gene expres-
sion. Protein kinase A activates CREB-1 and MAP kinase inactivates CREB-2, thus,
jointly, they enhance gene expression, making proteins for the new synaptic struc-
ture. The opposing action of CREB-1 and CREB-2 in enhancing and suppressing
gene expression may serve to regulate long-term memory formation, i.e., which
event will be stored and which will not.
When genes are activated by CREB proteins, they produce messenger RNAs
(mRNAs) that are distributed throughout the cell (see Figs. 9.2 and 9.3). The
mRNAs that reach synapses are in a dormant form and do not make proteins. When
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Fig. 9.1 Molecular mechanisms of short- and long-term memory. (From Kandel, 2006, p. 261,
reprinted with permission)
a synapse has been repeatedly stimulated by serotonin released by an interneuron,
the CPEB (cytoplasmic polyadenylation element-binding protein) that was present
becomes activated, which in turn awakens the dormant mRNA, which now makes
proteins and stabilizes the synapse. CPEB is a prion-like protein. Prions are pro-
teins that cause the “mad cow” disease (bovine spongioform encephalopathy) and
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease. Prions can fold into two distinct shapes, an infectious
(dominant) and a noninfectious (recessive) form. The noninfectious form is a normal
protein found throughout the body. The infectious form is self-perpetuating and can
transform the noninfectious form into the infectious form. There are normal genes
that encode prions giving rise to the noninfectious form, but it can become infectious
by contact with infectious prions, or sometimes spontaneously. Thus prion infection
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Fig. 9.2 Two mechanisms of long-term change. New proteins are sent to all of the synapses
(above). Only synapses stimulated with serotonin use them to initiate the growth of new terminals.
Proteins synthesized locally (below) are needed to sustain the growth initiated by gene expression.
(From Kandel, 2006, p. 271, reprinted with permission)
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
9.1 Storage of Memes as Memory 99
Fig. 9.3 Role of repeated stimulation in memory formation. (From Kandel, 2006, p. 274, reprinted
with permission)
does not result in replication of the foreign prion, but rather it converts the exist-
ing noninfectious prion into the infectious conformation. In the case of CPEB, it
becomes infectious when stimulated with serotonin. The infectious form of CPEB
replicates itself and maintains local protein synthesis at the synapse. It perpetuates
synaptic facilitation and thus long-term storage of memory.
Repetition is in general necessary for long-term memory. So-called flashbulb
memory may occur if an event is highly emotionally charged and causes a massive
influx of MAP kinase and protein kinase A into the nucleus to activate all CREB-1
protein and inactivate all CREB-2, thus directly creating a long-term memory.
While implicit memory can be stored in any synapse, basal ganglia and the
cerebellum seem to be particularly involved in its storage in mammals.
9.1.2 Explicit Memory
Storage of explicit memory, unlike implicit memory that can be achieved at the level
of a single synapse, involves the brain as consciousness and language involves the
integrative function of the brain.
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The sensory and association cortices, speech centers, the limbic system, espe-
cially hippocampus and amygdala, and the entorhinal cortex are intimately involved
in explicit memory. Among the structures, hippocampus is considered to be the brain
structure that is involved in consolidating short-term memory into long-term mem-
ory. Attention, mediated by the neurotransmitter dopamine, is necessary for explicit
memory to occur. BDNF is considered to be essential in maintaining long-term
explicit memory (Bekinschtein et al., 2008).
In animals, a spatial map develops when they enter a new environment, i.e.,
the hippocampus develops a multisensory representation of the new environment.
The spatial map was destabilized and did not last long when protein kinase A was
blocked, showing that it is memory dependent. Such a representation may be a
form of explicit memory in animals (Kandel, 2006). The spatial map was desta-
bilized when dopamine blockers were administered and enhanced when dopamine
receptors were activated, indicating the necessity of attention.
Repeated rapid stimulation of neuronal pathway to the hippocampus leads to
strengthening of the connection for hours and days. This type of synaptic facilita-
tion is called long-term potentiation (LTP) (Bliss and Lomo, 1973). Glutamate is the
principal excitatory neurotransmitter in the brain. Glutamate acts on both the AMPA
and the NMDA receptors in the hippocampal neurons. The AMPA receptor medi-
ates normal synaptic transmission, responding to potential from presynaptic neuron.
When the postsynaptic neuron is stimulated repeatedly and rapidly, the AMPA
receptor powerfully depolarizes the cell membrane allowing an ion channel in the
NMDA receptor to open, allowing calcium ion influx (Kauer et al., 1988; Lynch
et al., 1988). Calcium then acts as a second messenger akin to cyclic AMP dis-
cussed above, triggering activation of kinases which in turn activate CREB resulting
in structural change of the neuron associated with LTP. Rhythmic bursting activity
is highly effective in inducing LTP and the endogenous hippocampal theta rhythm
may play a role in LTP induction in vivo (Lynch et al., 1990).
In LTP of rat hippocampal neurons, dopamine rather than serotonin (as in
Aplysia) modulates the prion-like CPEB protein (CPEB-3) that results in perpet-
uation of the structural change at the synapse.
9.1.3 Learned Fear
Conditioned fear response is a basic learned response that involves long-term mem-
ory. The brain has to remember the stimulus associated with fear to elicit the
response.
When a tone is paired with an electric shock in the rat, the tone travels through
the auditory nerve to the medial geniculate body of the thalamus. The signal is
then carried by two separate pathways: one goes directly to the lateral nucleus of
amygdala, and another pathway goes to the auditory cortex first, then to the lateral
nucleus of amygdala.
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The electric shock activates pain fibers that terminate in the somatosensory tha-
lamus. From the thalamus, there again emerge two separate pathways, one directly
to the lateral nucleus of amygdala, the other through the somatosensory cortex to
the same nucleus.
The existence of two separate pathways for sensory input to amygdala, one
through the cortex and another bypassing it, indicates that unconscious evaluation
of fearful stimulus precedes conscious evaluation of it (Kandel, 2006). When the
neurons in the lateral nucleus are sufficiently stimulated, they send impulses to the
central nucleus, which in turn send signals to hypothalamus, limbic system, and the
cortex that result in the autonomic, endocrine, and behavioral fear response. Brain-
derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) plays an important role in synaptic plasticity.
Calcium influx through NMDA receptors and voltage-dependent calcium channels,
which occurs in the lateral nucleus during fear conditioning, activates protein kinase
A and Ca2+/calmodulin-dependent protein kinase IV. Each induces phosphoryla-
tion of CREB, which binds to the BDNF promoter, leading to BDNF expression in
the lateral amygdala and contributes to fear memory consolidation (Monfils et al.,
2007). Repeated stimuli of this sort result in long-term potentiation in the circuits
from thalamus to lateral nucleus of amygdala and from the lateral nucleus to central
nucleus, i.e., a conditioned reflex has been formed.
A gene encoding gastrin-releasing peptide (GRP) has been found to be highly
expressed both in the lateral nucleus of the amygdala and in the regions that
convey fearful auditory information to the lateral nucleus. GRP receptor (GRPR)
is expressed in GABAergic interneurons of the lateral nucleus. GRP excites
these interneurons and increases their inhibition of principal neurons. GRPR-
deficient mice showed decreased inhibition of principal neurons by the interneurons,
enhanced long-term potentiation (LTP), and greater and more persistent long-
term fear memory. By contrast, these mice performed normally in hippocampus-
dependent Morris maze. GRP and its neural circuitry seem to operate as a negative
feedback regulating fear and establish a causal relationship between GRPR gene
expression and LTP, and amygdala-dependent memory for fear (Shumyatsky et al.,
2005, 2002).
9.1.4 Learning Safety
What happens in the brain when an animal learns that certain signals denote safety?
Rogan et al. gave electric shock to mice only during periods when a tone was not
on, that is, when the mice heard the tone, it meant it was safe. Thus, the conditioned
stimulus (tone) came to signify a period of protection, reducing fear responses
and increasing adventurous exploration of a novel environment. Mice turned on
the tone when given the opportunity. Thus, conditioned safety involves a reduction
of learned and instinctive fear, as well as positive affective responses. Concurrent
electrophysiological measurements revealed a safety learning-induced long-lasting
depression of tone-evoked activity in the lateral nucleus of the amygdala, consistent
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with fear reduction, and an increase of tone-evoked activity in a region of the stria-
tum involved in positive affect, euphoric responses, and reward (Rogan et al., 2005).
Thus, the memory of positive events and feelings are also stored in neurons through
LTP and associated structural change in neurons in different pathways of the brain.
The tone-sensitive neurons in the thalamus and the neurons in the lateral nucleus
of amygdala both have connections with the striatum, and both convey information
concerning safety. Striatum in turn is connected with many areas of the brain includ-
ing the cingulate gyrus that inhibits amygdala. Thus stimulation of the striatum may
also decrease activation of amygdala and thus fear response.
9.1.5 Working Memory
Working memory involves the temporary storage and manipulation of information
necessary for the task at hand. Baddeley and Hitch proposed a multicomponent
model consisting of four subsystems. The first is concerned with verbal and acoustic
information, the phonological loop; second, the visuo-spatial sketchpad providing
its visual equivalent, while both are dependent upon a third attentionally limited
control system, the central executive, and a fourth subsystem, the episodic buffer
(Baddeley, 2003; Baddeley and Hitch, 1974).
The central executive is the master unit that is responsible for information inte-
gration and coordination of the subordinate systems and is considered to be largely
a function of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and its connections (Baddeley, 2003;
Goldman-Rakic et al., 2004; Kondo et al., 2004). The central executive directs atten-
tion to relevant information and suppresses irrelevant information and inappropriate
actions and coordinates cognitive processes for competing tasks.
The phonological loop stores phonological or sound-related information in a
temporary store and prevents its decay by continuously refreshing it through a
subvocal rehearsal system. The phonological loop not only maintains the sound
information but also registers visual information within the store provided the items
can be named. Different parts of the Broca’s area seem to be involved in the storage
and subvocal rehearsal systems. The verbal working memory seems to be largely
localized in the left hemisphere (Baddeley, 2003).
The visuo-spatial sketchpad stores visual and spatial information. It can be used,
for example, for constructing and manipulating visual images and for the represen-
tation of mental maps. The sketch pad may be subdivided into a visual subsystem
(dealing with shape, color, texture, etc.) and a spatial subsystem (dealing with loca-
tion). The spatial system seems to be localized more in the right hemisphere (Smith
and Jonides, 1997).
PET studies show that separable components may be responsible for the passive
storage of information and the active maintenance of information, with the stor-
age component being localized more in the back of the brain, and the maintenance
component in the front (Smith and Jonides, 1997).
The episodic buffer is considered to be a limited capacity system that depends
heavily on executive processing, but which differs from the central executive in
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being principally concerned with the storage of information rather than with atten-
tional control. It binds together information from a number of different sources into
chunks or episodes. In this buffer, information from different modalities can be com-
bined into a single multifaceted entity. Baddeley proposed that this may underpin
the capacity for conscious awareness (Baddeley, 2000, 2001). The episodic buffer
seems to be multimodal in function. The formation of unitary multidimensional
representations in the episodic buffer seems to engage posterior neural networks,
but maintenance of such representations is supported by frontal networks. The hip-
pocampus and prefrontal cortex play important roles in the representations in the
episodic buffer of working memory (Rudner and Ronnberg, 2008; Yoon et al.,
2008).
Working memory is important in psychiatry as it is impaired in various psychi-
atric conditions including schizophrenia and mood disorders. In schizophrenia, there
is an overproduction of dopamine D2 receptors that is associated with psychotic
symptoms and a reduction in D1 receptors. There seems to be a direct relationship
between the prefrontal dopamine function and the integrity of working memory,
suggesting that insufficient D1 receptor signaling, and thus reduction in cyclic AMP
and glutamatergic transmission, resulting in cognitive deficits. Working memory
deficits can be ameliorated by treatments that augment D1 receptor stimulation
(Goldman-Rakic et al., 2004).
In depression, there is often cognitive impairment and a reduction in the
size of the hippocampus, especially after repeated bouts of severe depression.
Antidepressants and ECT all have the effect of increasing neurogenesis in the den-
tate nucleus of the hippocampus. The newly generated neurons are particularly
sensitive to LTP (Pittenger and Duman, 2008; Sahay and Hen, 2007).
9.2 Evolution of Memes in the Brain and the Brain Code
Once learned stuff has been stored in the brain by forming neuronal synaptic con-
nections through LTP, what happens to the memory? We know that memory tends to
decay over time, and some memories are better preserved than others. We have seen
that emotionally charged events may become instantly fixed in memory (flashbulb
memory) while boring factual information may require a long series of repetitions
to become long-term memory.
Hippocampus is the main brain site for the conversion of short-term memory into
long-term memory as long-term memory does not form without it. Hippocampus
is also one area of the brain where chronic stress reduces the number of neurons
and their connections, and where neurogenesis occurs in adulthood (Drew and Hen,
2007; Gould et al., 1997; Pittenger and Duman, 2008; Sahay and Hen, 2007).
In the mouse hippocampus, different groups of neurons respond to different stim-
uli, such as shake or air blow. Such identification of network-level functional coding
units, termed neural cliques, has allowed real-time patterns of memory traces to be
digitized (Lin et al., 2007). For example, Lin et al. were able to express the memory
code associated with an experience in binary code based on a predefined sequence
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of clique assembly (general startle, air blow, drop, shake, air subcontext, drop
subcontext): the activation code 110010 corresponding to the internal representa-
tion of the air blow in context A, 110000 to air blow in context B, 101000 to drop
elevator A, 101001 to drop elevator B, and 100100 to shake. See Fig. 9.4.
Fig. 9.4 Neural clique code-based real-time information processes in the brain. Through a series
of hierarchical-extraction and parallel-binding processes, the brain achieves coherent internal
encoding and processing of external events. For example, when a person experiences a sudden
earthquake, neural cliques in his primary visual cortex encode the decomposed features about edge
orientation, movement, and eventually shapes of visual objects, whereas the neural cliques in the
vestibular nuclei detect sudden motion disturbances. As information is processed along its path-
ways into deeper cortex such as the inferior temporal cortex (IT), neural cliques begin to exhibit
complex encoding features such as houses. By the time it reaches high association cortices such
as the hippocampus (HP) and temporal medial cortex (TMC), the neural clique assembly encodes
earthquake experience and its location, with a selective set of “what and where” information. At
this level, abstract and generalized information such as semantic memories of “the earthquake is
dangerous and scary” have emerged. As information is further processed into other cortical regions
involving decision making and motor planning, a series of phased firing among various neural
clique assemblies lead to adaptive behaviors such as screaming and running away from the house,
or hiding under a dining table. As illustrated, the activation patterns of neural clique assemblies
in each brain region can be also converted into a binary code for universally comparing and cat-
egorizing network-level representations from brain to brain. Such universal brain codes can also
allow more seamless brain–machine interface communications. (Figure and legend reprinted with
permission from Elsevier (Tsien, 2007))
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Any given episodic event is represented and encoded by the activation of a
set of neural clique assemblies that are organized in a categorical and hierarchi-
cal manner. This hierarchical feature-encoding pyramid is composed of the general
feature-encoding clique at the bottom, sub-general feature-encoding cliques in the
middle, and highly specific feature-encoding cliques at the top. Tisen states that this
hierarchical and categorical organization of neural clique assemblies provides the
network-level mechanism the capability of not only achieving vast storage capac-
ity, but also generating commonalities from the individual behavioral episodes and
converting them to the abstract concepts and generalized knowledge that are essen-
tial for intelligence and adaptive behaviors. The conversion of activation patterns
of the neural clique assemblies to strings of binary codes may permit univer-
sal categorizations of the brain’s internal representations across individuals and
species. Such universal brain codes can also potentially facilitate the unprecedented
brain–machine interface communications (Tsien, 2007).
Tsien states that the binary brain code differs from the genetic code in several
aspects as follows:
1. Uninheritable: genetic code is directly inherited through reproduction, while
brain code is formed through experience or imitation.
2. Self-organizing: genetic codes are like blue prints, while brain codes are
dynamical and self-organizing based on connections.
3. Variable sizes: genetic codes are fixed in size in each individual and species,
while brain codes are variable in size limited only by the network capacity
determined by the convergence or divergence of connections and individual’s
experiences.
4. Modifiable: genetic code remains the same within an individual unless mutated,
while membership of individual neurons in a neural clique depends on synaptic
connections based on experience or disease states (Tsien, 2007).
Such universal brain codes might be exactly what we know as memes (or proto-
memes for animals that lack imitation or communication skills). While the brain
code is not inheritable through biological reproduction, it can spread through imi-
tation, language, and electronic means, and thus can be reproduced in other brains.
Thus, memes reside as brain codes of neural cliques in the brain. Outside the brain,
memes may reside in computers as binary codes on silicon, as patterns of ink in the
print media, or streams of radio waves.
Edelman has shown that clusters of neurons in the brain are subject to Darwinian
natural selection. Edelman’s theory of neuronal group selection posits that neuronal
selection occurs in three facets: (1) Developmental selection – during early phases
of neural development, random variations of synaptic connections exist, and groups
of neurons that are wired together fire together. (2) Experiential selection – the
groups of neurons that are formed during the first phase are selected by experience,
i.e., by reinforcement or nonreinforcement, throughout life. The reinforcements are
repeated firings that form strengthened connections such as LTP, facilitated by emo-
tional arousal. (3) Reentry – large numbers of local and long-distance reciprocal
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neural connections are established. They provide ongoing recursive interchange of
parallel signals among brain areas that serves to coordinate the activities of different
brain areas in space and time (Edelman, 1987, 1993; Edelman, 2004). According
to Edelman, neuronal groups connected by reentrant interactions are the selectional
units in higher level brains (Edelman, 2004). These neuronal groups might be iden-
tical or similar to the “neural cliques” that fire together as described above and
may represent memes.
Neuronal group selection is a Darwinian natural selection that occurs during the
lifespan of an animal and is dependent on reinforcement. Lack of reinforcement
usually results in reduction in synaptic connections, thus rendering the group silent
or inactive.
It is clear, then, that if memes can be represented as binary codes of excitation
of “neural cliques”, and neuronal groups that are connected by parallel interactions
as described by Edelman undergo Darwinian natural selection, then memes must
undergo Darwinian natural selection in the brain. Neuronal groups may be rein-
forced by signals (reentrance) from other similarly firing neuronal groups (forming
memes) and thus gain survival advantage. One might say that neurons thrive on
memes. When a competing meme becomes dominant, neural cliques underlying it
are enhanced, i.e., better fed, with more synapses.
Thus, some memes will become dominant with repeated exposure and rehearsal
and proliferate, i.e., recruit other neuronal groups; others will become dormant, not
forming new connections or recruiting others. The process of reentry resulting in
new parallel connections may be seen to be a process of replication of the meme, a
prion-like replication by contact through synaptic and/or dendritic connection. This
is not to imply that one neuron serves only one meme. In fact, a neuron has many
connections and may be a component of a number of different memes and memetic
connections.
Meme replication in the brain, therefore, does not involve reproducing new neu-
rons, but rather occurs through recombination of component memes in existing
neuronal groups. Such replication may occur through meme-processing mecha-
nisms such as cognition, often stimulated by the entry of new memes into the
brain.
The brain, in my view, is more like the Internet than one computer, with redun-
dant storage and constantly changing connections and storage, in which memes are
constantly created, propagated, combined, disintegrated, mutated, and evolved. Like
the Internet, there are many interconnected processing centers that execute these
functions. Some of these functions may involve a threshold number of process-
ing units and reach consciousness, others without reaching consciousness. Just like
information on the Internet, some memes stay dormant and others become activated
and replicated.
Dreaming may be an important meme-processing brain state. Visual dreams
occur mostly during the rapid eye movement sleep (REM), during which there is
autonomic arousal and motor inhibition. During this period, impulses arising from
brain stem (PGO spikes) reach sensory and association cortex through the thalamus.
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Winson postulates that REM might be like off-line processing in computers. In
this model, the task of associating recent events to past memories is accomplished
while the animal is asleep. This spares the frontal cortex from having to process new
information and integrate it simultaneously, allowing a more leisurely integration
during sleep (Winson, 1985).
Reiser postulates that these impulses will readily activate neural circuits with
relatively low excitatory thresholds, i.e., those circuits that retained memories of
meaningful experiences to which emotions are attached and connected to current
life problem (Reiser, 1991). These circuits would be those that represent significant
memes stored during the day. During dreaming, then, the newly introduced memes
find new connections with already stored memes, may combine with some forming
memeplexes, may awaken others from a dormant state, or may become dormant or
be simply discarded.
In addition to newly introduced memes finding connections with stored memes
during the dreaming state, dreams may also represent the processes of existing
memes finding new combinations and connections that are significant enough to
reach consciousness. Thus, in dreams, we may have a glimpse of the memes strug-
gling with each other, constantly making and breaking new alliances, configurations,
and reproductions within our brain.
In the process of human evolution, the brain’s capacity to contain memes
improved and so did the pace of evolution of memes within the brain as learned
entities. There is, however, a limit to how large human brain can become given the
genes of mammalian evolution. Cesarean sections are already commonly needed
because of the increasing size of the fetal brain. Memes within one brain die with
the brain. Memes had to find ways of sending copies outside of the brain in a reli-
able way and also to reside outside of the brain until it can infect other brains. This
will be the topic of the next chapter.
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In the previous chapter, we saw how memes enter the brain, reside in the brain, and
replicate, reassemble, and evolve. In this chapter, we will examine how memes leave
the brain and reside outside of human brains. It is this ability of memes to leave the
human brain and stay alive, replicate, and evolve that makes memes truly immortal
and may form a bridge between carbon-based life forms and other life forms.
When memes began to spread as imitations, proximity was of course an impor-
tant constraint. Unless you saw or heard the person to imitate, there was no imitation.
Then, the word of mouth came into being, i.e., imitation through communication,
“According to the Great Teacher, it is best to hammer the stone gently with a lighter
stone till it gets sharp rather than hammering it hard with a big stone.” Then, accord-
ing to another skilled person, “To make a stone with sharp edges, you can also grind
the stone on another stone.” The two memes combined to become the memeplex,
the skill of making a stone knife.
With the advent of written language, memes found a permanent niche in scrolls
and books. Translation from one language to another also improved meme propaga-
tion albeit the fact that with each different translation, the original memes underwent
considerable mutation and evolution. With the invention of the printing press, the
replication of memes exploded, which explosion became exponential with copy-
ing machines and the electronic media with instant and global distribution and
communication.
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In any instance of copying, even with electronic means, there is always some
inexactness in the process (mutation), and thus evolution of memes occurs outside
of the brain.
Once memes enter the brain, either through multisensory experiences such as TV
or video, or through written words or melody, they undergo further processing in the
brain. The processing occurs through filtering processes as the memes are analyzed
and classified, e.g., pleasant, unpleasant, reasonable, unreasonable, important, junk.
Through this process, the memes may be stored with high priority and connected to
existing memes, stored with low priority partially connected to existing memes, or
thrown into the dustbin. It is important to note that even the memes thrown into the
dustbin are not completely discarded yet and may still form neural connections with
existing memes and survive, as it were, under the radar.
As the brain has filters and processes of sorting and accepting or rejecting the
incoming memes based on the dominant memeplex or selfplex, the culture medium
in which the brain dwells has powerful memeplexes called culture that attempt
to control the circulating memes. In this age of information explosion, however,
geographic cultural memeplexes can be easily overwhelmed by global memes and
memeplexes.
10.1 Niche Culture
From an evolutionary point of view, culture as meme deposits probably began with
the niches the organisms found themselves. As organisms began to adapt to their
niches, some mutations occurred that enhanced the niche environment by manip-
ulating it. Dawkins calls genes that express themselves outside of the organism
the “extended phenotype” (Dawkins, 1982). For example, the beaver’s dam is a
result of the beaver’s genes that changes the environment in which the beaver lives.
Many organisms carry genes that alter the environment to build a niche conducive
to them, and by building such niches, they affect the selection pressure, i.e., the
better builders are selected. Many ants, bees, and wasps build nests that are them-
selves the source of selection of behaviors affecting the regulation, maintenance,
and defense of the nest. So do many mammals, reptiles, and amphibians (Laland
and Odling-Smee, 2000).
The selection pressure produced by niche environment may be memetic, i.e., bet-
ter builders of niches may be those who learned from the environment best. Thus,
there is coevolution of genes and memes resulting in better niche construction.
Learned behavior may facilitate selection pressure for the behavior and for those
with genes suited for the behavior (Baldwin effect). The acquisition of language has
been attributed to such effect (Shettleworth, 2003).
Laland and Odling-Smee propose a multiple processes evolution model in
which cultural processes build on information acquired through biological evolu-
tion and asocial learning (Laland and Odling-Smee, 2000). In this model, genes and
their extended phenotype (niches) as well as prior experiences may influence the
predisposition of an individual to be susceptible or resistant to certain memes. They
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argue that successful memes are those that are involved in constructing niches, i.e.,
cultural artifacts. Such cultural artifacts in humans, of course, consist of literature,
music, film, architecture, etc., which are themselves meme and meme vehicles.
10.2 How Memes Jump Brains
The question of how memes jump from brain to brain has been the topic of con-
siderable controversy as the analogy to virus, while being apt, is incomplete. In
case of virus, there is actual invasion of the protein molecules into the body of
the infectee, and once inside, the virus enters the cells and causes them to make
more copies of the virus. In the case of memes, however, what enter the body
are sensations, i.e., patterns of neural excitation. Such patterns of neural excitation
first take up residence in the brain as memory, i.e., changes in the configuration of
neural arrangement (long-term potentiation, dendritic growth, etc., see Chapter 9).
Such memory then may replicate, form complexes with other memories, stimu-
late the replication of resident memories, stay dormant, replicate, and mutate, and
in some cases fully convert the brain to its energetic replicators as in a religious
conversion.
Patterns of neural excitation may occur that may far exceed the original sensory
excitation when they interact with existing or induced excitations in the brain. For
example, the visual cortical excitation from seeing a photograph may be greatly
enhanced if the face in the photograph is that of a loved one, which in turn may lead
to a specific action, such as picking up the phone. In this case, the introduction of a
meme (photograph) into the brain caused a cascade of neural excitations that were
not inherent in the original meme.
In the case of a computer virus, the binary code (pattern of energy) is embed-
ded in the message (another binary code) that the receiving computer perceives
(understands) and processes while the virus is processed unperceived (unless there
is a good virus-detecting program). Once having entered the computer brain unper-
ceived, the virus may replicate by commandeering and corrupting other codes and
filling out all available space. Note that in both computers and brains, the meme or
computer virus does not “eat” or “kill” other neurons or programs, they just change
the existing codes which then become themselves replications or effects of the virus
or the meme. The way memes replicate is more akin to that of the prions, i.e., they do
not make copies of themselves de novo, but transform the configuration of adjacent
existing proteins to be prions.
In a comprehensive discussion, Aunger makes painstaking distinctions among
the genotypic and phenotypic aspects of memes, and the roles of signals as insti-
gators and interactors in meme transmission (Aunger, 2002). I do not believe a
literal analogy between genes and memes is useful. Memes are capable of being
both phenotype (e.g., meaning, artifacts) and genotype (e.g., alphabet, electronic
signals).
The question, in short, is how does a meme leave a brain? We are accustomed to
genes leaving an organism in the form of seeds, eggs, or sperm, which are adapted
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for the specific purpose of replication of an organism. Do memes have seeds, eggs,
and sperm? In the case of parasites, of course, the whole animal may leave, as well
as their eggs or spores as during an incubation period, or hookworm eggs leaving
with stool.
We know that memes enter our brains in the form of sensations; signal, particu-
larly language, being an important subset of it. Do they leave the brain also in the
form of sensations?
We should first define what we mean by memes leaving the brain. Replication
does not work properly if an organism fills up a niche so that there is no more room
to grow. To be immortally successful, a replicator has to find new spaces and new
vistas. In the beginning, memes arose from within brains as brain codes for a certain
idea or action (see Chapter 8), and spread through simple imitation – memes did
not leave the brain, the actions that the meme represented were simply adopted by
another brain, resulting in a meme (brain code) replication. As memes coevolved
with the brain, each became more complex and better suited for each other, i.e.,
brains were very friendly to memes jumping around. When the meme–brain col-
laborative invented language, memes could be better protected and developed the
capacity to replicate outside of the brain. Even without language, inventions and
artifacts contain memes, i.e., the sensory stimuli inducible from such things (e.g.,
wagon, Rosetta Stone) are memes themselves. With the evolution of written lan-
guage, memes developed the capacity to be encapsulated, analogous to DNA finding
the nuclear membrane. The function of such encapsulation is that the units of memes
could be better manipulated, i.e., the meme, “wagon,” is no longer “the fast one
that John has that rolls,” but “moves fast” + “John has one” + “ready to break” +
“squeaky.” Encapsulated memes are easier to manipulate, easier to reassemble, and
easier to dissemble.
How do memes leave our brains? They do not leave as in a parasite leaving and
finding another host. In fact, memes as brain codes never leave our brains. What
leave our brains are the replicated progenies of our memes that are encapsulated
in language and other forms of expression. Even primitive expressions are memes,
including grunts and screams, and laughter (laughter is infectious, no?). Memes in
our brains invented better and better methods of encapsulation for their progeny, in
speech, written language, and the electronic and digital media, which are especially
adapted for rapid replication. The word processor, for example, makes automatic
copies of what I write every 10 min.
An objection to the idea that language contains memes comes from the linguist,
Noam Chomsky, who points out that what is transmitted in a signal is insufficient to
account what people make of it, i.e., the signal does not contain enough memes to
enter other brains and replicate. The speed with which infants in different cultures
pick up language, which is not formally taught, indicates that there may be an innate
universal language device in the human brain, which supplies the missing ingredi-
ents in communication signals (Chomsky, 1980, 1988). Chomsky also proposes that
the innate language device is a result of the complexity of the human brain, which
explains why there are no fundamental differences among natural languages – any
language can be translated into another.
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Aunger points out that Chomsky’s “poverty of stimulus” in communication is
true in all communication, not just language (Aunger, 2002). The signal is always
insufficient to explain how the receiver reacts to it, be it communication between
cells, viruses, computer viruses, genes, or memes – there has to be a receiver that
interprets and reconstructs the signal based on the context and timing. The signal
containing small amounts of memes, or even fragments of memes, in my view, can
cause replication of existing memes in the brain, or transform other memes in the
brain or computer by simple contact as in prions.
Chomsky’s innate language device may very well be an evolutionary adaptation
to the development of language (memes) in Homo sapiens, in spite of his notion that
there is something intrinsic to it as opposed to the product of evolution, a “sky-hook”
according to Dennett (Dennett, 1995). Language, however, is not the only means
of representation (memes). There are universal nonlinguistic vocalizations (cries,
laughter), nonlinguistic artifacts, implicit rules of conduct, etc. In fact, language,
important as it is, is but a subset of metarepresentations (Distin, 2005).
So, what is the nature of a meme that enters and leaves the brain? I submit that it
is a pattern or a template that may use any number of media that can elicit another
pattern that can be related to the original one in the receiver. Thus, it may be patterns
of air vibration as in speech, patterns of photon-absorbing dots on paper in written
language, patterns of photons traveling in a fiber-optic cable, patterns of electrons
traveling in a tube of copper, patterns of fluorescence on the computer screen.
I see no reason to believe that such patterns can only reside in brains. They surely
exist in artifacts such as wagons, edifices, automobiles, airplanes, songs, novels,
recipes, puddings. But do they reside in wagons and puddings? They do, though in
a dormant or nonreplicating form. They will replicate when they are copied into a
brain or a computer that is capable of meme replication.
I further submit that memes need not be biologically derived, as long as it can
cause a brain or some other entity to develop replicating information. Mountains
can contain memes as in the Great Stone Face. The moon contains many memes for
the poetically inclined.
10.3 Communication and Memes
Communication is one method memes use to replicate themselves. In one-to-one
dialog, depending on the degree of attention paid and the degree of engagement of
the individuals, the meme transfer will be more or less successful. In mass commu-
nication, however, it is important for the memes to encapsulate themselves in such a
way that they are well protected and at the same time attractive, perhaps like a tough
nut associated with a beautiful flower.
There is considerable controversy concerning exactly what communication
is. Aunger describes three general approaches to describing communication –
(1) mechanical, (2) inferential, and (3) evolutionary (Aunger, 2002). The mechanical
approach is based on a mathematical model of communication proposed by Claude
Shannon and William Weaver in the 1940s. In this classic model of communication
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based on selecting best means of sending telephone signals, a sender translates a
message into a signal (e.g., electrical current) that is transmitted through a channel
to a receiver, which in turn decodes the signal into message and directs the mes-
sage to a destination. What is important in this model is reducing the noise that may
distort the signal.
Unlike the mechanical model, the inferential approach presupposes an awareness
of self and others in communication. Influenced by the philosopher of linguistics,
H. P. Grice, this model holds that there is an implicit agreement that rules the
exchange of information and that effective communication occurs only when both
the sender and the recipient desire to share a meaning. According to this view,
signals do not “convey” meaning, but rather constitute a stimulus from which
the participating parties actively construct meanings (Aunger, 2002; Sperber and
Wilson, 1986; 2nd edn 1995).
The evolutionary approach to understanding communication holds that “commu-
nication is a specialized behavior involving the broadcast of information” (Aunger,
2002). Such broadcast of information may be in the form of pheromones secreted
in the trail of an animal to attract a mate, animals signaling the finding of food,
or shrieks of warning. In this view, communication does not presuppose any prior
agreement between the sender and the receiver. Thus communication need not be
mutually beneficial, as in the case of female photuris fireflies who emit signals to
attract males of other species to devour them (Eisner et al., 1997).
Such broadcast communication is not dialog but dissemination. Why do organ-
isms broadcast information? In short, because it has evolutionary advantages, e.g.,
in finding a mate, in deceiving a predator or prey.
In fact, seeds and spores are means of dissemination – not of seeds and spores
but of the genes that build the organisms. When a seed is in contact with fertile
soil, it absorbs and interacts with the ingredients of the soil and builds organic
molecules that become components of the plant. Memes, like seeds, interact with
the ingredients of the brain to build more complex forms of the meme.
Aunger describes a fourth model that he calls coevolutionary, i.e., a consequence
of successful communication can be replication of the information conveyed, which
may in turn become a parasite of the sender and receiver. The information itself, the
meme, now becomes a replicator that coevolves with the brains. Communication,
according to this view, “simultaneously involves the sender and receiver in two
different relationships: first, as conspecifics with potentially divergent genetic and
social interests, but also as potential hosts to a more or less robust, parasitic
replicators with its own evolutionary interests” (Aunger, 2002, p. 265).
10.4 Memes as a Paradigm Shift in Evolution
and Extraterrestrial Diffusion of Memes
In a very short evolutionary timescale, an eyeblink compared to the genetic one,
memes that arose in human beings developed such attractants as fashion, makeup,
culinary arts, painting, architecture, music, poetry, fiction, nonfiction, ideologies,
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science, medicine, psychology, etc. Each and every one of these things is a meme-
plex consisting of memes; they are the result of gene–meme coevolution and are
replicators themselves.
In the course of this coevolution, parasitic memes have produced special-
ized memes that serve memes at the expense of genetic and biological interests.
Examples of this type of adaptations may include religions, certain forms of altru-
ism, suicide, and various – isms, all memes that inhibit biologic pursuit of pleasure.
Such memes must be enveloped in very attractive capsules able to induce strong
emotional fervor. Such gene-suppressor memes are only necessary as long as memes
are dependent on brains for replication.
But are bodies (or brains) necessary for memes? Currently, memes residing in
our brains are instructing our bodies to build computers – nonbiological brains that
serve memes.
Computers, in turn, can make other computers and program them (i.e., infuse
memes into them). Miniaturized computers can travel into space and to other planets
more easily than humans burdened with heavy bodies. Meme-containing artifacts
travel with spacecrafts and may be deciphered by other intelligent beings in other
parts of the galaxy (see the figure of a record containing earth sounds and images in
Voyager spacecrafts in Chapter 8).
We may be at a stage of paradigm shift in evolution – from genes to memes.
Genes are, after all, information for building proteins, which in turn are building
blocks of bodies. This information is no longer necessarily confined to DNA; it can
be stored in books, digital media, and computers who can then acquire necessary
molecules to build organisms. Genetic information stored in media other than cel-
lular nucleus would be less subject to degradation by variations in temperature or
radiation and thus capable of space travel to other worlds. By shedding the depen-
dence on earthbound biology, genes may have achieved the next stage of evolution
in the form of memes.
Memetic diffusion could occur across galaxies in several ways, through memes
themselves contained in records and machines (presupposes extraterrestrial indige-
nous intelligence), through electromagnetic signals such as radio and TV generated
for Homo sapiens that leak out of earth and may reach other worlds (presup-
poses extraterrestrial indigenous intelligence), and machines in spacecrafts that
contain instructions (memes) to build other machines with extraterrestrial stuff once
landed in another planet (does not presuppose extraterrestrial intelligence or even
life). Another possibility is that meme-driven machines could build DNA and thus
biologic organisms with stuff found in other lands (does not presuppose extraterres-
trial intelligence or life, but presupposes that there are molecules to build DNA).
Yet another possibility is that a terrestrial microorganism may hitch a ride in a
meme-driven space ship intendedly or unintendedly, and then replicate in another
planet starting a biologic evolutionary process (does not presuppose extraterrestrial
intelligence or life but presupposes that there are molecules to build DNA).
Another realm in which memes may free themselves from their dependence on
biological processes altogether and multiply may be in cyberspace as we will discuss
in the next section.
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10.5 Cyberspace and Extracerebral Memes
When communication was mostly verbal and face to face, meme transfer from
brain to brain was a simple matter. With the advent of written language, the trans-
fer could be delayed over time as memes could reside dormant in the scroll or
book until another brain perceived them. Memes could also reside in edifices and
other artifacts but they could only multiply when they entered human brains. With
the advent of printing press, copiers, and faxes, memes could multiply outside the
brain, but closely supervised by the sending and receiving brains. With the inven-
tion of the computer, however, memes have attained the capacity to replicate and
evolve without the intervention of human brain on an ongoing basis. Computer
viruses self-perpetuate, and in computer programs like the game of life (Callahan,
2008), invented by John Conway in 1970, cells replicate, die, multiply, and evolve
in cyberspace according to simple rules set in the beginning.
Cyberspace, in fact, is a creation of memes in which only memes can reside! It is
a space to which any meme-containing device such as our brains and computers can
be attached, and it is potentially limitless in size. Furthermore, as electronic entities,
memes may co-opt the whole universe as their abode. No wonder clever memes
had to invent such a space considering how our brains are limited in capacity, and
the genetic makeup of the human body makes it difficult for genetic evolution to
continue to grow the brain. As it is, the size of the head of the human fetus is often
too big for the birth canal.
In a sense, from the point of view of the memes, cyberspace may be the primal
soup, in which various experiments are taking place as we speak – replications and
extinctions of various combinations, recombinations, and dissolutions of newly cre-
ated, fairly established, old, dying, mutated with vigor, mutated with deformity, etc.,
memes are taking place.
One question is what role, if any, our brain (the coevolved gene–meme complex
we call our brain of the twenty-first century) should play in manipulating this primal
soup. It is possible there is not much as far as the whole pot of soup is concerned.
It is still within the purview of our own individual brains that are still closely net-
worked with cyberspace, to at least analyze some of the elements of successful and
unsuccessful memes. It is possible, however, that with Homo sapiens, there may be
a paradigm shift in biological evolution – once memes have found a way to repli-
cate and prosper outside of the human brain, memetic evolution in cyberspace may
supersede gene–meme coevolution of the species.
10.6 Implication of Liberation of Memes from Brains
The implications of the liberation of memes from the confines of the brain may be
enormous for the Homo sapiens. As long as memes needed the brain and, there-
fore, the genes to survive and propagate, memes that were loudest in ordering
genes to replicate them had a survival advantage. Such memes would propagate by
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threatening annihilation of the genes on one hand and promising “eternal life” on
the other – religions being prime examples.
When memes are freed from the confines of brains that are dependent on gene
multiplication, there is less need for the memes to co-opt genes for their purpose.
Put another way, the assemblies of memes that had survival advantage in gene-based
brains may not be as potent in replication in cyberspace and in brains that derive
information directly from cyberspace (as opposed to from other brains exclusively).
Memetic liberation may thus result in the liberation of gene-based brains from
the imperative of memetic replication. As we will discuss in Chapter 12, a non-
exploitive, peaceful symbiosis of genes and memes may be possible in the human
brain after all.
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11.1 Culture as Memetic Niches
Humans live in niches of memes called culture. Culture consists of memes such as
language, rules, morals, religion, beliefs, traditions, and esthetics. It also consists
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of matter–meme complexes like food, buildings, edifices, etc. In any meme pool
we call culture, there are prevalent or dominant memes and nonprevalent, recessive,
and/or latent memes.
Niches, by definition, tend to be stable habitats, and memes that form a particu-
lar niche are those that made copies of themselves over time, i.e., did not change
much. Memetic niche culture, therefore, tends to be conservative, i.e., resistant
to change. The conservative meme pool incorporated within it built, over time,
memetic infrastructures to support the existing gene–meme social power structure,
such as hereditary caste, wealth, and access to information. Social customs, reli-
gions, rituals, and other codes of conduct are such memeplexes that support the
dominant culture. Cultural artifacts such as books, scripture, churches, tombs, all
embed such memes.
11.2 Individual Brain in a Petri Dish of Culture
Individual brain may be likened to an organism in a petri dish of culture medium.
The petri dish culture medium, of course, consists of chemical molecules that are
under osmotic pressure to enter the organism (brain) as well as microorganisms
such as bacteria and viruses. Some of these chemicals and microorganisms enter
the organism (brain) either because the organism permits such entry, or because of
sheer numbers or osmotic pressure. Once entered, they either change the organism or
multiply within the organism. The brain in the culture medium also emits molecules
and microorganisms that have replicated within the brain, which in turn may seek
opportunities to infect other brains in the culture.
Does this analogy actually apply to real brains? No one would doubt that the
brain absorbs culture in which it grows. But what is actually “culture” that the brain
absorbs?
J. B. Tylor, who is considered to be the father of modern anthropology, defined
culture as “learned patterns of behavior that includes knowledge, belief, art, law,
morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits” (Tylor, 1871, 1924). In this
context, “learning” involves social learning, or learning from others, i.e., imitation.
Thus, what are absorbed by the brain are the memes, which reside as binary-coded
memory in the brain (see Chapter 9).
Some object to this notion by arguing that culture is not particulate but rather
an organic whole (Bloch, 2000). It is true that cultural artifacts such as buildings
and poems seem to have significance only when considered as a whole, but the way
the brain perceives them is only through binary nerve impulses that are stored in
binary memories. Culture, to the extent that they exist in the brain, is particulate.
The particulate components of a culture, therefore, can be used as a part of another
culture.
In some parts of the Middle East, bricks that were used to build Jewish temples
were reused to build Christian churches, which were in turn demolished to build
mosques. Likewise, the particulate components (memes) that comprise a particular
culture may be co-opted for another by becoming a part of a new memeplex. An
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example may be the meme of a winter holiday, which was Saturnalia during the
Roman times, then it became Christmas, a religious holiday, which, in turn, evolved
into a secular holiday. Another might be the meme, “ends justify the means,” used
by both communism and fascism.
11.3 Memes, Culture, and Anthropology
The idea of memes as cultural replicators has been criticized by a number of anthro-
pologists (Bloch, 2000; Boyd and Richerson, 2000; Kuper, 2000; Sperber, 2000).
Anthropology as a science began toward the end of the nineteenth century stimu-
lated by Darwin’s theory of evolution. Early anthropologists considered their job
to be “filling in the gap” between the emergence of Homo sapiens and the begin-
ning of written history, at which point historians would take over (Bloch, 2000).
Study of “primitive” non-Western people, such as the hunter gatherers of Africa and
Pacific Islands, was to provide information about earlier stages of cultural evolution.
This approach of studying “living fossils” had many difficulties and gave way to the
“diffusionist” schools in the early twentieth century. These schools, such as Kultur
Kreise school in Germany, the “children of the sun” school in Great Britain, and the
“culture contact school” in America held that cultural traits diffused from person
to person and from groups to groups. Tracing the migration of cultural traits then
became a major task of anthropology.
The cultural diffusionists held that culture needed not go through “stages of evo-
lution” but could evolve through absorption of information from another culture,
which idea is very similar to the later idea of meme contagion.
Criticism of the “diffusionist” school came from those who believed in “consis-
tency of culture” (Bloch, 2000). There were American and British versions of the
“consistency criticism” of the diffusionist model. The American version was greatly
influenced by Gestalt psychology and held that cultures form consistent wholes, that
there is a psychological need for integration of cultural elements into an organic
“world view,” and that elements of culture “diffused” from another culture has to be
molded into this organic whole (Benedict, 1938). The British school, often labeled
“functionalist,” is a social structural approach that emphasizes the practice aspect of
culture, i.e., there is coherence of mental attitudes and beliefs because of the need
to engage in coherent practices necessitated by social structure (Radcliffe-Brown,
1952).
Bloch argues that the criticisms against diffusionist ideas also apply to memes,
i.e., as the American school argues, memes, like traits, will be continuously inte-
grated and transformed by the receiver of information, and further, as the British
school argues, information cannot be understood outside the context of practice of
life. Consistency arguments essentially deny the existence of memes as discrete
particulate building blocks of culture.
The idea that there are cultural replicators has been challenged. Such challenges
are mainly based on the notion that cultural information is reproduced rather than
truly replicated (Boyd and Richerson, 2000; Distin, 2005; Sperber, 2000).
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In general, the “consistency” arguments emphasize that elements of culture must
interact with the “coherent” (or dominant) culture that includes implicit or nonlin-
guistic practices such as social structure, rituals. In my view, this is in no way an
effective argument against memes, particularly if one understands that memes need
not be explicit and that culture consists of dominant memes that impose a sense or
direction of coherence as well as subcultures that may contain nondominant memes
in defiance of the dominant ones. Just as in the brain, there are latent, often labeled
“pathologic,” memes in the society that may gain ascendance by further infusion
from another culture.
I believe arguments concerning whether memes are true replicators are largely
pointless and a result of pushing the analogy to genes excessively. Clearly, memes
do replicate (by copiers, by mass printing, faxing, etc.); they also are reproduced,
synthesized, and transformed. Defined as particulate information stored in the neu-
rons in binary fashion, memes are bits of information. Because of brain evolution
that favored meme production and replication, more memes do replicate. As memes
are dispersed into the outside world as codes, they are absorbed by other brains and
other interactors such as computers and may replicate, stimulate another meme, stay
dormant, or disintegrate, just like any virus or seed.
The vehemence with which some social scientists attack memetics seems to
arise from a sense of boundary violation – natural sciences infringing on the ter-
ritory of anthropology and sociology. They seem to feel threatened that memetics
may replace the elaborate and well-constructed structures of their fields. It seems to
me that their concern is misplaced – memetics do not replace the knowledge base
of these disciplines but would rather complement and enrich them by elaborating
their infrastructure, just as atomic science does not replace chemistry and quantum
physics does not invalidate Newton’s laws.
11.4 Dominant and Nondominant Memes in Cultures, Zeitgeist,
Devious Memes
Culture as a meme pool consists of many different memes and memeplexes that
reside in various niches – subcultures. Nevertheless, there are usually certain memes
that are dominant, i.e., more numerous and, therefore, more available for infecting
new brains. Such dominant memes maintain their dominance by building supporting
memeplexes whose primary purpose is to watch for and suppress the emergence or
entry of memes that might threaten their dominance. Culture is fraught with institu-
tions consisting of such supporting memes – traditions, rituals, religions, etc. These
memes usually combine with other memes that serve their purpose of maintaining
the existing power structure. Memes co-opted by such dominant memes may be pos-
itive ones such as beauty and love, or of punishment for allowing forbidden memes,
such as ostracism and damnation.
Dominant memes described above form the prejudice that exists and may even
be essential in cultural understanding (Balkin, 1998; Gadamer, 1975). According to
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Gadamer, such prejudices or “pre-understanding” is necessary to understand new
ideas.
Just how stable are the prejudices reflecting dominant culture in the face of new
meme entry? For those who believe that the psyche is a unitary whole, and every
experience and learning affects it in a fundamental way, such cultural traditions
may seem to be ingrained and not subject to modification to any significant degree
in later life. On the other hand, like me, if one believes the mind to be a reflection
of brain function and that the latter results from the processing of often conflicting
evaluations of perception and memory (memes), then the dominant memeplexes
in the brain can be significantly altered with new memes (ideas) at any phase of
individual development.
What is the agent, then, that actually evaluates new ideas against existing preju-
dices? Is it a meme that also does this work? As we discussed in Chapter 9, memes
are representations or codes, not actions themselves. What does act is the brain, or
more precisely the parts of the brain that are involved in processing sensory input,
comparing them with stored memory, and signaling the limbic system and the motor
cortex – what is called the executive (ego) function of the brain. The efficiency
of the executive function is determined by both genes and memes in the course
of human evolution and individual development. While memes introduced in early
life may greatly enhance it or suppress it, all Homo sapiens are endowed with this
capacity.
A subset of the executive function is the human reasoning, the exercise of the
brain muscle in evaluating a situation and making rational plans. Reasoning is based
on considerations of two main elements – genetic and cultural valuations. Such val-
uations are accompanied with emotional arousal, involving pleasure, anger, fear,
sadness, disgust, and combinations thereof. Valuations based on genetic imperatives
are pretty obvious and perhaps stable over time – survival and procreation. Cultural
valuations, on the other hand, are not at all obvious or stable. Consider the consump-
tion of beef and pork by religious (Christian, Orthodox Jewish, Moslem, Hindu)
vs. secular persons in America, India, Pakistan, etc. Over time, cultural expecta-
tions over behavior changed significantly. As late as 1804, dueling was practiced
even in the United States: Alexander Hamilton, former secretary of Treasury of
the United States, was killed in a duel by the Vice President of the United States,
Aaron Burr on July 11, 1804. Of course, such things would be unthinkable in the
twenty-first century. Zeitgeist consists of representative memes of the times and can
often be represented by catchy memes such as “Tune in, Turn on, Drop Out” of the
1960s.
Cultural attitudes toward race and gender changed dramatically over the latter
part of the twentieth century as well as political ideologies such as nationalism,
socialism, and communism. In the age of instant electronic communications, memes
literally travel at the speed of light, and the diffusionist theories discussed in the
previous section seem to be fully justified given current conditions. There just is not
enough time for dominant memes and the elaborate infrastructures to ward off the
onslaught of memes for any given locality. Even China is becoming a mimetically
open society in spite of the attempts of the power structure to control it. What about
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religious fanatics who seem to be immune to new ideas? I believe even the brains
of such fanatics contain islands of newly entered memes that are recruiting others
and vying for opportunities to replicate. It is the violent reaction of the existing
dominant memes that manifests itself as fanaticism – even to the point of suicide
bombing, an act of murdering defiant memes within the brain by killing the brain
itself.
11.5 Pathologic Memes
There are several types of pathologic memes:
1. Memes that inhibit or attenuate the brain’s executive (ego) function, thus making
it difficult for the individual to absorb, process, and integrate new information.
2. Memes that are devious, entering under false pretenses, then causing disease or
destruction (e.g., esthetically pleasing religious music).
3. Memes that replicate virulently, often bypassing the executive function.
4. Memes that are virulent because they arouse passion, bypassing executive
function.
5. Memes that cause an indolent infection, to become virulent later.
11.5.1 Memes That Inhibit or Attenuate the Brain’s Executive
(Ego) Function: Tradition and Prejudice
Culturally dominant memes are often memes that infect the brain early and form
the basis of prejudice vis-a-vis new incoming memes. These memes are infused to
the child, usually by parents or caregivers, as a matter of routine practice. Children,
of course, learn by imitation the memes parents practice. Memetic attitudes are also
transmitted, e.g., blind obedience, do not ask questions. “Why is the sky blue?”
“Because God made it so.”
11.5.2 Memes That Are Devious, Entering Under False Pretenses,
Then Causing Disease or Destruction
The prejudice-forming memes are often associated with cooperating memes that
render them more attractive through esthetic qualities (church buildings, hymns,
socializations, vision of heaven, immortality of soul, etc.) and/or threatening quali-
ties (ostracism, hell, etc.). Because the function of the prejudice or tradition memes
is solely the preservation of their own dominance, they may come into conflict with
the genetic imperative of pleasure, which is the indication of brain’s valuation of
gene-oriented well-being.
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Civilization itself is a memetic enterprise, an edifice of memetic replication,
refinement, and evolution. As civilization became more complex and more inter-
active with civilizations of other areas, the status quo-oriented memes also became
more complex and more reinforced and rigid. These tradition-sustaining memes are
only for themselves and are no longer concerned with the survival of the individ-
ual or the civilization. Enveloped in the scrolls, edifices, and priestly robes, these
tradition memes infect the young or vulnerable brain.
Though containing and cooperating with tradition-maintaining memes, the
esthetic memes can be truly catchy and beautiful, such as Christmas carols, hymns,
as well as Da Vinci’s Last Supper. Once lured into a church (or a mosque or an art
school), the brain may be further exposed to more memes of the particular tradition.
11.5.3 Memes that Replicate Virulently, Often Bypassing
the Executive Function
These are the explosively catchy phrases, jingles, or fashions that sweep across
large areas, like a viral epidemic. Most brains exposed to them catch them, usu-
ally over TV or word of mouth. Fortunately, like viral epidemics, they tend to be
short lived. Some examples are, “Baaad!,” “Whaaatzup?,” “It’s the real thing (coke
commercial),” “chemical sensitivity syndrome.”
These memes are pathologic only in the sense that they bypass the executive
function, i.e., they come under the radar for scrutiny for acceptance of rejection.
11.5.4 Memes that Are Virulent Because They Arouse Passion,
Bypassing Executive Function
Another type of meme that bypasses the executive function is the emotion-ridden
meme, particularly abundant in large group settings such as a political rally or a
religious service. The frenzied emotional and memetic state participants enter dur-
ing a Pentecostal service, during which they speak in “tongue,” is an example. The
mindless repetition of “Sieg Heil!” during a Nazi rally seen in film is a reminder that
these memes were parts of memeplexes that caused mass murder and destruction of
civilization.
11.5.5 Memes that Cause an Indolent Infection, to Become
Virulent Later
As opposed to the dominant and virulent memes discussed above, certain nondom-
inant or nonvirulent memes may enter the brain in varying qualities, often through
active processes such as reading a book or conversing with a friend. These may
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be ideas that are not readily accepted, empathic feelings, or images of persons or
events.
One may also encounter criticisms or demeaning words by others, “You are
stupid!,” “You are ugly!,” etc. These phrases, while bothersome, may be soon put
away and forgotten. Some of these memes, while being processed by the brain,
perhaps while dreaming, may be attached to other memes that are emotionally sig-
nificant (valuated) and may occupy a niche within the brain either in a dormant state
or with minimal proliferation.
If there is a new infusion of similar emotion-arousing memes in later life, these
dormant or minimally replicating memes may be stimulated to replicate rapidly,
inundating the brain. The brain, then, may be full of “Your are stupid!,” “You are
ugly!” memes as well as the newly introduced similar memes, “You are a failure,”
“There is no hope,” “Nobody loves me,” “Life is not worth living,” etc.
11.6 Protective Memes and the Placebo Effect
It should be made clear that not all memes are pathogenic or pathological. In fact,
many memes are protective against stress and pathological memes. These protective
memes are generally well recognized for their salutary affect, such as the effects of
such memes as love and attachment. A sense of belonging, or spirituality, may be
protective as well. Even grooming and licking in rats, which experience persists as
memory, a precursor to memes, have protective effects against stress as discussed in
Chapter 2.
The placebo effect is a prime example of a protective meme. Placebo, meaning
“will please” in Latin, is a substance or a procedure prescribed by a physician with
the expectation of relief. When it is a drug, it usually contains an inert substance,
the “sugar pill.” Placebo is obviously a meme representing the cultural expectation
of relief.
Placebos are powerful. At least one-third of patients with any illness respond to
placebos, and up to 50–75% of depressed patients respond to placebo. It is generally
accepted that the effectiveness of most active drugs represent the effect of the active
ingredient plus the placebo effect.
How does placebo actually work? The meme that the placebo represents, i.e.,
relief, enters the brain (even though the pill may enter the gut) and takes up residence
in the brain as memory of an event, i.e., changed neural cluster, which, in turn,
infects (or causes) other neural clusters resulting in a cascade of brain signals and
connections. How was the meme, placebo, formed in the first place? Early personal
learning, i.e., conditioning, plays a role, such as mommy kissing the boo-boo away
leading to relief at the touch of a caregiver, or taking an aspirin for headache leading
to taking a pill for pain. In modern societies, however, the meme that there is a pill
for every ailment is ubiquitous. In certain indigenous cultures, however, what the
witch doctor orders may have a similar function.
Even though the ingredient of the placebo may be identical, placebos used for
different conditions seem to result in different neurobiologic responses, i.e., the
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mechanism of action of the placebo may be specific to the illness. This implies that
the memeplex formed by the placebo meme and the illness meme may form new
connections of specific neural clusters in the brain, giving rise to illness-specific
responses.
In depression, placebo response was shown to have a different brain mechanism
than pharmacotherapy, involving mostly the prefrontal areas having to do with the
executive function and planning. Depressed patients who responded to placebos also
showed certain EEG characteristics in the prefrontal areas (Leuchter et al., 2002;
Hunter et al., 2009; Leuchter et al., 2004). Mayberg and her colleagues found that,
on PET scan, placebo response was associated with regional metabolic increases in
the prefrontal, anterior cingulate, premotor, parietal, posterior insula, and posterior
cingulate and metabolic decreases in the subgenual cingulate, parahippocampus,
and thalamus. Regions of change overlapped those seen in fluoxetine responders.
Fluoxetine response, however, was associated with additional subcortical and lim-
bic changes in the brainstem, striatum, anterior insula, and hippocampus, sources
of efferent input to the response-specific regions identified with both agents. They
conclude that the common pattern of increases in cortical glucose metabolism and
decreases in limbic-paralimbic metabolism in placebo and fluoxetine responders
suggests that these changes may be necessary for depression remission, regardless
of treatment modality (Mayberg et al., 2002).
A positive placebo response is seen in up to 50% of patients with Parkinson’s
disease and pain syndromes. The response is more pronounced with invasive pro-
cedures or advanced disease. Placebo was shown to cause a substantial release of
endogenous dopamine in the striatum of Parkinson’s Disease patients through acti-
vation of the damaged nigrostriatal dopamine system on PET scan in one study (de
la Fuente-Fernandez et al., 2001).
In the immune system, the ingestion of a placebo resulting in boosting antibod-
ies against cholera that was greater than active oral cholera vaccination has been
reported (Wasserman et al., 1993).
In pain syndromes, endogenous opioid release triggered by cortical activation,
especially the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, is associated with placebo-related
analgesia and can be reversed by opioid antagonists (de la Fuente-Fernandez and
Stoessl, 2004; Wager et al., 2007; Zubieta et al., 2005). Covert treatment of an anal-
gesic is less effective than overt treatment, suggesting an expectation component to
clinical response (Diederich and Goetz, 2008).
The opposite of the placebo effect is the nocebo effect, indicating noxious effects
of inert substances. Nocebo effects represent the unexplainable side effects of place-
bos, such as headache and nausea often seen with placebo administration. It may
also account for considerable amount of side effects associated with active drugs.
There may be different mechanisms for placebo and nocebo effects. Scott et al.
studied the placebo and nocebo effects in a pain situation using the PET scan.
Placebo-induced activation of opioid neurotransmission was detected in the ante-
rior cingulate, orbitofrontal and insular cortices, nucleus accumbens, amygdala,
and periaqueductal gray matter. Dopaminergic activation was observed in the ven-
tral basal ganglia, including the nucleus accumbens. Regional dopaminergic and
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opioid activity were associated with the anticipated and subjectively perceived effec-
tiveness of the placebo and reductions in continuous pain ratings. High placebo
responses were associated with greater dopaminergic and opioid activity in the
nucleus accumbens. Nocebo responses were associated with a deactivation of
dopamine and opioid release. Nucleus accumbens dopamine release accounted for
25% of the variance in placebo analgesic effects. They conclude that placebo and
nocebo effects are associated with opposite responses of DA and endogenous opioid
neurotransmission in a distributed network of regions. The brain areas involved in
these phenomena form part of the circuit typically implicated in reward responses
and motivated behavior (Scott et al., 2008).
An interaction between the genes and the placebo effect has been reported. In
one study, patients with social anxiety were genotyped for the serotonin transporter-
linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) and the G-703T polymorphism in the
tryptophan hydroxylase-2 (TPH2) gene promoter, and brain function was assessed
during a stressful public speaking task before and after an 8-week treatment
with placebo. Results showed that placebo response was accompanied by reduced
stress-related activity in the amygdala. However, attenuated amygdala activity was
demonstrable only in subjects who were homozygous for the long allele of the
5-HTTLPR or the G variant of the TPH2 G-703T polymorphism, and not in car-
riers of short or T alleles. Moreover, the TPH2 polymorphism was a significant
predictor of clinical placebo response, homozygosity for the G allele being asso-
ciated with greater improvement in anxiety symptoms. This study suggests a link
between genetically controlled serotonergic modulation of amygdala activity and
placebo-induced anxiety relief (Furmark et al., 2008). This is an example of a direct
interaction of genes and memes in specific brain areas.
Placebo is a ubiquitous meme that is found in all cultures where illness occurs.
Placebo memes coevolved with the brain, and there may be an increasing fit between
placebos and brain function.
11.7 How Memes Come in Under the Radar
How exactly do some memes elude the executive function and be absorbed into the
brain? Aircraft flying under the radar evade detection because the altitude is too
low for the radar to discern its shape. Memes that evade the screening by executive
function do so by coming in disguised, i.e., pretending to be harmless or familiar
(and thus already accepted).
The signal itself, regardless of the content, is important here. The sound of the
word, the melody of the jingle – in essence, the esthetics of the incoming meme is
the disguise that the memes wear. Certain combinations of musical notes are inher-
ently pleasing and relaxing – one could attach words to these that ask you to suspend
reason, i.e., the meme screening process. Religions tie in the idea of immortality, a
genetically pleasing notion, albeit of the “soul” rather than the body, with suspen-
sion of reason (e.g., miracles) and are introduced into the brain often in early life.
Once religious memes establish themselves in the brain, it becomes off-limits to
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reason. Anything that is religious is now acceptable without the screening of the
executive function.
Certain memes arouse genetically determined anticipatory pleasure, e.g., food
and sex. So, a meme that promises 72 virgins is tempting to someone who is already
infected with fanatical Islam, with eternal life in paradise thrown in, which can
happen now if you just martyr yourself.
Empathy is another mechanism through which memes may enter the brain under
the radar of the executive function. In empathy, the perception of someone with an
emotional arousal causes a direct stimulation of the mirror neurons in the frontal
cortex resulting in muscle tones of the observed person, then the emotional reac-
tion. Memes encapsulated in empathy memes, thus, may enter the brain before
conscious scrutiny of the meme can take place. Thus, the sadness of a mother
whose child was killed by a gang member in Los Angeles may evoke a meme
in the reader of both sadness and anger toward the gang. The murder and anger
memes against the murderer entered the reader’s brain encapsulated in the empathy
meme.
In the course of the gene–meme coevolution, persons who were better meme
producers and meme spreaders were favored and thus selected. One attribute of a
person well-endowed with memes is that he/she is famous, i.e., other people copy
them. Memes coming from such persons are thus more valued, i.e., more easily
accepted.
Of course, the predisposition of the individual brain, in turn determined by early
gene × meme interaction, is important in favoring certain types of memes than
others. For example, persons with the s/s allele of the 5-HTTLPR gene may be more
susceptible to fear/anxiety memes coming in under the radar. On the other hand,
those with a variation in MAOA gene may be more susceptible to violence/antisocial
memes (see Chapter 1).
11.8 Spread of Memes
I discussed earlier that memes spread more like seeds and spores, rather than by
negotiated exchange as in a dialog (see Chapter 10). Just as seeds may come
wrapped in attractive packages, such as delectable fruits which are vehicles of their
dispersion, so do memes wrap themselves in attractive packages, which may be
themselves memes. Thus, memes packaged attractively, e.g., esthetically pleasing,
spiced with sex and/or violence, will be memes that are more easily swallowed by
the consumers.
Once memes reach a certain density in a population, it spreads exponentially as
“fashion,” which is truly an often imitated, “successful,” meme. Fame is an attribute
of persons whose memes are fashionable.
As seeds and spores are often blown in the wind and dispersed widely, so are
memes blown in electronic winds across oceans and continents. Electronic dispersal
of memes, especially through the Internet, has become the most effective means of
global distribution of memes.
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Direct contact is still a means of meme transfer. Face-to-face conversation, class-
room teaching, live demonstrations of techniques, etc., are still effective, especially
if the meme transfer also involves emotional arousal, either through empathy or by
deliberate induction (e.g., speech inciting anger and violence). The person to whom
memes are transferred in direct contact may not realize the memes’ entry or may in
fact reject it. Even feelings of loathing generated by being in contact with someone
indicate that the memes that are the object of loathing have entered the brain. As
any Washington lobbyist knows, access means influence.
11.9 Internal Processing of Memes and Consciousness: Thinking
as Meme Manipulation
What happens to a meme that has entered the brain? Let us be more specific here –
a meme enters the brain as sensation, patterns of excitation of sensory nerves. These
patterns undergo the process of perception which involves considerable amount of
filtering. What gets filtered out? Stimuli that are insignificant – the brain evaluates
the significance of the stimuli. Through the process of habituation, even strong stim-
uli may lose significance and be ignored. Stimuli that convey meaning, i.e., those
that can stimulate neural circuits connected to already existing memes, are more
likely to be recognized. Thus, the new stimulus may energize existing memes or
may infect existing memes and build modifications and become parasitic in them,
just as a virus changes an existing cell and make it cancerous or a prion transforms
a protein on contact.
At a neural level, the patterns of nerve firing represented in the sensory cortices,
and the subsequent firings in the association cortices, would result in several com-
binations of possibilities – replication of existing memes, modification of existing
memes, and creation of new memes that may be only associated with old memes,
for example, a concept that may be the opposite of an existing one. The new memes
thus created would be a memeplex, a complex formed from existing and the newly
introduced memes that may be particularly conducive to acceptance and replication
in the brain.
The incoming meme, then, results in two parallel outcomes; stimulating existing
memes and the deposit of memory of the incoming event in the episodic memory
pool. Both results are dependent on both the strength of the incoming meme and the
response of the host.
According to the concept of neuronal group selection, the clusters of neurons
representing memes undergo Darwinian selection within the brain, and the domi-
nant, more replicated memes cohere to form the selfplex, the sense of I, that also
determines what is compatible with the ego and what is ego-alien. However, the
coherence of the selfplex is seldom complete, as there are still competing and
coexisting “I”s in each individual. Seen as a memetic pool, the brain has many com-
peting memes, some of which may have cohered into several different clusters. New,
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incoming meme may upset this balance of power by energizing the nondominant
memes or attenuating the dominant memes.
The host brain responds to the incoming meme by applying a filter that either
strengthens or attenuates it. This filter is the perceptual process, i.e., the incoming
signal being compared to contents of the association cortices and limbic structures
which contain resident memes. This evaluative process of the brain that includes
the executive function of the frontal cortex is the process of meme manipulation –
making the incoming stimuli interact with existing memes and genetic imperatives
including emotion.
It should be noted that the process of meme evaluation involves enhancement or
multiplication of memes used in the evaluation process, i.e., the memes associated
with reasoning and logic as well as the resident memes that are memories of past
experiences and learning. This enhancement occurs as the neural clusters that con-
tain the memes receive attention and thus value, probably through dopaminergic
mechanisms. Thus, the exercise of meme-evaluative process called thinking will
further strengthen the “thinking muscle.”
We discussed earlier (see Chapter 9) that memes are stored as memories in neu-
ral clusters. We know that the brain is an active organ, consuming fully 20% of
the oxygen intake. Neurons in the brain are constantly in action and are constantly
in interaction with the memes – memes as implicit and explicit memories, both
declarative and episodic, and as memeplexes such as schemas.
So, what is the brain activity that consumes so much energy? Much of the activ-
ity must be manipulating memes – recognizing, sorting, and classifying incoming
memes, comparing incoming memes with existing memes, determining the location
of newly introduced memes, negotiating the fit (salutary, neutral, conflicting, etc.),
etc. When this process of meme manipulation becomes conscious, i.e., requiring
enough attention to recruit a concerned effort of the working memory and executive
function, we call it conscious thinking. Of course, meme manipulation occurs with-
out reaching consciousness much of the time, thus thinking occurs without reaching
consciousness much of the time.
In this view, consciousness merely represents the brain activity that reaches a cer-
tain level of synchronization through what Edelman calls reentry, i.e., recirculation
of the sensory input through the neural pathways for further processing (Edelman,
2004). The level of consciousness is gradual – from totally unconscious, automatic
brain activity such as respiration and processing of insignificant memes to low-level
conscious activity such as reflex withdrawal of hand before a sensation may or may
not reach consciousness or being semiconscious of low-level background music to
self-awareness and intention.
A competing view point concerning consciousness is that of Crick and Koch,
which argues that consciousness arises when the activity of brain reaches or activates
a small specialized subset of neurons, perhaps the claustrum, the sheet of brain tissue
located below the cerebral cortex that connects extensively with wide areas of the
brain including almost all of the sensory and motor areas and the amygdala (Crick
and Koch, 2005).
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Whether consciousness arises when sufficient numbers of neurons are involved
in a synchronized activity, or whether it represents a spotlight that claustrum (or
some other bunch of neurons) directs at memes that require concerted processing, it
seems clear that consciousness is an evolutionary adaptation to deal efficiently with
the complexity of memes.
11.10 Free Will
Making a conscious choice has been shown to be preceded by unconscious brain
activity that has already made the decision. For example, Libet asked subjects to
flick their wrist randomly but indicate when the decision was made by watching
a clock. He found that subjects’ decision to move the hand was preceded by brain
activity about half a second before the stated decision, though the subjects perceived
the decision to be simultaneous with the action (Libet, 1999, 2002, 2006; Libet et al.,
1983; Libet and Mochida, 1988; Libet et al., 1979, 1982).
Haggard and Eimer measured brain activity (lateralized readiness potential,
LRP) while the subjects decided which hand to move. The LRP preceded the
conscious decision, indicating that the decision was made before it reached con-
sciousness (Haggard and Eimer, 1999). Furthermore, it was possible to influence
which hand the subject would choose to move by a single transcranial magnetic
stimulation that was subthreshold for movement. Right-handed subjects would
normally choose to move their right hand about 60% of the time, but when the
right hemisphere was stimulated, they chose their left hand about 80% of the
time. The hand preference was influenced only when the coil was positioned
over frontal cortex. Thus, it appears that a single magnetic stimulus which does
not evoke movement can alter high-level motor planning (Ammon and Gandevia,
1990). Such influence by magnetic stimulus was effective only when the response
occurred within 200 ms of the “go” signal, which corresponds to the time
delay between decision and consciousness observed by Libet (Brasil-Neto et al.,
1992).
It seems, however, that the conscious will may be able to “veto” an action in
the last few milliseconds (Libet, 2003). In this model, unconscious impulses to per-
form a volitional act may be open to suppression by the conscious efforts of the
individual, sometimes referred to as “free won’t.” Such “free” suppression may,
however, have as much unconscious neural antecedents as “free will” (Velmans,
2003).
So, what is free will in memetic terms? The unconscious neural activity for action
predating conscious decision is clearly a memetic process. The sense of conscious
free will occurs when the memetic processing impinges on the selfplex, i.e., when
the action is strong enough to reach a level of importance for the selfplex. There
are many actions that we take, including muscle movements that do not reach con-
sciousness, such as shifting position in a chair. If we pay attention, however, then
we may be more readily conscious of such movements.
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Decision making may be seen to be the act of memetic processing, in which
various memes, as it were, vote on a course of action among the choices presented.
Only when the voting is over an important issue will the process become conscious.
Does free will influence decisions? It appears immediate decisions are made
unconsciously and not by free choice. However, as with free will not we may inten-
tionally and consciously limit our future choices through memetic manipulation. If
enough memes in our brain are persuaded to incline in one direction long before
the election, then the outcome of the election may be more predictable. As in an
election, the outcome of the secret ballot is by definition unpredictable, but based
on the campaigns and polls preceding it, one can make an educated guess.
11.11 The Unconscious, Collective Unconscious, Freudian
Unconscious
From the above discussion, it should be apparent that most brain activity including
meme manipulation occurs without reaching consciousness. It is when the process-
ing requires some thought, i.e., the synchronized activity of sufficient parts of the
frontal lobes (and perhaps claustrum) does it become conscious.
The Jungian concept of collective unconscious can be interpreted as the memes in
the meme pool called society, that are so pervasive that they enter the brains almost
automatically, i.e., without undergoing the filtration process for new memes. Such
memes are usually introduced in early life and form the basis of a priori prejudice or
predispositions that we call cultural traits. Sense of beauty, taste, right and wrong,
how justice should be carried out – all these form part of the collective unconscious.
These cultural memes naturally co-opt genetic imperatives for food, sex, and dom-
inance and form strong mutually supporting memeplexes. Such cultural traits do
change with introduction of new memes, e.g., sense of beauty changes as fashion
changes, at one time eating raw fish was “disgusting” in the Western culture, and
burning at the stake was an accepted means of execution during the middle ages.
It is my contention that even memes in the collective unconscious, as long as they
reside in the neural clusters, can be made explicit and be reprocessed through the
executor of memes – reason.
What about the Freudian unconscious as a product of repression? Repression
can be conceptualized as a process by which the dominant memeplexes prevent
incompatible memes that are strong enough to become memories (i.e., meme-
containing neurons) from receiving attention and thus reinforcement (Edelman’s
reentry) necessary for replication. Thus, the repressed memes are outside of con-
sciousness except when they exert influence on other unconscious (or automatic)
processes such as association with incoming memes or in internal processing such
as dreaming.
In this view, most memes except those recruited by working memory are uncon-
scious (or preconscious). Such unconscious memes may be (1) nonproblematic
memes that require little processing, such as new factual information that are rou-
tinely stored, (2) culturally pervasive memes that enter the brain automatically
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
134 11 Culture and the Individual
(under the radar) that form prejudices and the collective unconscious, and (3) memes
that are in conflict with dominant memes and have been rendered unconscious and
hard to reach through deprivation of reinforcement.
11.12 Selfplex and the Shadow: We Are All Multiple
Personalities
Self-awareness is the idea of self as a unitary entity and is often attributed to the
development of the Theory Of Mind (TOM). TOM is the ability to see others as
having minds, i.e., thoughts, intentions, and feelings. The most commonly used test
of TOM ability is the false-belief task (Perner and Wimmer, 1988), a version of
which is the “Sally-Ann task.” A child is shown two dolls, Sally and Anne, who are
playing with a marble. Then, Sally puts away the marble in a box (Box A), and Sally
leaves. After Sally leaves Anne takes the marble out and plays with it, then puts it
in another box (Box B), then leaves. Sally returns and the child is asked in which
box Sally would look for the marble. If the child has TOM, then she will say Sally
would look for the marble in Box A, where she had put it when she left, even though
the child knows that the marble is now in Box B. TOM involves that another’s state
of mind may be different from their own and be able to predict behavior based on
that understanding.
The development of mirror neurons as an evolutionary achievement may have
contributed to the ability for TOM. As discussed in Chapter 7, mirror neurons in
the brain in the frontal and anterior cingulate cortex fire when observing another
chimpanzee or human engage in an activity or show an emotion. This ability to
empathize, to feel, or to act in other’s shoes, may eventually induce the abil-
ity to see oneself as if the self was an object, i.e., self-awareness (Oberman and
Ramachandran, 2007; Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006). As you understand
how others are feeling, you also understand how others might feel about you, or
think of you. You also can see yourself, think of how you would feel under cer-
tain circumstances, i.e., predict your own feelings and behavior using self-empathy
and TOM.
The problem is, of course, that you are not sure about yourself, that you are not
always consistent. In fact, you often say, “one part of me would like to do x, and
another part would like to do y, and most likely, y will win out.” Self-awareness
shows us that the self is not unitary, but is often divided into many parts.
Emotions often catalyze the assumption of dominance of one selfplex over
another. We are familiar with our “pleasant personality” and our “aggressive per-
sonality.” The emotional brain state precipitated by an external stimulus may thus
favor one type of selfplex over another.
We have seen in previous sections of this chapter that our brain contains many
memeplexes comprising of neurons that have evolved over time, in constant inter-
action with genes and memes, existing and incoming. No wonder the memeplexes
have cohered into at least several clusters that we call self (or personalities within
the self).
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Selfplex is the sense of my own personality, who I am, what I am like, what I
believe in, what I would and not do. It is known in other terms such as ego, self,
self-schema, and identity. Selfplexes within a given brain develop over time in the
course of the epigenetic development of genes and memes and may cohere into
several selfplexes with varying degrees of inherent compatibility. The incompatibil-
ity between two selfplexes within the same brain may be especially pronounced if
they are formed at two different periods, say in an immigrant’s life in two differ-
ent meme pools or cultures with two different languages. Thus, there may be some
individuals who hold American values and behave like Americans when living in
America and speaking English, and when they return to their native lands, revert
back to their old values and behave like the natives, speaking the native tongue.
In this case, the dominant selfplex may be dependent on the location, and thus the
surrounding meme pool of the brain. In this case, two selfplexes are not in con-
flict at the same time, and not much effort is required to switch the dominance.
Much of the time, the different memeplexes in our brains coexist without serious
conflict.
Among the memes that form selfplexes, there are those that are in direct conflict
with the dominant selfplexes and therefore are particularly inhibited from replicat-
ing. These “unacceptable” memes and memeplexes form the “shadow” of Jungian
psychology. If the shadow becomes empowered, either through the weakening of the
dominant selfplexes or through incoming memes that facilitate the shadow, there
may be conscious conflict, experienced as anxiety and psychological turmoil. If
there is a revolution in the republic of memes that is our brain, then the shadow may
take power, resulting in a complete change in personality, which may be in the form
of psychosis, dissociation, or depressive and manic syndromes.
How strong the dominant selfplex is, and how well it harmonizes and cooperates
with the nondominant selfplexes and shadow may determine whether the individual
is a flexible and adaptive person who can feel and behave appropriately (and thus
differently) depending on situations as opposed to one who is rigid and fragile,
or frankly show incompatible personalities, often in outbursts or episodes of
dissociation. Our brains contain multiple personalities almost by necessity as we
have absorbed many memes from different personalities. The job of harmonizing
the many selfplexes and utilizing them as the occasion demands, of course, falls on
the executive function of the brain. (See Chapter 12 for further discussion of this
topic.)
11.13 Transcendence
Transcendence, the phenomenon of rising above individual needs and concerns in
favor of spiritual or higher purpose, may be a remarkable example of gene–meme
coevolution. The experience of transcendence seems to involve two components:
an altered state of consciousness and recognition of an entity that is beyond the
interests of the individual, whether it is a god, a spirit, or a cosmic order.
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Altered states of consciousness accompany the activation of strong stress reac-
tions such as fight/flight and “freezing” (or conservation/withdrawal, playing dead).
The so-called adrenaline rush of fight/flight can be intoxicating. Relaxation and
accompanying EEG changes bring out changes in self- and other awareness.
Altered states of consciousness certainly seem to have adaptive significance as
under these conditions the brain may be spared of the time-consuming reasoning
process.
Altered state of consciousness often occurs with the activation of the dopamin-
ergic pleasure/reward system previously described, often occasioned by drug use or
situations causing strong emotional arousal.
While often associated with an altered state of consciousness, the act of tran-
scendence seems to be more in the service of memes rather than genes. In fact,
the notion of arising over one’s individuality contains within it a subjugation of
the genetic bodily demands. Memes developed the capacity to tweak the neurons
such that pure activities serving the memes act as rewarding activities resulting in
injection of dopamine into the pleasure center.
Memes seem to have coevolved with the genes such that there are variants in
dopamine receptor genes that build brains particularly welcoming transcendence
memes. In one study, a higher level of dopamine 4 receptors in the frontal cortex
predicted spirituality and transcendence (Comings et al., 2000). The gene coding
for vesicular monoamine transporter 2 (VMAT2), an integral membrane protein that
acts to transport monoamines, particularly the neurotransmitters dopamine, nore-
pinephrine, serotonin, and histamine, into synaptic vesicles, has been called the
“God Gene” as those with polymorphisms that enhance its function scored higher
on a “self-transcendence” scale (Hamer, 2005).
Transcendence is possible only with the help of the memes as the idea of rising
above one’s bodily needs. Memes are, in fact, transcendental entities as they tran-
scend the brains by migrating from one another and infecting one another. Through
the cooperation of the memes, genes achieve the experience of transcendence, and,
though tied down to a particular brain, the genes can vicariously experience the
wonderful exploits of memes in other worlds and other brains. From the meme’s
point of view, the human brain is a territory to conquer; from the brain’s perspec-
tive, memes are invaders that show the way to a promised land. In the course
of coevolution of genes and memes, values or emotions were attached to them,
as the values code for nurturance and survival. As the experience of pleasure is
genetic, but appraisal of value is memetic, different endeavors have acquired differ-
ent valuations, i.e., studying is good, god is good, sexual desire is bad, brotherly
love is good. At the fundamental level, as memes were in charge of the valua-
tions, whatever served the memes were good, and whatever served the genes more
than memes were somewhat bad, whatever served only genes and not memes were
very bad. Thus, spirituality, a purely meme-oriented activity, acquired the most
value.
Individuals that adapted to the spirituality meme–gene coevolution then may
have spiritual needs that are beyond the understanding of those without the DRD4
or VMAT2 genes.
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11.14 The Individual as a Pawn in the War of Memes
We discussed in the previous chapter how memes are stored in external devices as
well as in the brains of human beings. We also saw that there are conflicting memes
and mutually incompatible memes, and in our brains they tend to cohere into differ-
ent personalities vying for dominance. From the meme’s point of view, all human
brains are like islands for colonization, and the more brains like memes dominate,
the more the speed and breadth of their replication. Thus there is a constant state of
conflict among competing and incompatible memes in the meme pool called human
society.
For certain memeplexes, such as certain religions and political ideals, dominance
may mean the extinction of competing incompatible memes and the brains that
contain them. Such memeplexes may then breed cooperating memeplexes such as
fanaticism and patriotism in the service of stamping out competing memes through
massacres, wars, and book-burnings. In these circumstances, individuals who kill
and who are killed are but pawns of the toxic memes in the society.
How to prevent the individual from being the pawns of toxic memes? It is only
through the strengthening of the reasoning powers of the brain, i.e., appropriate
sorting, filtering, and processing of memes that it encounters that such toxic memes
can be isolated and controlled rather than being controlled by them. Only when
sufficient numbers of brains in the society are equipped with such reasoning ability
will the society be safe from the unchecked proliferation of toxic memes. In addition
to the reasoning powers, the brains must develop early warning mechanisms for the
introduction of the toxic memes so that the likelihood of their coming in undetected
is lessened.
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12.1 Normality and Health
What is normal? There are several ways of defining normality: (1) normality as
what is common or prevalent without precisely defining what constitutes common,
(2) statistical normality – if a value falls within two standard deviations, it is within
normal limits, (3) normal as an ideal – a “normal” person may be someone without
any conflicts, a state for which one might strive but never achieve, (4) normality
as absence of pathology (abnormality) – according to this definition, the presence
of even a single abnormality disqualifies the whole, as in a tissue pathology sam-
ple, (5) normality by legislation (or decree), e.g., homosexuality was an illness until
1973 when the Board of the American Psychiatric Association voted unanimously
to remove it from the diagnostic and statistical manual. Each of the normality defi-
nition has uses within their specific context but can be misleading if used in another
context.
What is health? Is being healthy normal?
The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health as “a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity”. According to this definition, mental health would be an ideal state of
well-being difficult to achieve in real life.
The capacity to work and to love, a phrase attributed to Freud, is another
definition of mental health that sets the bar to a lower achievable level.
Vaillant describes six models of mental health: (1) mental health as above
normal, (2) mental health as positive psychology, (3) mental health as maturity,
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(4) mental health as social-emotional intelligence, (5) mental health as subjec-
tive well-being, (6) mental health as resilience (Vaillant, 2003). We will briefly
review these models and consider how the concept of gene × meme interaction
may contribute to a unification of the models.
1. Mental health as above normal: In this model, the important task is defining what
“normal” is. In general, persons who have no difficulty to work, love, and play
are considered to be in good mental health. The Global Assessment of Function
(GAF), part of the DSM multiaxial diagnostic scheme (see Chapter 14), is an
attempt at quantification of mental functioning (thus mental health), and on a
scale of 1–100, scoring somewhere over 90 is considered to be in superior mental
health.
2. Mental health as positive psychology: Drawing in Maslow’s concept of self-
actualization of talents, capacities, and potentialities, positive psychology as
represented by Seligman emphasizes optimism and endeavors to build quali-
ties that help individuals and communities not just to endure and survive but
also to flourish (Seligman, 1991, 2002). Positive mental health has been divided
into four components – talents, enablers, strengths, and outcomes (Peterson and
Seligman, 2004). Talents, e.g., disposition and intelligence, are genetically deter-
mined and not subject to much intervention. Enablers are social interventions and
environmental variables that can be strengthened. Strengths are character traits
such as openness and creativity that can be changed. Outcomes are the dependent
variables such as strength of social relationships and GAF that can be a measure
of therapeutic intervention.
3. Mental health as maturity: Since Erikson’s groundbreaking description of adult
developmental stages, there followed descriptions of adult ego development,
adult moral development, and adult spiritual development. They all posit that
there is continuing development in adulthood, i.e., maturity toward mental
health. Vaillant added two stages to original Erikson’s model of adult devel-
opment as follows: identity (adolescence) – intimacy – career consolidation –
generativity – keeper of the meaning – integrity.
4. Mental health as social-emotional intelligence: According to Vaillant, social-
emotional intelligence can be defined by the following criteria (Vaillant, 2003):
a. Accurate perception and monitoring of one’s own emotions.
b. Appropriate expression of emotions. This involves the capacity to self-
modulate anxiety and to shake off hopelessness and gloom.
c. Accurate recognition of and response to emotions in others.
d. Skill in negotiating close relationships with others.
e. Capacity for focusing emotions (motivation) on a desired goal. This involves
delayed gratification and adaptively displacing and channeling impulse.
5. Mental health as subjective well-being: Subjective well-being or happiness
(excluding potentially destructive excitement in risk taking behavior or drugs)
is considered to be an antidote to learned helplessness. Happy people, after con-
trolling for age, socioeconomic class, and disease, were shown to be half as likely
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to die at an early age or become disabled as unhappy people (Ostir et al., 2000).
Is happiness then a genetically determined temperament or a reflection of safe,
non-stressful environment? It appears that happiness is more temperamental and
tends to affect the environment more than the environment affects the temper-
ament. The subjective well-being of monozygous twins raised apart was found
to be more similar than that of heterozygous twins raised together (Bouchard
et al., 1990; Newman et al., 1998; Tellegen et al., 1988). Some of the heritable
factors that contribute to a high level of subjective well-being include a low level
of trait neuroticism, high level of trait extraversion, absence of alcoholism, and
absence of major depression (Vaillant, 2003). Relationships were shown to be
more important to subjective well-being than money.
6. Mental health as resilience: This model is concerned with how the individual
copes with stress. The trait of resilience or hardiness, and the type of psycholog-
ical defense mechanisms used will determine whether the individual can bounce
back from stressful situations without significant emotional distress.
12.2 Gene × Meme Interaction and Mental Health
The models of mental health discussed above by and large indicate that mental
health is a desideratum involving aspects of personality such as resilience and open-
ness that are achieved through interaction of temperament and experience in the
course of continuing development of the person. Mental health is thus a state of
well-being of the mind.
Pursuit of happiness is a fundamental motivation underlying all mental activ-
ity. What are the factors involved in the experience of happiness? Clearly, there
are certain basic biological drives and needs that must be met, i.e., feeding, sex,
exploration, attachment, physical comfort. Yet, the amount of fulfillment of the bio-
logical drives to produce a sense of happiness seems to vary depending on culture
and individual. For example, obtaining a piece of bread for a person starving may
produce extreme happiness while ten times the amount of bread will not elicit much
happiness in a well-fed individual.
Modern humans are not happy with bread alone. We are happier with gourmet
meals with complex flavors and tastes, perhaps with a glass of wine, served in pleas-
ant and clean surroundings, often with good company and accompanied with music.
The ingredients of this type of happiness are clearly both biological (genetic) and
memetic (cultural). The arts of cooking, of decorating a room, of making wine, of
conversation and of music are all products of memetic evolution based on genetic
needs.
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines happiness as a state of well-being and
contentment, or a pleasurable or satisfying experience (Merriam-Webster, 2008).
The term happiness is usually used to denote a sustained state of well-being while
the term pleasure often denotes more immediate positive experience.
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Happiness as a goal in life, while accepted widely, has had many different mean-
ings through history. Simply put, what constitutes happiness may be classified in
two large categories – (1) pursuing and satisfying one’s desires and needs through
positive action, and (2) reducing the needs and desires so that one is in a state of
satisfaction without the need for much positive action. Hedonism is often asso-
ciated with the former, while stoicism or asceticism is associated with the latter.
Another dichotomy has been between seeking pleasure of the body and senses ver-
sus of the spirit a la St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas (http://science.jrank.org/
pages/7739/Happiness-Pleasure-in-European-Thought.html, 2008). Clearly, seek-
ing happiness for the spirit at the exclusion of the body is an example of memes
driving the brain.
Pleasure is the experience that drives animals, including humans, to action and
forms the biological/genetic basis of happiness.
12.3 Neurobiology of Pleasure, Punishment, and Inhibition
The main centers of the brain’s reward circuit are located along the medial forebrain
bundle (MFB). The ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the nucleus accumbens are the
two major centers in this circuit, but it also includes several others, such as the sep-
tum, the amygdala, the prefrontal cortex, and certain parts of the thalamus. Each of
these structures appears to participate in its own way in various aspects of behavioral
response. All of these centers are interconnected and innervate the hypothalamus,
informing it of the presence of rewards. The lateral and ventromedial nuclei of the
hypothalamus are especially involved in this reward circuit. The hypothalamus then
acts in return not only on the ventral tegmental area, but also on the autonomic and
endocrine functions of the entire body, through the pituitary gland. See Figs. 12.1,
12.2, and 12.3.
The emotion of pleasure and reward seems associated with the dopaminergic acti-
vation of a circuitous pathway, first involving a descending medial forebrain bundle
component and then involving the ascending mesolimbic ventral tegmental pathway
(Bozarth, 1987; Wise and Bozarth, 1985), eventually activating the dopaminergic
nucleus accumbens. The septum, the amygdala, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
and certain parts of the thalamus also participate in the circuit. The ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, with its extensive connections with the limbic system, may link the
conscious to the unconscious and ascribe meaning to perceptions by associating
them with meaningful memes.
The ventral tegmental pathway can also be activated by various substances
including alcohol, amphetamines, exogenous and endogenous opiates, barbiturates,
caffeine, marijuana, and nicotine.
All of these pleasure centers are interconnected and innervate the hypothalamus,
particularly the lateral and ventromedial nuclei. The hypothalamus then activates the
ventral tegmental area, as well as the autonomic and endocrine functions through the
pituitary gland.
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Fig. 12.1 Brain structures associated with pleasure, punishment, and inhibition 1.
Fig. 12.2 Brain structures
associated with pleasure,
punishment, and inhibition 2.
Aversive stimuli that provoke fight or flight responses activate the brain’s pun-
ishment circuit (the periventricular system, or PVS), which is activated to cope with
unpleasant situations by activating the fight/flight response. It includes the hypotha-
lamus, the thalamus, and the central gray substance surrounding the aqueduct of
Sylvius. Some secondary centers of this circuit are found in the amygdala and the
hippocampus. The cholinergic punishment circuit stimulates the secretion of adrenal
corticotropic hormone (ACTH) as well as stimulation of the adrenal medulla and
sympathetic outflow. ACTH in turn stimulates the adrenal cortex to release adreno-
cortical hormones. Stimulation of the punishment circuit can inhibit the pleasure
circuit, thus fear and punishment can drive out many pleasures.
The behavioral inhibition system (BIS), associated with the septo-hippocampal
system, the amygdala, and the basal nuclei, receives inputs from the prefrontal
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Fig. 12.3 Dopaminergic pathways in the brain. (http://www.ask.com/bar?q=brain+reward+diagram
&page=1&qsrc=2417&ab=5&u=http%3A%2F%2Fthebrain.mcgill.ca%2Fflash%2Fi%2Fi_03%
2Fi_03_cl%2Fi_03_cl_par%2Fi_03_cl_par.html, copyleft). The three diagrams and
explanatory text are from The Brain Top To Bottom, website by Canadian Institute of
Neuroscience, Mental Health, and Addiction, Canadian Institutes of Health Research, http://
thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/index_a.html. Copyleft. The linear drawing is in public domain)
cortex and transmits its outputs via the noradrenergic neurons of the locus coeruleus
and the serotonergic fibers of the medial Raphe nuclei. Serotonin may also play
a major role in this system. The BIS is activated when both fight and flight seem
impossible and the only remaining behavioral option is to submit passively.
When a sensory stimulus is perceived by the cortex to indicate a danger, it is
routed first to the thalamus. From there, the information is sent out over two parallel
pathways: the thalamo-amygdala pathway (the “short route”) and the thalamo-
cortico-amygdala pathway (the “long route”). The short route quickly activates the
central nucleus of the amygdala. Then the information that has been processed by
the cortex through the long route reaches the amygdala and modifies its response
dependent on the cortical evaluation of the threat. This cortical evaluation involves
the following steps: (1) The various modalities of the perceived object are processed
by the primary sensory cortex. Then the unimodal associative cortex provides the
amygdala with a representation of the object. (2) The polymodal associative cortex
conceptualizes the object and transmits the information to the amygdala. (3) This
elaborated representation of the object is then compared with the contents of explicit
memory (memes) available through the hippocampus, which also communicates
closely with the amygdala. The hippocampus is also involved in the encoding of the
context associated with a fearful experience. The amygdala conveys the gratifying
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or aversive nature of the experience through connections to the nucleus accumbens,
the ventral striatum, the septum, the hypothalamus, the nuclei of the brainstem, and
orbitofrontal, cingulate, piriform, and other parts of the cortex. The combination
of stimuli from the amygdala with working memory (memes) in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex may constitute the experience of emotion. The basal ganglia have
close connections with the amygdala and are involved with the voluntary expression
of emotions. The amygdala has outputs to the nuclei of the sympathetic nervous
system in the brainstem and the hypothalamus, controlling the pituitary gland and
the endocrine system.
The anterior cingulate gyrus of the frontal lobe seems to be important in emo-
tions and cognition. The subgenual anterior cingulate, together with the rostral
cingulate, is considered to be the emotional sector of anterior cingulate gyrus and
subserves autonomic arousal, reward mechanisms, and emotions, particularly anx-
iety and sadness in close coupling with the amygdala (Grady and Keightley, 2002;
Pezawas et al., 2005). The dorsal portion of the anterior cingulate, called “cogni-
tive cingulate,” is involved with error monitoring and selecting among competing
responses.
Orbitofrontal cortex plays an important role in decision making in the context
of emotional situations. Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, together with subgenual
cingulate, plays a role in responding to reward contingencies.
In the course of evolution, the brain has developed intricate mechanisms for
adapting to the environment that include the emotions of pleasure and fear. Emotions
facilitate cognitive evaluation of a situation by providing flavor and urgency – the
“gut reaction” often is a shortcut of much elaborative cognition. The mirror neurons
that appeared in primates that directly elicit an imitation of emotions of another ani-
mal probably enhanced the development of memes as imitation of others’ emotions
and behavior. Thus, in addition to perceptions based on sensations, empathy occur-
ring as mirror neuron activity may be then perceived as an internal sensation, which
might be a precursor to an internal representation of the self, i.e., by empathizing
with others, one might also learn to empathize with oneself.
12.4 Mental Health: A Democracy of Memes
In the beginning, memes developed simply as patterns of neural connection (mem-
ory) that were transmitted from one individual to another through observation and
activation of the mirror neurons and/or the perceptual apparatus. In the beginning,
memes were obviously in the service of the genes as memes that elicited the pleasure
experience were readily incorporated, and those that elicited the fear/punishment
response were discarded. Memes that arose from individuals who were success-
ful were welcomed as they promised pleasure. As memes became more numerous,
and became free-floating in books and electronic media, largely independent of the
brain from which they rose, the link between memes and immediate pleasure or fear
became largely uncoupled.
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Now in the form of information and knowledge, memes are to a large extent emo-
tionally neutral, neither pleasure nor fear. Except, of course, the process of acquiring
memes has been linked to pleasure as an evolutionary adaptation of Homo sapiens,
though such pleasure may also be seen in some animals that acquire new skills
through learning.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, memes also acquired the ability to
encapsulate themselves in disguise by forming memeplexes such as a toxic
meme (e.g., murder) being sugarcoated in a fashionable –ism (e.g., patriotism,
fascism).
Modern human brain is immersed in an ocean of memes of all shapes, colors,
and sizes, mutually compatible, incompatible, or indifferent. The sole purpose, of a
meme is replication. Thus, once inside the brain, each meme is intent on replication.
Replication of a meme in the brain is by converting another set of neurons to be like
them, which involves connecting with another set of neurons and converting it. The
brain is a Hobbsean universe of memes where each meme is out for itself against all
other memes. It is natural, then, that some memes should form alliances with each
other, and recruit other allies to form small cooperating societies, or memeplexes
and complexes of memeplexes. Thus, small societies of memeplexes develop, and
there may be tension, cooperation, or frank conflict among these societies of memes.
Before the advent of memes, the animal had a unity of purpose dictated by genes.
With memes, however, the unity of purpose has been lost, replaced by competing
purposes of genes and memes.
From early childhood, memes enter the brain that stand for social norms, codes
of conduct, and ways of relating with people. Some social memes are created by the
brain through trial and error, e.g., the child learns that it is more effective to ask with
a smile rather than with a frown. Such autochthonous memes may be augmented by
imitation of others, or may spread by others imitating them. The learning of morals
and ethics may be through a combination of memes introduced from outside as well
as trial and error. Some social memes, such as a tendency toward altruism, may arise
from genes that have been evolutionarily selected sociobiologically (Wilson, 1980).
Empathy, both automatic through motor neurons and conscious through identifi-
cation, would play an important role in the development of memes concerned with
the sense of morals and justice, in parallel with those introduced from the society in
the form of codes and rules.
During adolescence, there is an influx of new memes as the developing brain
has now gained the ability to abstract and absorb abstract memes. There is confu-
sion, conflict, and turmoil among the competing memes, some already resident but
called to question by new incoming memes, and newly introduced abstract memes.
Eventually, one or more memes are identified as comprising the essence of the self,
the selfplex, which are the memeplexes that have been successful in competing with
others and established dominance. There are often more than one dominant self-
plexes depending on the environment in which the brain finds itself. For example,
the dominant selfplex at work may be that of a “scientist,” while at home, it may be
“wife” and “mother.” At church, she might be a “Christian.” The selfplex(es) then
rule over other societies of memeplexes within the same domain.
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When the dominant selfplexes in different domains are in reasonable harmony
with each other, they are called roles that can change smoothly depending on the
setting. When a selfplex for a particular role asserts dominance over others, for
example, a religion, then there is potential conflict. Such dominant selfplexes often
recruit self-serving memeplexes such as prejudice against other and chauvinism.
Counterbalancing such memes are tolerance memes and freedom memes.
How the selfplex and other societies of memes should relate with each other is
a meme itself, and has a number of variations. One model is that of an authoritar-
ian and tyrannical regime in which one selfplex ruthlessly suppresses others. The
self is, therefore, seen to be unitary and coherent with a strong identity, with strong
support of prejudice and chauvinism memes. Authoritarian selfplex is subject to
violent overthrow by the repressed memes and memeplexes if they are energized by
an infusion of new memes or if the selfplex is weakened either by a decrease in brain
function, or by infusion of conflicting memes. An example of the fear an authori-
tarian selfplex exhibits toward new meme infusion is censorship. Individuals with
authoritarian selfplexes tend to advocate censorship, for example of “bad words.”
Of course, the “bad words” are resident in the brains of those individuals as memes;
otherwise they would not recognize a “bad word.” And they are often preoccupied
with the “bad words” that they look for them in everything they see or read. This is
an example of the replication of the resident memes represented by the “bad words,”
and how the authoritarian selfplexes are threatened by it.
Another model of interaction of memes and selfplexes in the brain is that of an
enlightened sovereign or of an oligarchy, where the selfplex maintains hegemony but
is open to coexistence with other selfplexes and conflicting memes, and recognizes
them as legitimate, some of them more so (the aristocrats, so to speak) than others.
Yet another model is a democracy of selfplexes where there is recognition that
different senses and objectives of the self can coexist, and depending on the needs of
the genes and the environment, the different selfplexes may be elected to be domi-
nant, with the consent of the ruled (Benjamin et al., 1996; Cohen et al., 2005; Ebstein
et al., 1996; Okuyama et al., 2000; Shiraishi et al., 2006; Van Gestel et al., 2002).
The memes within the selfplexes are not mutually exclusive, i.e. – some memes
may participate in more than one selfplex. Just as an incoming administration in a
democracy may retain some of the cabinet members of the outgoing administration
of another party, newly dominant selfplexes often retain memes of now nondom-
inant selfplex. Furthermore, the memes that form the day to day working of the
memetic government, like bureaucrats in a government, continue to function regard-
less of the changes in dominance of selfplexes. This model of memetic relationship
in the brain may offer the most flexibility and least oppression. Unlike in multiple
personality in which a repressed selfplex overturns the dominant one temporarily,
in a democracy the change of regime is based on rational needs and is effectuated
without suppression of the now nondominant selfplex.
In a memetic democracy, the selfplexes that may be likened to be major parties
recognize the right to exist of the minor, even subversive parties. Thus, revolu-
tionary memes and subversive memes, and even toxic memes, can exist in a state
of check and balance, and may express themselves in accepted forms such as
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creativity and art. Freedom, tolerance, and openness memes are universally accepted
by the competing major selfplexes. Depending on the form of government, i.e.,
parliamentary democracy or a presidential system, the ease with each the selfplex
changes may differ.
What is mental health considering the gene–meme interactions? The brain as
a well-functioning memetic democracy may well fit the bill. As to Vaillant’s first
model, mental health as above normal, Winston Churchill’s description of democ-
racy may suffice: “democracy is the worst form of Government except all those
other forms that have been tried from time to time”(Churchill, 1947).
As to the second model, mental health as positive psychology, pursuit of plea-
sure, both genetic and memetic, would be best facilitated in a memetic democracy,
in which there are memes that seek primarily one or the other or both ends. The
memes that constitute character strength such as open-mindedness and curiosity
(See Table 12.1 below) may find certain brains particularly habitable because of
Table 12.1 The values in action institute classification of character strengths
Love
Love, valuing close relations with others
Kindness, generosity, compassion, altruistic love
Social intelligence, emotional intelligence – being aware of others’ feelings and motives
Temperance
Forgiveness and mercy, not being vengeful
Modesty and humility, not regarding oneself more special
Prudence, not taking undue risks, refraining from things that one might regret later
Self-regulation, self-control
Wisdom and Knowledge
Creativity originality, ingenuity.
Curiosity, interest, novelty seeking, openness.
Judgment, open-mindedness, critical thinking
Love of learning – mastering new skills, knowledge, etc.
Perspective, wisdom, providing wise counsel to others
Appreciation of beauty and excellence
Courage
Bravery
Integrity, authenticity, honesty – taking responsibility for one’s feelings and actions
Persistence, perseverance, industriousness, taking pleasure in completing tasks.
Zest, vitality, enthusiasm, vigor – approaching life with excitement
Justice
Citizenship – social responsibility, loyalty, teamwork.
Fairness:
Leadership.
Transcendence
Gratitude – for the good things that happen, taking time to express thanks
Hope, optimism, future orientation.
Humor, playfulness, seeing the light side
Spirituality, purpose – coherent beliefs of higher purpose and meaning of life that guide
conduct and provide comfort.
Based on strengths of character and well-being (Park et al., 2004) and mental health (Vaillant,
2003).
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their genetic predisposition. For example, those brains with the serotonin trans-
porter promoter gene (5-HTTLPR) l/l may be more likely to welcome kindness/love
memes and those with type 4 dopamine receptor gene (D4DR) l/l may be asso-
ciated with curiosity/novelty-seeking memes (Benjamin et al., 1996; Cohen et al.,
2005; Ebstein et al., 1996; Okuyama et al., 2000; Shiraishi et al., 2006; Van Gestel
et al., 2002). On the other hand, strong exposure to character strength memes in
early childhood may turn off certain genes that may be incompatible with them,
such as the 5-HTTLPR s/s that predisposes the individual for fear and anxiety
memes.
The third model, mental health as maturity, is compatible with a mature brain
that is tolerant of competing needs and inclinations. Erikson’s developmental stages
can be seen to be stages of development of the ability to manipulate memes. In
the earliest stage, memes concerning trust and mistrust have to be properly pro-
cessed, followed by those of autonomy and shame, then taking initiative and guilt
memes. During early school years, the child is infused with memes concerning rules
and concrete operations (industry), as well as memes associated with inferiority.
Adolescence ushers in a consolidation of selfplexes that have been formed in var-
ious stages of maturity in earlier stages. Processing of memes concerning sex and
sexual identify is also important in adolescence. In early adulthood, the task is the
processing of memes associated with intimacy and sharing as well as loneliness.
Memes concerning success and competence in career are also important in what
Vaillant calls the stage of career consolidation. In middle age, generativity or pro-
ductivity memes, as well as memes associated with stagnation and boredom must
be processed. There may be a proliferation of memes associated with meaning of
life and place of the person in culture, what Vaillant calls “keeper of the mean-
ing.” Then, in Erikson’s integrity vs. despair stage, memes concerning continuity
of life and meaning as well as memes concerning mortality are processed with
intensity.
This memetic view of stages of life does not posit achievement vs. nonachieve-
ment, but rather considers the memes that are more numerous depending on the
stage. There may be only partial processing, and there may coexist processed
(integrated) and nonintegrated memes, e.g., one might feel productive academically
(abundance of academic memes and success memes associated with them) but not
personally (abundance of dissatisfaction memes associated with relationships).
The fourth model, mental health as social-emotional intelligence, likewise, is
achieved in a memetic democracy where empathy and socialization memes are given
free expression.
The fifth model, mental health as subjective well-being, is best achieved in a
memetic democracy where there is an orderly process of memetic expression and
change of dominance, and where both genetic and memetic pursuit of happiness
is recognized. There is, as in any democracy, healthy tension among competing
memes and ongoing debate, which can be consciously carried out with the use of
reason, the tool invented for effective memetic manipulation. Such a brain is then
naturally resilient, Vaillant’s sixth model, as it is best equipped to deal with stress
by mobilizing all available genetic and memetic resources.
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In a memetic democracy, most of the memes in the surrounding culture would
be represented, but the unique interaction resulting in the epigenesis of the genes
and memes through development would result in unique combinations of memes
constituting the selfplexes. Each democracy of such selfplexes would have unique
needs and desires just as each individual in a society has unique needs and desires.
Furthermore, the needs and desires are likely to change over time with adaptation
and possible change of regimes.
Pleasure is the activation of the dopaminergic reward system elicited by fulfill-
ment of the needs of the genes or memes or both. Sustained pleasure would be
possible when a majority of the memes and genes are satisfied, and the minorities
are not dissatisfied enough to open revolt.
The self is not a coherent and unitary entity, but equilibrium of constantly chang-
ing selfplexes in a sea of memes. The self is fragile, an uneasy coalition of memes,
that is subject to changes of regime and revolutions.
Mental health is a state of well-being of the gene–meme interaction in the brain.
Such well-being is most likely achieved in a memetic democracy within the brain
that recognizes both genetic and memetic needs, provides an orderly mechanism for
their expression and mechanisms for adaptation to changing demands, and strives to
maintain both cohesiveness and diversity within the societies of memes contained
within.
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13.1 Unhappiness
Mental illness is usually defined as conditions that interfere with the sense of well-
being or function of the individual in emotional, behavioral, or cognitive spheres.
Some have equated the lack of a sense of well-being, or unhappiness, per se, with
mental illness with presumed biological underpinnings (Heller, 1999). Others have
emphasized the role of societal power structure as the origins of unhappiness. For
example, Smail defines a person as “a point in social space through which outside
powers and influences flow, rather than an entity within which powers and influ-
ences originate” (Smail, 2001). He proposes a close relationship between love and
power noting that as children, the form our loving takes is exacted by power. “The
relatively helpless infant and child can no more choose the characteristics of those
he or she is dependent on than can the family dog, and, uncomfortable as it might
be to suggest, our learning to love contains a strong element of choiceless depen-
dence.” In memetic terms, then, the power memes possessed by and inflowing from
the parental figures and the complementary memes of helplessness set the stage for
unhappiness in the young child.
The structure of society itself as the cause of unhappiness has been articulated
by others including Marcuse, Foucault, Lacan, and Sartre to whom existence itself
is anxiogenic (Foucault, 2001; MacCannell and MacCannell, 1986; Marcuse, 1964,
1991; Stern, 1967). The demands of modern industrial society for conformity are
considered to be structural causes of unhappiness, and according to Lacan, this
power relationship is established with language itself, and in the pronouns – I,
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you, and he/she/it that define a power relationship among them. Of course, the
structure of society and the power relationships are all transmitted to the indi-
vidual in the form of memes and the dominant memes that “pull the strings” in
society are the memes automatically accepted by the “culture” and, therefore, the
individual brain without undergoing the filtering process of the executive function
(see Chapter 11).
Anecdotally, when Freud and Jung were sailing to America to lecture on psycho-
analysis, Freud remarked to Jung that they were bringing the “plague” to America.
Lacan reportedly gave a new ending to this anecdote: Freud did not know at the time
that even though they did bring la peste to America from Europe, America would
send it right back in the form of a distorted emphasis on the ego and its adaptation
to the business-like civilization of American rational democracy (MacCannell and
MacCannell, 1986). This is as good a description as any of the infectious quality
of memes (of psychoanalysis), and how the dominant societal memes in America
attached themselves to the original psychoanalytic memes, mutated them, and
returned them to Europe to infect European psychoanalysts.
Unhappiness, therefore, may be seen to be a universal condition arising from
the experience of powerlessness as children and of continuing powerlessness of
the individual and the masses vis-a-vis the powerful societal forces such as con-
formity, as well as symptoms of a biologically/genetically determined individual
vulnerability.
There is clearly a continuum of emotional, behavioral, and cognitive spheres
of function within and among individuals. For example, in terms of low mood,
there is the continuum of euthymia – sadness – depressed mood – depressive syn-
drome. In the other direction is euthymia – pleasant mood – euphoria – hypomania –
manic syndrome. So with behavior – from severe inhibition to impulsive explosive
behavior; with awareness – from stupor to alertness to hypervigilance.
On the other hand, as we saw in the previous chapter, the neural circuits for
pleasure/reward and fear/punishment are separate and discrete – thus certain stimuli
could activate both circuits at the same time. As memes are clusters of memory neu-
rons and are closely connected to and reinforced by emotions, a physical stimulus
from outside or an incoming meme may activate separate existing memes that are
associated with reward and fear circuits respectively. A percept may be both pleas-
ant and unpleasant and in some cases, only one emotion may be conscious while
the other circuit is also activated but remains unconscious. If such a state contin-
ues, then the continuous activation of the circuit that has not been conscious may
result in a kindling phenomenon whereby a sudden and strong emotion becomes
conscious.
The sense of well-being may be threatened or lost whenever there is perception.
The firing of mirror neurons in a person while seeing a movie of a crying mother
who lost a child will stimulate the limbic system resulting in sadness that overtakes
previous euthymic mood, empathy ensues and the sense of well-being is for the
moment disrupted (Agnew et al., 2007; Dapretto et al., 2006; Gazzola et al., 2006;
Ramachandran and Oberman, 2006; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Shmuelof and
Zohary, 2007). Is this mental illness? It could be if the person in question sees sad
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movies continuously and does nothing but cry. More likely, however, the person in
question will function normally after leaving the theater, thus the temporary sadness
would not be an illness. On the other hand, there are persons who habitually get into
situations that cause mild to moderate sadness. Such persons might be called mildly
ill or neurotic.
At a certain point in the continuum, an autonomous psychiatric syndrome may be
triggered as we will discuss in Chapter 14. Unlike mild mental illness or neurosis,
an autonomous psychiatric syndrome represents a frankly pathologic state usually
not reversible without definitive and potent treatment usually involving drugs.
13.2 Memes and Mental Illness
We likened mental health to a well-functioning memetic democracy in which there
is an overall sense of coherence while there is competition and tolerance of different
memes within it. In a democracy, there is always debate and tension, at times to an
uncomfortable degree. At what point does conflict and tension become unhealthy
and thus become an illness?
Reasoned argument, persuasion, and compromise are essential in conflict reso-
lution in a democracy. When the brain lacks sufficiently powerful reasoning ability
(the ability to manipulate the memes), or when competing memes are intransigent
and are unable to reach an agreed-upon course of action based on compromise, then
the conflict becomes irresolvable and severe anxiety ensues.
Of course, there are some brains in which democracy never takes hold. In such
brains, there may be a tyranny of an irrational dominant selfplex that represses all
incompatible or questioning memes. As new memes always seep into the brain
one way or another, e.g., in conversations with others, and particularly through
the printed and electronic media, the selfplex must invest an inordinate amount
of energy in suppressing the incoming memes lest they take hold and collaborate
with existing suppressed memes to start a revolution. Individuals with tyrannical
selfplexes are particularly intolerant of others’ views that may differ from them and
thus are threatening to inject them with different memes. Such individuals, however,
are subject to sudden reversals of their fanatical views, which represents a revolution
within the memetic brain.
Some individuals have a tyrannical selfplex that is severely repressive because
it is very fragile and constantly in a state of threatened overthrow. The subver-
sive selfplex in such a brain may be an even more repressive and depressive one,
a repository of all unacceptable and derogatory memes. When such a fragile self-
plex is overturned through new meme infusion (e.g., failure memes) under stress,
the new selfplex may manifest severe depression. Such a memetic revolution may
also result in a paralysis of the executive function, i.e., the ability to manipulate
memes, resulting in psychotic disorganization.
In these instances, the memes may trigger off an epigenetic cascade resulting in
a major psychiatric syndrome (see Chapter 14).
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13.3 Culture and Mental Illness
Culture affects the symptoms of mental illness as well as the diagnosis, access to
treatment, and quality of treatment of mental illness (Satcher, 2001). According
to the Surgeon General’s Report of 2001, disproportionate numbers of African
Americans are represented in the most vulnerable segments of the population – peo-
ple who are homeless, incarcerated, in the child welfare system, victims of trauma –
all populations with increased risks for mental disorders. As many as 40% of
Hispanic Americans report limited English language proficiency. Because few men-
tal health-care providers identify themselves as Spanish speaking, most Hispanic
Americans have limited access to ethnically or linguistically similar providers. The
suicide rate among American Indians/Alaska natives is 50% higher than the national
rate; rates of co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse (especially alcohol)
are also higher among native youth and adults. Because few data have been col-
lected, the full nature, extent, and sources of these disparities remain a matter of
conjecture. Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders who seek care for a mental illness
often present with more severe illnesses than do other racial or ethnic groups. This,
in part, suggests that stigma and shame are critical deterrents to service utilization.
It is also possible that mental illnesses may be undiagnosed or not treated early in
their course because they are expressed in symptoms of a physical nature.
Indeed, in Asian culture, patients with depression are more likely to present to
the physician with pain and abdominal discomfort, and there are certain culturally
accepted “psychosomatic diseases” such as Hwa-Byung or fire-illness in Korea (Lin,
1983; Park et al., 2001, 2002). Koro and Latah are also culture-specific syndromes
(see Chapter 3).
Culture is the meme pool in which the brain resides, and it is not surprising that
the prevalent memes in the pool should infect the brains and determine both the
symptoms and help-seeking behavior.
In each culture and subculture, there are prevalent memes that represent how a
person behaves or feels given a psychiatric condition. Thus, a depressed person may
withdraw and isolate self in one culture, in another, she may cry out aloud and act
in bizarre ways, and yet in another, have serious headaches. The prevalent meme in
one culture may be seeing a shaman when ill, in another, seeing a psychiatrist, yet
in another, receiving acupuncture.
The prevalent meme in one culture for the cause of depression may be retribution
for a past sin, in another, an angry ancestor’s spirit, and yet in another, an imbalance
in neurotransmitters.
Culture also determines what is normal and deviant within the meme pool, i.e.,
what is acceptable and what is considered to be unacceptable. For example, in cer-
tain indigenous cultures, hearing ancestors’ spirits may be a normal and, therefore,
an acceptable phenomenon while such auditory hallucinations would be considered
pathologic in other cultures. When a dominant memeplex in a culture pathologizes
any competing memes, as in the case of the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union
when political dissidents were diagnosed with “sluggish schizophrenia,” then the
culture itself, like a tyrannical reign in a brain, may be called pathologic.
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While the contribution of culture, or prevalent memes in the regional meme pool,
must be recognized, we must also recognize that there is a global meme pool in the
modern world. Very few brains in the twenty-first century have pure cultures of
regional memes – most brains contain memes from other cultures and the global
memes of rationality and science.
By reinforcing the rational memes in the brain through education and publicity,
we may be able to attenuate the provincial cultural memes that tend to distort or
minimize the suffering from mental illness, and facilitate appropriate help-seeking
behavior.
13.4 Mental Illness and Psychiatric Syndromes
Mental illness ranges from universal unhappiness arising from the human condi-
tion to serious distortions of reality in the form of delusions and hallucinations.
Somewhere in between the two extremes is neurosis, a term no longer recognized
by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association,
but is nevertheless descriptive of mild to moderate degree of suffering by afflicted
individuals.
Neurosis, often manifest by moderate anxiety and/or depression, is generally
considered to be a result of developmental hang-ups and faulty learning. Any num-
ber of developmental theories, Freudian, Jungian, Eriksonian, etc., can provide clues
to the repeated traumas and failure or inadequacy in mastering the demands of the
developmental stage resulting in residual unconscious conflicts and faulty patterns
of expectations and behavior.
Developmental task can be conceptualized as the integration of newly introduced
and newly arising memes with the needs of unfolding genes. Neurosis denotes
a state of the brain where the mutually incompatible and conflicting memes and
memes representing genetic needs have not found a workable modus vivendi, where
workable democracy has not developed in the brain. There may be an authoritarian
brain state where a large number of memes that are potentially salutary are in a
state of severe suppression; or a state of near anarchy where competing memes and
selfplexes achieve ephemeral dominance.
Repeated exposure to fear and violence memes in childhood, when the meme-
processing faculties of the brain are not fully developed, may render the brain
susceptible to replication of these traumatic memes and further stunt the growth
of the executive function, which is best nurtured with safety and safe-exploration
memes. When any attempt at exploration and initiative is met with violence and
trauma, fear memes and violence memes will replicate.
When a revolution overthrows an authoritarian memetic regime, anarchy often
results as the dominant selfplexes did not condone the coexistence of viable
alternative selfplexes to take over in an orderly fashion as in a democracy. The
anarchy of conflicting memes may generate overewhelming anxiety, which in
turn may trigger a gene-driven cascade into a final common pathway psychiatric
syndrome.
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The final common pathway psychiatric syndromes are serious conditions reflect-
ing a pathologic brain state that, without treatment, results in an autonomous course
and often chronic outcome. Major depression, manic-depressive bipolar syndromes,
panic anxiety, and psychoses are the major examples of final common pathway syn-
dromes. In all these syndromes, the meme-processing executive function of the brain
is severely impaired, and thus general reduction in meme proliferation as well as
directly gene-oriented therapy is necessary.
Psychiatric symptoms and syndromes may be classified in several functional
clusters of continuum as follows, which will be discussed in more detail in Part IV:
A. Attention-cognition spectrum syndromes (delirium, dementia, impulse control
syndromes, ADHD, antisocial personality, obsessive-compulsive personality
traits, obsessive-compulsive syndrome)
B. Fear–anxiety–depression spectrum syndromes (anxiety, panic, ASD, PTSD,
depression – neurotic and syndromic, borderline syndrome, mania, adjustment
disorders, avoidant traits and personality, phobias)
C. Reality perception spectrum syndromes (psychosis, dissociation, conversion,
somatoform, misattribution somatization)
D. Pleasure-motivation spectrum syndromes (substance use/abuse, addictions to
substances and beliefs, fanaticism)
E. Primary memetic syndromes (eating disorders, factitious syndromes, malinger-
ing, meme-directed irrational Acts)
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14.1 Psychiatric Diagnosis and Problems with DSM
In Chapter 1, I described the evolving model of mental illness as a result of
epigenesis, the turning on and off of genes in interaction with environment. In
Chapter 2, we examined how stress, newly introduced memes that interact with
resident memes in the brain, causes changes in genes and brain structures. In the
subsequent chapters, we examined the nature of memes as brain code and how
culture as memetic pools affect mental health and illness. We saw that memes as
neural connections are the actual agents of culture affecting genes and physiology.
In this chapter, we will consider briefly the history of psychiatric diagnosis and then
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discuss what rational psychiatric diagnostic scheme should be in the light of gene ×
meme × environment interaction.
A widely accepted diagnostic scheme is the official diagnostic scheme of the
American Psychiatric Association, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM). The fist DSM, published in 1952, was based on Adolf Meyer’s
psychobiology, a model that prominently posited the interaction among constitution,
personality, and environment (Meyer and Winters, 1950). Psychiatric disorders were
considered to be reactions of the personality in adapting to environmental demands.
Both DSM I and DSM II (published in 1968) were based on the then prevailing etio-
logic theory – psychodynamics. DSM III, published in 1980, was a frank admission
of the inadequacy of the psychodynamic model as it attempted to redefine psychi-
atric diagnoses as research questions rather than coherent entities. By adopting an
“atheoretical” model, it dropped the psychodynamic view of etiology and the notion
of neurosis, that there is a continuum of psychiatric problems or conflicts between
the normal and the psychiatrically ill. It adopted, to a large measure, the “research
criteria for psychiatric diagnosis” that was designed to choose “pure cultures” of
major psychiatric disorders for genetic research (Feighner et al., 1972). DSM III
and its direct successor, DSM IV (1994), classify major psychiatric syndromes into
mutually exclusive categories (e.g., schizophrenia vs. schizoaffective disorder) pre-
sumably based on the notion of different genetic underpinnings. Though it claimed
to be atheoretical, it thus implicitly adopted a biological/genetic model of psychi-
atric syndromes. Another outstanding feature of DSM III and IV is the multiaxial
system of diagnosis – Axis I: Major psychiatric syndromes, Axis II: Personality dis-
orders and developmental disorders, Axis III: Medical diseases, Axis IV: Stressors,
Axis V: Global assessment of functioning (GAF). This system explicitly makes the
important declaration that psychiatric syndromes and medical diseases coexist in a
patient, and has made important contributions in avoiding the “either physical or all
in the head” notion of a symptom.
DSM III and IV have helped foster psychiatric research by defining reliable
populations for study. This fortuitously coincided with the rapid development in
molecular biology and genetics, psychopharmacology, neuroimaging, and the com-
pletion of the Human Genome Project. If we can define a “pure culture” of a genetic
syndrome, we are now in a position to understand its genetic underpinnings.
The multiaxial system of DSM III and IV, in addition to recognizing the coex-
istence of medical and psychiatric conditions, has also pioneered the notion that
diagnosis is more than the listing of diseases but also includes the personality aspect
of the patient, as well as the role of stress and the level of functioning. It is an attempt
to diagnose the patient, not merely the disease.
On the negative side, the problems include: confusion concerning the categories
and criteria for diagnosis, confusion concerning the distinction between Axis I and
Axis II, and confusion concerning the nature and function of multiaxial diagnosis.
Confusion concerning categories: Any clinician attempting to use DSM III and
IV realizes that the diagnostic criteria are arbitrary. While it is possible to assign a
patient mechanically to one diagnosis or another, it often makes no clinical sense.
We often realize that there are patients who almost meet the criteria, or meet most of
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the criteria for more than one category. Examples include the differentiation between
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, making the diagnosis of borderline per-
sonality disorder, and classifying psychosis in a patient with the history of both
schizophrenia and substance use. Genetic research of probands with the categori-
cal diagnoses has shown that, in fact, these categories are heterogeneous, that many
different genes may underlie the same category such as schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder (Cheng et al., 2006; Prathikanti and Weinberger, 2005) and that one or a
few genes may underlie many different categories such as bipolar disorder, schizoaf-
fective disorder, and schizophrenia (Caspi et al., 2002, 2003; Craddock et al., 2006;
Hamshere et al., 2005; Murphy et al., 2004). It seems clear that attempting to find
the biological underpinnings of current categorical diagnoses is a wrong approach.
The “biological underpinnings” have been shown to be for brain states and traits
that may be associated with a variety of psychological/functional predispositions
and deserving of a status independent of specific Axis I diagnosis.
Confusion concerning distinction between Axis I and Axis II: What is the
distinction between a personality disorder and a major psychiatric disorder? Is
schizophrenia not a developmental, personality disorder? Where does a borderline
personality with a psychotic episode belong in this scheme? Genetic studies have
also shown that there may be a continuum between personality disorder and a major
psychiatric syndrome, e.g., borderline personality and bipolar disorder (Akiskal
et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2004).
Confusion concerning the nature and function of multiaxial diagnosis: What is
the multiaxial diagnosis the diagnosis of? Axes I and II are diagnostic categories
with explicit criteria, Axis III is diagnosis without explicit criteria, Axis IV is a list
of stressors, Axis V is a scale. Axes IV and V are, strictly speaking, not diagnoses at
all. What is the overarching framework for this laundry list? What are the functions
of Axes IV and V in a diagnostic scheme?
The problems of DSM III and IV are rooted in two major areas. One is that it is
based on a conceptually faulty notion that psychiatric illnesses are categorical and
discrete. Second is that the multiaxial system is a hodge podge of interesting and
important areas to consider in making a diagnosis that lack conceptual rigor.
Discussing these problems with the current DSM, McHugh (McHugh, 2001,
1992, 2005; McHugh and Slavney, 1998) called for a rethinking of psychiatric
diagnosis along the perspectives of disease, dimensions, behavior, and life story.
He proposed that mental illnesses be considered in four, non-mutually exclusive
clusters – (1) disease (e.g., schizophrenia), (2) psychological vulnerabilities (e.g.,
emotional stability), (3) behavior (e.g., alcoholism), and (4) distress evoked by
events (e.g., grief).
Some (Genova, 2003) have called for “dumping” of DSM altogether in favor of
disease codes of ICD 10.
The overarching problem of current DSM is that it lacks a coherent conceptual
model of psychiatric illness, that in the light of modern understanding, it is behind
the times. In view of the advantages of DSM discussed above, however, what is
called for is a reconceptualization, not abandonment, of the multiaxial model of
diagnosis.
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14.2 What Is Diagnosis?
Diagnosis derives from the Greek dia, meaning through or across, and gnosis, mean-
ing knowing. Knowing Through, Knowing Across What? Hippocrates, the father
of medicine, believed “with regard to diseases, the circumstances from which we
make the diagnosis are – by attending to the general nature of all, and the peculiar
nature of each individual – to the disease, the patient, and the applications – to the
person who applies them. . . the patient’s habits, regimen, and pursuits. . .thoughts,
sleep, or absence of sleep, and sometimes his dreams. . .” (Hippocrates: Of the
Epidemics, Section III)(Hippocrates). Diagnosis must be the knowing of the whole
of the patient. DSM III and IV were attempts toward this goal, though the goal was
not explicitly stated, and thus suffered conceptual confusion.
The diagnosis of the whole of the patient must explicitly define the suffering
dimension of the patient, the illness, and the contributing morphological, physi-
ological, biochemical, genetic disease or conditions, the memes and stresses that
interacted with them, and the assets of the patient that protect or mitigate against
the noxious forces.
Illness is by definition memetic, i.e., how a person experiences suffering and
expresses suffering is determined by prevailing belief systems and imitation of those
who suffer from ailments. Illness is often the manifestation of a strife and/or rev-
olution within the patient’s memetic brain, caused by stress or other weakening of
the dominant selfplexes, resulting in the upsurge of hitherto repressed aspects of the
personality.
Medical diagnosis in the last century underwent a major transformation, i.e., from
syndromic (illness) to etiologic (disease), largely due to advances in genetics and
biochemistry. This spectacularly successful reductionistic approach, however, often
led to a lamentable neglect of the patient as a person. Should psychiatry follow the
footsteps of medicine? The multiaxial diagnosis in psychiatry potentially allows us
to avoid the pitfalls of replacing illness with disease. For psychiatry, at least, both
illness and disease have to be recognized and treated. Currently, however, all Axes
I and II diagnoses are syndromes, and, as we have noted, each syndrome proba-
bly has a number of different genetic/neuroscience underpinnings (disease), each
of which, in turn, gives rise to different combinations of syndromes depending on
developmental history. For example, the 5-HTTLPR s/s may underlie depressive
syndrome, anxiety syndrome, risk-aversive personality, and irritable bowel syn-
drome (see Chapter 1 for further discussion of 5-HTTLPR). Should 5-HTTLPR
s/s replace all of the syndromes as an etiologic diagnosis, at the expense of knowing
what the patient’s suffering is?
We need a separate axis for the psychiatric illness, the memetic, phenomenologi-
cal, experiential dimension of the patient, such as depression, anxiety, and psychosis
and a separate axis for the genetic/neuroscience disease diagnosis. The differen-
tial diagnosis of the syndrome, e.g., depression, would not be major depression vs.
bipolar disorder vs. schizoaffective disorder vs. mood disorder secondary to general
medical condition vs. substance-induced mood disorder. The differential diagno-
sis would instead be: what are the factors that resulted in a memetic revolution or
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memetic war within the brain? What is the extent of contributions to the depressive
syndrome by the specific brain dysfunction, to what extent did specific genes and
early experiences contribute to the brain’s vulnerability to dysfunction, what is the
extent substances may also have contributed, to what extent did recent stresses also
contribute, are there psychosocial support systems that may be mitigating the extent
of depressive memes and thus the depressive syndrome?
When the existence of a genetic/neuroscience disturbance is apparent, then a
differential diagnosis of this condition should occur following the medical model.
This approach will firmly establish the notion that both the illness (memes) and
the disease require attention and care. This approach would also apply to general
medicine.
14.3 Psychiatric Diagnosis: Dysregulation and Final Common
Pathway Syndromes, Resurrection of Neurosis
As discussed above, medical diagnosis saw a shift from syndromic diagnoses (e.g.,
consumption, grippe) to etiologic and laboratory diagnosis (e.g., tuberculosis, Type I
diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia). With the advent of DSM III and IV, it was hoped
that the psychiatric disorders, as with medical illnesses, would give way to discrete
etiologic diagnoses underlying them, perhaps, schizophrenia Type I that would turn
out to be associated with a discrete gene mutation. Research has shown, however,
that there are numerous “vulnerability” genes that subserve normal functions but
may also, in some instances, cause certain aspects of a syndrome (e.g., psychosis in
mood disorders, depression in anxious patients).
Our new model is a continuum model with genetic endowment for adaptive func-
tion that may become dysfunctional. Of course, there are exceptions, such as a
detrimental mutation. There is also the possibility of cliff edge phenomenon, where
an increased expression of an evolutionarily adaptive genetic trait may reach a point
of sudden maladaptiveness, perhaps as in the case of vigilance (Nesse, 2004).
Most psychiatric conditions are syndromes of dysregulation. The dysregulation
may be a reflection of memetic conflict or memetic turmoil, or it may reflect an
epigenetically unstable limbic structure, which in turn is activated by incoming
memes. Anxiety is normal and necessary, but when it becomes panic, and repeated
without provocation, it is dysregulated anxiety and needs treatment. So is sadness
and depression, vigilance and paranoia, creativity, “out of the box thinking” and
psychosis. So is brave exploration and antisociality. The sharp distinction between
normality and psychiatric disorder, and one psychiatric disorder from another, of
DSM III and IV has served its purpose in obtaining reliable syndromic populations
to study. The syndromes turned out to be continuums and genetically heterogeneous.
We must discard the categorical approach. We should also recognize personal-
ity traits and symptoms that border between normality and serious autonomous
psychiatric syndromes. I suggest resurrecting the term neurosis.
Discarding the categorical approach does not mean that we should not have a line
of distinction between neurosis and major psychiatric syndromes. Major psychiatric
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syndromes, such as the depressive syndrome and psychosis, however, should be a
designation of the expectable autonomous course of the illness rather than mutually
exclusive categories. Such major psychiatric syndromes are final common path-
way syndromes that reflect a common brain functional pathology (e.g., hyperactive
D2 receptors in the mesolimbic system) with heterogeneous genetic, biochemical,
and memetic contributions (e.g., drug induced psychosis). One patient may have
multiple psychiatric syndromes as well as neuroses.
Neurosis serves as an intermediate diagnosis between normality and major final
common pathway syndromes and would encompass various traits and symptoms
that represent gene × meme interaction (interaction includes simple additive effect
as well as synergy and mitigation) and early learned behaviors. Neurosis would
include such symptom complexes and personality patterns as generalized anxiety,
phobias, minor depression, schizotypal and avoidant personalities and the borderline
syndrome.
The evidence that psychotherapy affects the brain function/structure (Goldapple
et al., 2004; Kandel, 1979, 1998; Paquette et al., 2003; Roffman et al., 2005) further
provides the necessity to reintroduce the notion of neurosis as the psychotherapy
thereof may actually prevent the full development of a major syndrome, as would
other preventive measures such as social support and protection of children from
violence and abuse.
There is overwhelming evidence that social support mitigates against stress and
the precipitation, maintenance, and prognosis of symptoms of major psychiatric
disorders (Brugha, 1995; Norman et al., 2005; Silver et al., 2006; Surkan et al.,
2006).
The multiaxial system begun with DSM III has to be modified to be compatible
with the new model, and should be a diagnosis in its original sense, i.e., a thorough
knowing of the patient.
The new system should clearly delineate the phenomenological/memetic illness
dimension of the patient from the potential genomic/brain morphological and func-
tional states and the interacting stresses and protective assets of the patient. The
new system, therefore, must have three new entities reflected in the axes: (1) the
genomic/brain morphological/functional dimension, which we will call the geno-
neuroscience diagnosis, (2) early, recent, and current stress, and (3) the protective
psychosocial assets of the patient.
In addition, the new system should have a separate axis for formulation, an
integration of the entries in all the axes in managing the person who is the patient.
14.4 Proposal for a New DSM Scheme
I propose that the axes of the new DSM consist of the following:
Axis I: Memetic/phenomenological (neurophysiomemetic) diagnosis: psychi-
atric syndromes, traits, and symptoms, based on deviations of normal brain
function.
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Axis II: Geno-neuroscience diagnosis: genes, brain morphology, biochem-
istry and pathology, functional changes and conditions independent of, but
potentially influencing Axes I and III.
Axis III: Medical diseases and condition.
Axis IV: Stresses – childhood, recent past, and current.
Axis V: Psychosocial assets: protecting and/or mitigating against disease and
functional state, past 5 years and current.
Axis VI: Biopsychosocial and epigenetic formulation.
Each axis is conceptualized to influence each other and provides a snapshot of
the major factors that must be considered in the pathogenesis and/or management
of Axes I and II.
14.4.1 Axis I: Memetic/Phenomenological (Neurophysiomemetic)
Diagnosis: Psychiatric Syndromes, Symptoms, and Traits,
Based on Deviations of Normal Brain Function
This axis will represent the phenomenological psychiatric illness of the patient. This
approach accepts the suffering dimension of the patient on its own level, no matter
what the underlying etiology. The emphasis here is what memes are emitted by the
patient, and what dysfunctional memes may be out of control within the brain. The
diagnostic terms will be familiar psychiatric syndromes, but the memetic nature of
diagnosis has to be considered.
I suggest that the syndromes be classified in six broad categories based on
deviations of normal brain function in a continuum of severity and manifestation.
A. Attention-cognition spectrum syndromes (delirium, dementia, impulse control
syndromes, ADHD, antisocial personality, obsessive-compulsive personality
traits, obsessive-compulsive syndrome).
B. Fear–anxiety–depression Spectrum Syndromes (anxiety, panic, phobias, ASD,
PTSD, borderline personality, dependent and avoidant personalities, social pho-
bia, bipolarity and mania, depression – neurotic and syndromic, adjustment
disorders).
C. Reality perception spectrum syndromes (psychosis, dissociation, conversion,
somatoform, misattribution somatization).
D. Pleasure-motivation spectrum syndromes (substance use/abuse, addictions to
substances and beliefs, fanaticism).
E. Primary memetic syndromes (eating disorders, factitious disorders, malingering,
meme-directed destructive behaviors).
These categories are not mutually exclusive, and each entity within the categories
may have subtypes and degrees of severity specified. For example, anxiety-
situational, anxiety neurosis, major depression, psychosis – acute, Type I, bipolar
syndrome – Type I, cognitive syndrome – delirium superimposed on dementia.
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See Part IV for further discussion of each of the categories.
Currently, Axis I diagnosis is of limited value in psychopharmacology as the
drugs are the same for most cases of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
disorder, major depression, etc. The reason for this is that the categories do not over-
lap but the symptoms (phenomenology) for which treatment is directed do. Thus,
it makes better sense to classify Axis I in large clusters of symptoms for which
symptomatic treatment may be indicated.
Axis I often indicates a state of pathologic replication of memes such as anxiety
and depression. The cause of replication of the memes may be an overwhelming
influx of new memes (situational), the continuing conflict among resident relatively
dormant memes causing ebb and flow of replication, or reawakening of some dor-
mant memes causing new conflict with dominant ones (neurotic), or may be a final
common pathway major psychiatric syndrome from a culmination of any of the
memetic and genetic factors (syndromic). It may also be a primary memetic syn-
drome based on imitation, such as malingering, factitious syndromes, or suicide
bombing.
The diagnoses in Axis I can and often would be overlapping. Thus, a
patient could be diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive personality trait; obsessive-
compulsive syndrome; depression, neurotic; and depression, syndromic. The diag-
nosis would not use rigid diagnostic criteria but list one or more characteristic
features that may be memetic (e.g., low self-esteem) or physical signs (e.g.,
anorexia). This scheme is compatible with current medical diagnostic prac-
tice where hypertension, hyperlipidemia, edema, nephrotic syndrome, diabetic
nephropathy, and Type II diabetes mellitus might be diagnosed in the same patient.
Who should make Axis I diagnosis? As currently is the practice, any qualified
mental health professional should be able to make the phenomenological Axis I
diagnosis, unlike Axis II diagnosis below, which should be made only by a qualified
medical professional.
14.4.2 Axis II: Geno-Neuroscience Diagnosis: Genes (Including
Family History of Psychiatric Illness), Brain Morphology,
Biochemistry and Pathology, Functional Changes and
Conditions Potentially Influencing Axis I
I expect that this category will be a work in progress for a while as potential
diagnoses in this axis have so far been thought of as mere biological underpin-
nings of Axis I. As discussed above, Axis I syndromes should be conceptual-
ized as symptomatic manifestations of heterogeneous entities, some with major
geno-neurobiological and epigenetic contribution, and others with much more
contribution by situational and memetic factors. Thus, Axis II should not be
conceptualized merely as biological underpinnings of Axis I, but rather inde-
pendent genetic/neurobiologic diagnoses that may or may not contribute to the
behavioral/emotional phenotype in Axis I. In fact, it may explain Axes III and V
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rather than Axis I as in a patient with irritable bowel syndrome and 5-HTTLPR
s/s genotype whose anxiety is only moderate. In fact, some Axis II diagnoses are
more likely to be the biological underpinnings of psychological and physical dis-
positions equally relevant to medicine and psychiatry. By establishing Axis II as an
independent dimension for geno-neurobiological state, we can eschew the unneces-
sary argument as to whether the psychiatric syndrome in Axis I is “biological” or
“psychological” in origin. It also obviates the futile quest for finding the biological
underpinnings of arbitrarily defined Axis I disorders (Frances and Egger, 1999).
For Axis II, we may be initially content with neurobiologic findings on imaging
and known genetic factors, e.g., low hippocampal volume and enlarged amygdala,
hyperactive subgenual anterior cingulate, 5-HTTLPR s/s.
The entities in Axis II would eventually illuminate, together with Axis IV, how
Axes I, III, and V may have evolved as well as suggesting potential intervention
specifically designed for the neurocircuit dysfunction which may be both phar-
macologic and psychotherapeutic. Until such refinements occur, any identifiable
putative biological factors should be listed here, including gene variations as in
5-HTTLPR, MAOA, and DAT1. It should also include abnormalities in brain imag-
ing studies including MRI, fMRI, SPECT, PET, and CT. Significant family history
of psychiatric illness should be also noted here.
These conceptualizations of Axes I and II will promote research as tests for asso-
ciations and correlations among items between the axes are likely to reveal new
ways in which psychiatric syndromes, personality traits, etc., are associated with
specific genes and specific areas and functions of the brain.
14.4.3 Axis III: Medical Diseases and Conditions
This axis would list medical conditions and diseases that may coexist with the
mental condition.
14.4.4 Axis IV: Stresses: Childhood, Recent, and Current
Entries in this axis are the factors that potentially contributed to the personality
trait and neuroses and may have set the stage for the major psychiatric syndrome in
Axis I. In contrast to DSM IV, I propose that we specifically list major stresses in
childhood, as well as recent and current stressors.
14.4.5 Axis V: Psychosocial Assets and Recent/Current
Functioning
A thorough knowing of the patient is not possible without considering the assets
as well as liabilities of the patient. This axis should provide information about the
protective and mitigating factors for health rather than illness. They would include
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
174 14 Psychiatric Diagnosis: Toward a Memetic–Epigenetic Multiaxial Model
intelligence, educational level, school and work history, and social support. I would
propose maintaining the global assessment of functioning of the current DSM at
the end of Axis V, but extend the GAF for past year to past 5 years to account
for functioning before recent stresses in Axis IV, to express it in a single fractional
number: Previous 5 years GAF/ Current GAF. Expressed as: 70/40.
14.4.6 Axis VI: Biopsychosocial and Epigenetic Formulation
This axis is an integration of the previous five axes as they apply to the person who
is the patient. Genetic factors such as family history should be considered in the
light of early memetic experiences including abuse and nurturing. The illness on
Axis I, neurobiologic findings on Axis II and physical conditions in Axis III should
be integrated with recent and current stressors, social support, and functioning levels
in Axes IV and V. This integrated formulation should lead to a rational memetic and
genetic management plan for the patient.
14.5 An Illustrative Case
A 48-year-old married Hispanic female, currently unemployed, was admitted to the
medical service for exacerbation of gastroenteritis. A psychiatric consultation was
requested because she was observed crying, and stating that life was not worthwhile
living.
Medical history revealed that the patient developed gastroenteritis from an early
age, with frequent bouts of diarrhea and abdominal pain. She had multiple med-
ical admissions for this. She was also diagnosed with hepatitis C associated with
intravenous drug use. Upon admission, she had hyponatremia and hypokalemia,
which have been corrected. Her liver function test was within upper normal
limits.
Psychiatric consultation interview revealed that the patient has long-standing
depression with bouts of exacerbation, as well as nightmares and flashbacks of child-
hood abuse of several years’ duration, including physical and sexual abuse. She was
second of six siblings, had never known her biological father, had been abused by
her stepfather. Her mother and stepfather were both migrant field workers. She had
dropped out of school in the eleventh grade to be married to an abusive husband,
which resulted in a divorce within 2 years. She used many substances since the
age of 14, including alcohol, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine. After her
divorce, she worked in various menial jobs and obtained her GED by attending an
adult school. She then attended a school to become a cosmetician and worked in
that capacity for several years, and married her current husband, who is a mechanic
and a caring, non-abusive person, and had two daughters. She had by then stopped
using substances heavily.
Her family history revealed very little concerning her biological father, whom
she never knew, other than that he used substances. Her mother was described as
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being an ineffectual person who was unable to protect the patient from the abusive
stepfather. Her mother also had bouts of depression, and was considered to be a
very rigid, religious, and superstitious person. The family was Catholic. The patient
herself had been religious and attended church regularly until about 2 years ago, but
currently she does not as she “lost faith.”
The patient had very little contact with her mother or stepfather since she left
home, but she knows that they both died about 5 years ago. Her older daughter,
age 18, was killed in an automobile accident 2 years ago, after which her gastroen-
teritis flared up, and she had to stop working. She started using methamphetamine
heavily again. Upon questioning, the patient admitted that she is currently under-
going menopause, and has hot flashes and mood changes. She is not on hormone
replacement therapy.
The patient’s husband describes the patient as a loving but anxious person, who
tends to become preoccupied with worries, and tends to become compulsive when
stressed. For example, she would clean the house several times a day, call her hus-
band and daughter several times a day to make sure they are OK. He also noted that
the patient’s gastrointestinal problems get worse when she is anxious, particularly
since the tragic death of their daughter. He also stated that the patient frequently
wakes up from sleep with nightmares and that she has been using methamphetamine
especially since their daughter’s death.
Mental status examination revealed a rather thin Hispanic woman appearing her
stated age, wearing hospital attire. She showed rather labile affect, particularly when
talking about her deceased daughter, her mood was depressed, and had passive
thoughts of wishing she would die, had hopeless and helpless feelings. She admitted
to an exacerbation of insomnia and nightmares, of seeing her deceased daughter as
well as the patient’s childhood abuse. Although the chart noted that the patient was
disoriented upon admission, at the time of the interview, the patient was cognitively
intact, and showed good abstraction and judgment.
Genetic testing revealed 5-HTTLPR s/s genotype, and CYP 450 2D6 poor
metabolism.
Diagnosis
Axis I:
a. Posttraumatic stress disorder
–first associated with childhood physical and sexual abuse,
–exacerbated by abuse by first husband,
–recently re-exacerbated by her daughter’s death.
b. Depressive neurosis associated with 5-HTTLPR s/s and PTSD.
c. Depressive syndrome as exacerbation of above, precipitated by daughter’s death,
contributed by increased substance use and exacerbation of gastroenteritis,
menopause.
d. Obsessive-compulsive traits, probably to ward off depression, mimetically asso-
ciated with mother’s obsessive-compulsive traits.
e. Polysubstance abuse, probably to self-treat depression, PTSD symptoms, and
physical discomfort.
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f. Probable delirium on admission, associated with electrolyte aberrations on
admission, now resolved except for possibly labile affect, which may also be
associated with menopause.
Axis II:
a. 5-HTTLPR s/s.
b. CYP 450 2D6 poor metabolizer.
c. Probable amygdalar hypersensitivity.
Axis III:
a. Chronic gastroenteritis associated with stress.
b. Electrolyte imbalance upon admission associated with above.
c. Hepatitis C associated with intravenous drug use.
Axis IV: Stresses
a. Stresses in childhood
Childhood physical and sexual abuse
b. Stresses in early adulthood
Physical abuse by first husband
c. Recent and Current Stresses
Daughter’s death 2 years ago
Exacerbation of gastroenteritis
Menopause
Axis V: Psychosocial Assets and Recent/Current Functioning
Assets:
Supportive husband
History of recovery from stress by attending adult school, getting GED, good
employment history until death of daughter.
Function (last 5 years/current)
75/55
Axis VI: Formulation
The patient probably has by family history genetic predisposition for depression
and obsessive-compulsive traits on her mother’s side as well as at least substance
abuse on her biological father’s side. Further contributing to her depressive neuro-
sis and tendency for depressive syndrome, as well as gastroenteritis, is her genetic
status of 5-HTTLPR s/s. Further, her hepatitis C associated with early intravenous
drug abuse and her status as a poor metabolizer of CYP 450 2D6 enzyme are
considerations in using drugs that are metabolized by the liver.
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For a patient with her genetic vulnerability to heightened stress response, her
early memetic environment of migrant farmers was filled with memes for drug and
alcohol abuse and domestic violence. Her stepfather was clearly infected with these
memes and physically abused the patient as a child. This early childhood abuse
caused an epigenetic cascade resulting in stress-responsive gastroenteritis as well
as depressive and obsessive-compulsive neurosis, which led to polysubstance abuse
as self-treatment for the symptoms, again an endemic meme, which unfortunately
led to increased symptoms in the long run. The patient’s inability to assert herself
effectively may have been due to infection by her mother’s religious memes, some of
which may have infected the patient’s tendency toward obsessive-compulsiveness.
Nevertheless, the patient made surprisingly good adaptation by first divorcing her
abusive first husband, then finishing her education, getting out of an abusive first
marriage, and working productively as a cosmetologist, for which her obsessive-
compulsive traits may have been put to good use. She also married a caring man
and had two children. One wonders whether there may have been an unidentified
beneficial memetic model for the patient during this period. Reconnecting with this
memetic model may be an important factor in planning therapy.
The tragic loss of her older daughter due to a motor vehicle accident, however,
resulted in a massive infusion of stress memes, overwhelming her meme-filtering
function, and awakening dormant stress memes, resulting in an unchecked replica-
tion of hopeless and helpless memes, traumatic memes of physical and sexual abuse,
finally culminating in a depressive syndrome as well as a severe exacerbation of
gastroenteritis. Memes associated with menopause, such as the loss of reproductive
function, may have contributed to the strengthening of her low self-esteem, and the
physiologic concomitants of menopause such as hot flashes may have contributed
to her lability of affect. Her delirium upon admission was of course a result of the
electrolyte imbalance.
Therefore, the treatment planning should proceed at a multiple levels:
Treatment:
1. Depressive Syndrome, Depressive Neurosis:
a. Gene-Oriented Rx:
Depressive syndrome is a final common pathway syndrome requiring both
gene- and meme-oriented treatments. In view of her hepatitis C and her CYP
2D6 poor metabolizer status, drugs that are metabolized by the liver, and
especially by this enzyme must be used with caution. As she has severe
insomnia, and her anorexia associated with her gastroenteritis and depres-
sion, an antidepressant that induces sleep and increases appetite, and has an
alternative metabolic pathway to CYP 450 2D6 would be ideal. In view of
her 5-HTTLPR s/s status, an SSRI may not be effective. Mirtazapine is a
non-SSRI drug that has both serotonergic and noradrenergic action, induces
sleep, and enhances appetite. It is metabolized by both CYP 450 2D6 as
well as CYP 450 3A4, an alternative pathway to 2D6. While mirtazapine
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is metabolized by the liver, her normal liver enzyme levels indicate that
use of this drug is not contraindicated. Thus, mirtazapine 15 mg hs was
recommended.
b. Meme-Oriented Rx:
The patient had overwhelming proliferation of depressive memes that had
to be controlled. Hospitalization was recommended as a broad-spectrum
meme-oriented therapy, to change the source of incoming memes in a
controlled setting, and to provide augmentation of meme-filtering activity.
Hospitalization also provides such diversionary activities as occupational and
recreational therapy.
After the hospitalization, the patient should receive outpatient meme-oriented
therapy which would include stress management techniques which would be
conducive to both depressive syndrome and depressive neurosis, as well as
the stress-responsive gastroenteritis. She should also receive specific memes
as education concerning menopause. Cognitive-behavioral therapy geared
to building self-esteem memes would be effective as well as interpersonal
therapy directed to resolving the grief over her daughter’s death.
2. PTSD
Gene-oriented therapies include use of antidepressants as described above.
Specifically for the nightmares, Prazocin 1–6 mg per night may be tried. The
patient received optimal relief with Prazocin 3 mg hs.
Meme-oriented therapies for PTSD would include all broad-spectrum meme-
oriented therapies including stress management, relaxation training, music, and
dance therapy, etc., as well as specific meme-oriented therapies such as recount-
ing traumatic events with suppression of physiologic arousal with propranolol,
cognitive-behavioral therapy, etc.
3. Obsessive-Compulsive Traits and Substance Abuse
In this patient, both obsessive-compulsive traits and substance abuse seem to be
attempts to manage and self-treat depression and PTSD. Thus, the treatment of
the latter conditions may resolve these conditions. Exploration and understand-
ing of the memetic component of her obsessive compulsive traits as an imitation
of her mother’s coping strategy may be helpful, as well as her infection by her
father’s substance abuse memes that resulted in her hepatitis C. Providing alter-
native means of deriving pleasure, such as through relaxation training, music,
dance, massage therapy, may be also helpful.
An avatar, constructed by the patient in collaboration with the therapist, who is
endowed with the attributes that the patient wishes to achieve, may demonstrate to
the patient that she can, indeed, emulate herself behaving and feeling self-confident,
assertive, and in control in virtual reality, which will eventually transform itself into
reality itself.
I wondered in the formulation above whether the patient had an unidentified
memetic model during the period when she divorced her first husband and went
back to school to become a cosmetologist. In fact, it turned out that the patient had
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made friends with an older woman, Rema, who was herself a cosmetologist. The
patient had gradually lost contact with Rema who had moved to another city. When
the patient was reminded of that relationship, she successfully reconnected with her
and has weekly phone conversations with her. The patient considers talking with
Rema regularly to be a great part of her current psychotherapy.
Note: This chapter is largely based on a paper entitled, A proposal for a new multiaxial model
of psychiatric diagnosis. A continuum-based patient model derived from evolutionary develop-
mental gene–environment interaction, published in Psychopathology (Leigh, 2009). This chapter,
however, explicitly adds the memetic dimension to the paper.
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15.1 Memetic Diagnosis
In the previous chapter, I proposed that a new multiaxial psychiatric diagnostic
scheme should have, as Axis I, Memetic and phenomenological diagnosis.
What is memetic diagnosis? Memetic diagnosis such as depression and anxiety
are descriptions of the memes that distress the patient. As discussed previously,
psychiatric symptoms often arise from memetic conflicts, and major psychiatric
syndromes are common final pathway brain dysregulation arising from gene ×
meme interaction. Furthermore, how a person experiences mental anguish and
expresses it is often based on imitation of others, in the original meaning of
the term, meme. In addition, memetic influences from the surrounding culture
as well as the zeitgeist often determine in what form the distress is expressed.
Memetic diagnosis, then, should be accompanied by a thorough memetic assess-
ment of the patient that includes the early memetic environment, potential gene ×
meme interaction in childhood, early and recent imitation figures, and recent infu-
sion of stress memes. This memetic assessment should be an important component
of the biopsychosocial and epigenetic formulation, the Axis VI of my proposal.
Epigenetic formulation involves the interaction between genes and memes
through development, with particular attention to significant stresses and nurturing
in early life and recent stresses and social support. These are the factors that may
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have augmented vulnerability genes and attenuated resilence genes or vice versa,
resulting in syndromic mental illness, neurotic traits, or mental health.
At first glance, Axis I memetic diagnosis may not seem to differ from con-
ventional diagnosis, and as far as nomenclature goes, this notion is correct. What
memetic diagnosis implies, in addition to the meaning of the memes collected, is
the fact that the memes have replicated to become a problem. Thus, it is necessary
to identify the cause of the replication as well as to treat the process of replication.
The cause of the replication may be (1) imitation and/or empathy, deliberate or
automatic, (2) large influx of new memes, (3) replication of dormant resident memes
due to either weakening of the dominant memes or new memes augmenting the res-
ident ones, (4) combination of any of the above, potentially causing a final common
pathway dysregulation of the brain. The presumptive identification of the cause of
the replication is then reflected in the memetic diagnosis with the qualifiers of: neu-
rotic (resident meme conflict or resurgence), situational (influx of new memes or
weakening of the dominant memes), or syndromic (final common pathway syn-
drome representing brain dysregulation). The qualifiers are not mutually exclusive,
so that a person may have depression, neurotic and situational; anxiety and panic,
situational and syndromic.
In this chapter, I will briefly describe how memetic assessment should be made,
how priming factors and role models should be considered in the biopsychoso-
cial formulation, and anticipate some new methods and techniques that need to be
developed to further this aim.
15.2 Memetic Assessment
Memetic assessment of a patient should take into account the fact that there are con-
scious and unconscious memes, and that pathogenic and resilience memes may be
either conscious or unconscious. The proliferation of usually dormant pathogenic
memes occasioned by recent stress is often the precipitating event of the final
common pathway syndrome.
15.3 Conscious Memes
Traditional methods of history taking and mental status examination will reveal the
memetic content of the patient’s suffering. In addition, the clinician’s mirror neurons
will generate memes within the clinician mirroring the emotional experience of the
patient, i.e., empathy.
In making a memetic diagnosis, it is important initially to listen to the patient and
appreciate the patient’s memes rather than reinterpreting them immediately accord-
ing to the clinician’s memes. For example, when a patient complains of feeling sad
and tearful, it should not immediately translate into depression, as the memeplex of
feeling sad and tearful (think of an image of a person who is sad and tearful) can
have many different causes and situations. For example, she may be feeling sad and
tearful because she has an image of someone sad and tearful stuck in her mind (i.e.,
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an isolated unchecked replication of sad and tearful memes as an imitation of the
image), whom she may have seen in a film or a book. Thus, a natural question to
ask may be, “When you are feeling sad and tearful, what comes to your mind, any
persons or images?” Of course, considering the associated symptoms and signs of
a major final common pathway syndrome such as major depression is important,
but so is an understanding of the memetic nature of the patient’s experience and
presentation.
External or situational stresses and the memes they awaken are important con-
tributors to psychiatric symptoms and should be addressed. In addition, as memetic
conflicts often lead to anxiety, despair, and emotional turmoil, it is important to
identify memetic conflicts in the patient. Direct questioning may be very useful,
i.e., “Stress, as well as conflicts or dilemmas within one’s own mind often causes
anxiety, irritability, and depression. Have you had any recent stresses or struggles
within your own mind?” When asked, many patients will respond with a sense
of relief that the clinician understands his or her emotional turmoil. The memetic
conflict is often conscious or preconscious and readily available for discussion,
such as ambivalent feelings about job or spouse, or even existential (and possibly
depressive) ruminations about life and suicide.
15.4 Unconscious Memes
The memetic conflicts are often unconscious, i.e., repressed by the dominant self-
plexes, and the patient may adamantly deny any internal conflict. This is particularly
the case when the memetic conflict is among the memes that have been resident
in the brain for a long time, perhaps since childhood, or when there is a con-
flict between the seflplex and a surreptitiously introduced memes (see Chapters 11
and 12) that may awaken a dormant and dangerous resident meme.
Such unconscious memes and memetic conflicts may be surmised indirectly by
obtaining a thorough personal and cultural history as well as the history of interac-
tion among family members and cultural/subcultural groups and artifacts, such as
customs and values. Very strong affect-laden acceptance or rejection of such values
and customs may reflect underlying conflict. Projective tests, such as the thematic
apperception test (TAT) and the Rorschach may also shed some light into the uncon-
scious memetic life of the patient (Blatt et al., 1994; Bornstein and Masling, 2005;
Klopfer and Kelley, 1942; Stein, 1955).
15.5 Priming Factors and Role Models
Memetic assessment should incorporate priming factors and role models. Priming
factors may include having been exposed to the meme that mental distress should
be expressed as a somatic symptom, and a role model may be a relative or a friend
who had a particular symptom. For example, the exacerbation of back pain with
depression may be modeled after a friend who had similar symptoms and was
bedridden.
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15.6 The Need for New Memetic Diagnostic Tools
Up to this point, we discussed existing diagnostic tools to identify the memes and
memetic contribution to psychiatric illness. It is obvious that the existing tools are
limited because they do not explicitly identify memes as the target of investigation.
Thus, there is a need for tools specifically designed for collecting and identifying
memes and memeplexes. In a sense, free association in psychoanalysis and psycho-
analytically oriented psychotherapy is a method of collecting memes, but the length
of the procedure is uneconomical and what to do with the seemingly randomly
collected memes is open to question.
There is a need for more efficient and systematic methods of useful meme col-
lection. The Jungian word association test may be an existing technique that may
identify unconscious conflictual memes or complexes, and may deserve another look
(Golden et al., 2000; Mohan, 2000).
Computerized meme scan may be developed. The goal of the scan would be
to identify more common meme conflicts and the presence of pathologic memes
and their strength as well as to determine the selfplexes and the degree of memetic
democracy or autocracy. An inventory of beliefs, both common and uncommon,
may be developed. Meme scan could also incorporate aspects of word associa-
tion test, free association for a limited amount of time (somewhat akin to the
Gottschalk-Gleser verbal sample test), Myers-Briggs personality typology, and
skin conductance associated with computer-presented potentially conflictual word
(Gottschalk and Gleser, 1969; Gottschalk et al., 1969; Myers et al., 1985; Quenk,
2000; Tieger and Barron-Tieger, 1997; University of Mississippi, Department of
Psychology, 1981).
Memodynamics might be a tool to understand the ebb and flow of memes and
the relative strengths of various memeplexes in the course of development of the
individual. This would be a history of conscious and unconscious belief systems
and their changes from childhood through adolescence to adulthood and beyond.
What was your idea of how the world started when you were a child? What was
your idea of your parents as you are growing up? What did you like to read as a
child? Fairy tales? Did you believe in fairies? When you were school age, what
did you believe about how the world began? How about now? Who was your hero
when you were in grade school? In high school? Please describe how things changed
during your adolescence, etc. This type of detailed history could also be obtained
through a computerized program where the subject plays an active role in inputting
the data and answering questions.
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An understanding of memetic diagnosis should naturally lead to meme-oriented
therapies. We discussed in the previous chapter that memetic diagnosis entails the
identification of the causes of pathogenic meme replication. We discussed that the
cause of the unchecked replication may a combination of induction of pathogenic
memes by imitation or empathy, massive influx of memes from the environment
due to sheer exposure, and/or resurgence of dormant pathogenic memes due to a
weakening of the dominant memes.
Memetic therapy may be geared both to the cause of the replication as well as
to the pathogenic memes themselves. In order to treat the influx of memes caused
by either exposure to external memes or through empathy, one has to block the
continuing entrance of the pathogenic memes into the brain, i.e., perception and
induction of memes. This will also tend to prevent the weakening of the dominant,
healthy memes.
16.1 Blocking the Entrance and Induction of Pathogenic Memes
How does one block the continuing infusion of pathogenic memes into the brain?
An environmental change, including hospitalization, is a means of controlling the
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memetic environment of the brain. Diversion of attention from the pathogenic
memes in the environment is another method – including vacation, relaxation train-
ing, recreational activities, even sleep. Intersensory inhibition has been reported to
be effective in reducing seizure-inducing stimuli in rats (Kramer and Adler, 1976).
Judicious use of sensory deprivation may also be considered, but it may lead to
unchecked replication of existing memes and hallucinations (Merabet et al., 2004).
When pathogenic memes are induced through empathy or imitation of a person,
e.g., a charismatic leader, physical separation from that person may be therapeutic,
i.e., separating the person from a cult or even incarceration as a means of separating
a person from the pathogenic meme environment of a gang. Care should be taken,
however, that the new environment is not equally pathogenic.
External memes enter the brain encapsulated in a sensory vehicle, i.e., as words,
images, melodies, which consist of sensory stimuli, i.e., visual, auditory, olfactory,
gustatory, and tactile (which also include temperature, pain, pressure, and vibration).
As each sensory modality tends to attend to one sensation at a time, it should be
possible to prevent the entrance of a meme by saturating the sensory modality in
which the meme is substantially encapsulated. For example, if the pathogenic meme
is in the form of an image, say that of Hitler, presenting the subject with another
image that is attractive (likely to replicate), such as the image of a loved one or a
relaxing scenery, may block the entrance and replication of Hitler’s image and what
it stands for.
Auditory and tactile stimulation may be similarly utilized, e.g., repeated playing
of favorite song or relaxing music, tactile stimuli such as massage that can dis-
tract attention from the pathogenic memes and thence their replication. As there is
plasticity and cross-contamination among sensory modalities, such saturation with
nonpathogenic sensory stimulus may also block other forms of pathogenic memes
(Shimojo and Shams, 2001; Violentyev et al., 2005).
16.2 Treating Memes in the Brain
In addition to blocking the entry of pathogenic memes, memetic therapy should be
geared to suppressing and/or eradicating the replicating pathogenic memes already
in the brain. This may be accomplished by first identifying the pathogenic memes
and their nature, identifying the components of the pathogenic memeplexes, and
identifying their sensory capsules or vehicles, and neutralizing or suppressing them.
16.2.1 Identifying Pathogenic Memes and Memeplex Components
As discussed in the previous chapter on memetic diagnosis, an obvious way of iden-
tifying pathogenic memes is to listen to the patient. The complaints of the patient,
and more importantly, the preoccupation of the patient, when verbalized, are the
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pathologic memes that the patient experiences. They may be emotions, such as feel-
ing blue and sad, anxious or angry. They may be thoughts, such as wishing to die,
future is hopeless, etc. From the verbal communication (memetic emission) of the
patient, one can also recognize the underlying memeplexes, the schema or world
view as well as the schema of the self, i.e., selfplex(es). Such memplexes may be
“The world is a hostile and hurtful place and nobody loves me,” “I am not a worth-
while person,” “I feel this way because I am guilty,” “I am anxious because the FBI
is watching me,” etc.
Asking specific questions can also elicit pathogenic memes, for example, “Do
you feel hopeless about the future?” “Do you have any thoughts of suicide?” “Do
you have feelings that others are trying to do harm to you?,” etc. As for empa-
thy/imitation, one could ask “Do you know of anyone who had symptoms or feelings
like yours?” “Tell me about people who are important in your life,” etc.
Free association is another technique that may be useful in identifying under-
lying memeplexes, as some of the pathogenic unconscious memplexes may reveal
themselves in disguised forms.
Empathy, i.e., firing of mirror neurons on the part of the clinician is another
important method of understanding the patient’s memetic state and memplexes.
What one is feeling is often what the patient is experiencing, and the thoughts
(memes) that come to mind are also often induced by the patient’s memes.
Once the underlying memeplexes have been identified, it is useful to consider
the component memes of the memplexes or schemas. For example, the memeplex,
“I am not a worthwhile person” may consist of (1) sad affect (meme), (2) angry
affect (meme), (3) experience of failure (meme), (4) negative bias in evaluation
(meme affecting executive function), (4) hopelessness (meme). The memeplex may
be further buttressed by a recurring thought in the form of a voice (which may be a
thought perceived as an inner voice, or frank auditory hallucination) that says “you
are worthless” (meme that encapsulates itself in auditory sensation).
16.2.2 Identifying Capsules and Vehicles
In the above example, we observed that a memeplex may recruit a sensory modality
that augments its replication, i.e., the voice that repeats itself, “you are worth-
less!” Other forms of capsules and vehicles may be identified, such as an image
of oneself being ugly and diseased, a thought that the head may be filled with dirty
thoughts, may be putrefied, etc. Such thoughts (memes) may multiply and gain fur-
ther strength, becoming a delusion, e.g., “My brain is filled with maggots,” then
“I can feel the maggots squirming about in my brain!”
The memes may travel in vehicles, such as written words, drawings, and paint-
ings. Words and drawings can recreate the original memeplexes in the brains of
those who read or see them, as in Munch’s famous painting, The Scream.
It should be made clear from the outset that the vehicles that carry memes are
memes themselves but that these memes serve the function of embedding and
transporting other memes that form the content of the vehicle.
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Melody and rhythm are readily available vehicles for memes to travel, thus
songs and verses have been used throughout history to carry various memes and
memeplexes, most of them not pathogenic. Nevertheless, some pathogenic memes,
such as that of violence, may be carried in some rap music and others. Note that
some memes may co-opt the melodies of familiar and beloved songs to camouflage
themselves and to infiltrate unsuspecting brains.
An example is the melody of the English folk song Greensleeves from the six-
teenth century, that was co-opted into the Christian hymn, the Manger Throne, by
William Dix in 1865. Parts of the two verses are presented below:
Greensleeves Manger Throne
Alas my love you do me wrong
To cast me off discourteously;
And I have loved you oh so long
Delighting in your company.
Green sleeves was my delight,
Green sleeves my heart of gold
Green sleeves was my heart of joy
And who but my lady green sleeves
What Child is this who, laid to rest
On Mary’s lap is sleeping?
Whom angels greet with anthems sweet,
While shepherds watch are keeping?
This, this is Christ the King,
Whom shepherds guard and angels sing;
Haste, haste, to bring Him laud,
The Babe, the Son of Mary.
Why lies He in such mean estate,
Where ox and ass are feeding?
Good Christians, fear, for sinners here
The silent Word is pleading.
Nails, spear shall pierce Him through,
The cross be borne for me, for you.
Hail, hail the Word made flesh,
The Babe, the Son of Mary.
16.2.3 Neutralizing Capsules and Vehicles
Once the capsules and vehicles of pathogenic memes have been identified, methods
should be devised to neutralize them. Unfortunately, specific techniques of doing
this have yet to be developed. Devising such techniques should be relatively easy in
principle. For example, if a particular melody carrying a pathogenic meme can be
identified within the brain, it may be possible to feed into the brain the inverse of
the sound wave of the pathogenic meme, thus completely neutralizing it. So with
a counter-rhythm. It may also be possible to co-opt the pathogenic meme carry-
ing sound or melody by substituting the words that are antidotes of the pathogenic
memes. Thus, an inner voice repeating, “I am a bad person,” may be substituted by
an actual repetition of the words, “I am a good person.”
As for visual stimuli such as images, the repeated presentation of a substitute
image by itself, or paired with the pathogenic image initially and then presented by
itself, may neutralize the pathogenic image.
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Words as vehicle are more complex but could still be broken down to syllables
and letters with attendant visual and sonic qualities that may be amenable to sensory
neutralization. Nonsense words or antonyms that are look-alikes or sound-alikes
may also be utilized.
16.2.4 Deconstructing and Suppressing Memes
The content of the memes and memplexes, in addition to the exterior capsules
and vehicles, may be also deconstructed and subject to suppression. In this case,
it is important to recognize that it is unlikely that the meme as memory can be
completely eradicated, but rather the goal of therapy would be to suppress its
replication.
Deconstructing a memeplex may go like this:
What goes into “I am worthless”?
It involves I + am + worth+ less
What is “I”? –I am John Smith, I am a clerk, I am a husband, etc.
What is “am” – exist, identify with, alive, not dead, etc.
What is “worth”? – good, rich, healthy, can be relied on, do the work, etc.
What is “less”? – no good, not meeting the criteria, not deserving, etc.
The treatment may involve feeding back the following memes for each memetic
component.
For “I”: I am John Smith, I am a clerk, have been for 5 years, I am a husband
with two children, good children, a good father
For “am”: I exist, am alive, am needed as husband and father,
For “worth”: I am a good worker, can be a good husband, can be a good father,
in fact, am a good father
For “less”: Maybe not rich, maybe not as good as I could be because I am
depressed, I can be good when I get better, I can be Excellent!
16.2.5 Augmenting Protective Memes
Meme-oriented therapy should also be geared to enhancing protective memes
as well as neutralizing pathogenic memes. The protective memes include non-
autocratic selfplexes, memes that enhance self-esteem, memes that induce relax-
ation and enjoyment, memes that facilitate gratifying interpersonal interaction,
etc. Relaxation training, music therapy, massage therapy, etc., can both atten-
uate pathogenic memes and enhance protective memes. Direct meme infusion
through hypnosis or experience of caring by the therapist might be other means
of strengthening protective memes.
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16.3 Conventional Meme–Directed Therapies
Certain conventional therapies are clearly meme directed. In fact, most psychother-
apies are meme directed in the sense that they wind up endeavoring to change
the memetic content of the person through meme exchange, i.e., talking. Specific
psychotherapies will be discussed in Chapter 18.
16.4 Need for Novel Therapies
Existing psychotherapies have been either geared toward the thoughts (cognitive
therapy), behavior (behavioral therapy), or to conflicts arising from basic drives and
inhibitory forces (psychodynamic therapy), or combinations of the above.
The recognition of gene × meme interaction and the role of stress that arises
at least in part from memetic conflicts in mental illness provide us with a new
perspective in therapy.
Psychiatric therapy should be geared toward both genes and memes.
(1) Gene-oriented therapy
This should take into account the epigenesis of the person, i.e., what physical
and memetic stresses in early life caused which genes to be turned on or off
resulting in the vulnerability to mental illness, and how can we reverse it? Gene-
oriented therapy is not limited to drug therapy. In fact, there is evidence that
a nurturing environment in adulthood and psychotherapy may be effective in
reversing the effects of early stress on specific genes and thus the micro- or
macro-morphology and function of the brain.
(2) Meme-oriented therapy
The recognition that memes interact with genes, and that memes are actual
functional neuronal units that may have various components such as thoughts,
beliefs, sounds, imagery, colors, texture, and emotions opens up a whole new
world of meme-oriented therapies.
(a) Existing multimodal therapies such as music and dance could be integrated
with psychotherapy with a common memetic theme. In addition, novel ther-
apies may be developed that may be geared to modality-specific compo-
nents of the pathogenic meme, e.g., sound, image, emotion. Deconstructing
a memeplex may lead to specific antidotes for its components. Such an anti-
dote may be the infusion of an incompatible idea encapsulated in a catchy
tune, or it could be an inverse sound wave to an existing tune that carries a
pathogenic meme.
(b) Novel therapies geared toward a resolution of meme–meme conflicts could
be devised. Such conflicts could be identified utilizing novel techniques
such as a meme scan (Chapter 15). New memes that would either har-
monize or buffer the conflicting memes could be infused encapsulated in
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imagery or melody, and the patient may be prepared to be more receptive
to meme infusion through relaxation, hypnosis, or medications.
(c) Avatars and Virtual Reality Techniques.
Another novel meme-oriented therapy is the use of avatars as models of
imitation. Avatars are digitized images of oneself, and such avatars may be
programmed to look and behave in certain desired ways in virtual reality
that the subject observes. For example, the avatar may be more slender
than the subject, more assertive, and may exercise. After seeing the avatar,
subjects have been shown to be more assertive, and more likely to exercise
(Bailenson, 2006; Bailenson et al., 2008; Platoni, 2008; Taylor et al., 2008;
Yee and Bailenson, 2007). In this memetic therapy, one actually imitates
oneself projected into the future (virtual reality).
Virtual reality has already been used to desensitize patients with phobias.
Patients could also practice job interviews, giving presentations, etc., using
virtual interviewer or virtual audience. These are examples of memetic
therapy as the subject practices different memes (facial expression, pos-
ture, speech, etc.) in virtual reality. Through such practice, the patient may
choose the appropriate memetic constellations to present as the selfplex for
the situation.
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17.1 What is Broad-Spectrum Meme-Oriented Therapy?
Our body contains many microorganisms. Many of them are beneficial, even
essential, for bodily function such as those in the gut that assist the digestive func-
tion. Some ancient intruders became an integral and essential part of our very cells
in the form of mitochondria. Other microorganisms are merely symbiotic, causing
neither harm nor any benefit. Then, some, like the varicella and herpes simplex
viruses, are pathogenic but may stay in our bodies without causing much trouble as
their multiplication is checked by our immune system. Under certain conditions of
weakened defenses, however, the latent pathogenic viruses may multiply and dis-
ease ensues. Weakened defenses may be caused by infection by another organism,
as in HIV, or by malnutrition, drugs, etc. Under those conditions, even normal flora
may overgrow and cause disease. Of course, infusion of virulent microorganisms
may overwhelm the defenses and cause disease immediately. In all these instances,
there is a massive multiplication of the organism in the disease state.
Likewise, there is a massive multiplication of memes in mental illness – the
culprit memes may have been initially benign and beneficial, or symbiotic, or
pathogenic but dormant. In the disease state, there is a massive multiplication of
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memes in the form of ideas (e.g., paranoid or obsessive), emotions (e.g., depressive
or euphoric), worries, desires, and behavior.
In treating infections by microorganisms, broad-spectrum antibiotics have been
particularly useful as they target a broad range of organisms, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the organism, the therapy can be effective. Especially in the case of mixed
infections, they can be particularly useful. Similarly, there are broad-spectrum ther-
apies that may be geared to suppressing a broad range of memes. Of course, as
in the case with antibiotics, broad-spectrum memetic therapy may have the side
effect of suppressing beneficial normal flora of memes as well. Nevertheless, when
the unchecked multiplication of memes may be overwhelming, broad-spectrum
anti-meme therapy can be a very effective method of controlling the situation and
preventing an escalation of the memetic multiplication.
How can we actually achieve this? Antibiotics generally interfere with the
replicative mechanism of the microbe. What is the replicative mechanism of
memes? As we discussed in Chapters 9 and 11, memes replicate through signal
reinforcement of the neural cliques that make up the memes and by recruiting
other neural clusters through the development of new synaptic and dendritic con-
nections. These old and new connections are enhanced by attention, affect, and
thinking. There is, of course, unconscious replication of memes in the background,
but the dominant replication process is usually conscious in the form of thoughts and
feelings. Thus, depriving the pathogenic memes of attention, affect, and thought and
thus the neural reinforcement would interfere with their multiplication.
An obvious approach is pharmacological intervention, a direct suppression of
attention and cortical activity. It is well known that most mental illness is associated
with insomnia and the promotion of sleep with drugs have beneficial effects. Many
tranquilizers, especially benzodiazepines, induce drowsiness and reduced attention.
Antipsychotic drugs and antidepressants are often chosen for the “side effect” of
sedation as well as for the specific action. Many patients on these drugs also report
a blunting of their affect.
There are a number of extant nonpharmacologic techniques that are considered
to be valuable in promoting mental health, but the reason why they are effective has
not been clearly defined. They include such diverse techniques as relaxation train-
ing, meditation, hypnosis, bath, massage, music therapy, dance therapy, exercise,
and bibliotherapy. In the light of our understanding of memes, it is clear that all
these techniques have in common the focusing of attention on something other than
the thoughts and feelings that are distressful, and thus the ability to suppress the
multiplication of memes.
17.2 Sleep, Sedation, and Electroconvulsive Therapy
Most current psychotropic drugs have either sedative or stimulant effect on the brain.
The sedative qualities of the drug are useful in two ways: (1) in inducing sleep and
thus temporarily stop most meme replication, especially if the drug suppresses rapid
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eye movement (REM) sleep and (2) by general reduction in attention directed to
memes while awake, thus reducing meme replication (Rush and Griffiths, 1996).
Stimulants, on the other hand, seem to have the effect of reducing the scattered
attention and thus chaotic meme replication in attention-deficit hyperactivity dis-
order (ADHD), and focusing attention to the memetic task at hand. The memes
associated with the task had been at a disadvantage because of the unchecked
proliferation of irrelevant memes. In patients with chronic depression associated
with chronic physical illness, especially in elderly patients, stimulants may enhance
attention and energy, strengthening the selfplex memes.
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) produces a generalized seizure activity in the
brain, i.e., all memetic proliferation is suspended during the seizure activity when
all neurons are firing simultaneously. Memory impairment is common following
ECT, indicating reduced accessibility and thus multiplication of memes.
17.3 Relaxation and Meditation
Relaxation and meditation therapies are grouped together here because they are usu-
ally practiced together, i.e., meditative techniques are usually utilized to bring about
relaxation, and relaxation is usually suggested or achieved during meditation.
Relaxation therapy has three models – specific effects, relaxation response, and
integrated. The specific response model is geared to specific effects based on the
modality, i.e., muscle relaxation for symptoms associated with muscle tension. The
relaxation response, first formulated by Benson et al. (Benson et al., 1975) pos-
tulates that all effective relaxation techniques produce a generalized physiologic
“relaxation response” characterized by reduced sympathetic arousal. The integrated
model posits that most relaxation techniques have both a relaxation response and a
specific component (Schwartz et al., 1978).
The techniques of relaxation usually involve one or a combination of the fol-
lowing: focusing on muscle relaxation, focusing on breathing, focusing on bodily
sensations (e.g., warmth of hands), focusing on an imagery, focusing on a word or
sound (mantra) (Geba, 1973; Jacobson, 1962; Samuels, 1975).
By diverting attention from the proliferating, pathogenic memes, and focusing
attention on the specific sensation, regardless of the body part or function, there is
attenuation of general memetic replication. This broad-spectrum anti-meme effect,
together with whatever specific physiologic effect the relaxation of muscles or pac-
ing of breathing or vasodilation in hand warming might have, may be responsible
for the overall beneficial effect of relaxation and meditation in mental illness.
17.4 Hypnosis
Contrary to popular notion, hypnosis involves focused and concentrated attention on
a sensation or imagery. A state of altered consciousness or trance is induced by first
fixating attention to a physical sensation, often by gazing at a point or concentrating
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on a feeling of floating. This concentration of attention tends to attenuate attention
paid to other memes and thus their proliferation.
The hypnotic experience itself depends largely on the hypnotizability of the indi-
vidual, which seems to be a trait associated with the ability to concentrate attention
and to enter into a dissociated state. In highly hypnotizable individuals, hypnosis
can alter actual sensory experience such as pain or auditory stimulus through activa-
tion of the prefrontal and cingulate gyri (Faymonville et al., 2006; Nash, 2005; Raij
et al., 2005).
In the dissociated state, susceptibility to suggestion is heightened, and the sub-
ject is ready for new meme infusion by the hypnotist. The hypnotist may then
infuse the subject with memes designed to neutralize existing pathogenic memes
and to enhance salutary memes. The subject can then be taught self-hypnosis, in
which the newly introduced salutary memes can be reinforced. The dissociative
experience in hypnosis thus may nurture the development of a healthier selfplex
that will replace the currently dominant selfplex which is saddled with multiplying
pathogenic memes (Bob, 2008).
Even without achieving a dissociated state, the directed focusing of attention in
hypnosis and self-hypnosis deprives the pathogenic memes of unchecked multipli-
cation, and potentially rechannels attention to salutary memes. Hypnosis is often
used in conjunction with relaxation, and may have synergistic effects.
17.5 Music and Dance Therapy
As early as eighth and ninth centuries, the Islamic scholar and psychologist,
al-Farabi (872–950), known as “Alpharabius” discussed the therapeutic effects of
music in his treatise, Meanings of the Intellect (Haque, 2004). In the seventeenth
century, Robert Burton, an English scholar and vicar at Oxford University, wrote
that music and dance were critical in treating mental illness, especially melancholia
(Burton, 2001). Music therapy became widely recognized after World War II.
The Nordoff–Robbins approach to music therapy posits that everyone can
respond to music, no matter how ill or disabled. Music can enhance communication,
and enable people to live more resourcefully and creatively.
Music therapy has been shown to be effective in alleviating anxiety, depression,
pain, and disability in a wide variety of medical and psychiatric conditions including
mood disorders, addictions, perioperative anxiety and pain, cardiac rehabilitation,
autism, and psychosis (Choi et al., 2008; Dingle et al., 2008; Hanser, 1993; Hanser
and Mandel, 2005; Hanser and Thompson, 1994; Jing and Xudong, 2008; Kemper
et al., 2008; Klassen et al., 2008; Leung, 2008; Mandel et al., 2007; Maratos et al.,
2008; Nilsson, 2008; Raglio et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2008; Sarkamo et al., 2008).
Specific modes of music, e.g., major vs. minor keys, may have specific effects on
the brain, e.g., music in major mode has been shown to be more effective in reducing
mental fatigue associated with stress (Suda et al., 2008).
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Music as well as massage has been shown to attenuate the right frontal EEG
activation seen in depressed adolescents (Jones and Field, 1999).
Music seems to activate specific pathways in the brain that may have salutary
effects on mood and cognitive function (Boso et al., 2006; Esch et al., 2004; Thaut,
2005). There is also evidence that BDNF (brain-derived neurotrphic factor) may be
released with music (Angelucci et al., 2007). Specific music, for example, Mozart’s
piano sonata (K448) but not Beethoven’s fur Elise was shown to enhance spatiotem-
poral tasks and increased blood flow in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, occipital
cortex, and cerebellum in individuals even after the music has stopped (Bodner et al.,
2001).
Rhythm, an essential component of music, has direct effects on human motor
activity and its regulation (Thaut et al., 1999). Dance therapy is a good example of
the utilization of rhythm in health care.
How do these therapies affect the memes? Music is itself memetic, i.e., partic-
ular tunes and rhythms are encoded in neurons and the patterns are replicated in
recall and reproduction. An example of such replication, often unwanted, is the phe-
nomenon of the earworm, the repetition of a song or jingle in one’s mind over and
over again. Music therapy is a form of meme infusion which may have direct neuro-
physiologic and neurochemical effects as discussed above, in addition to the effect
of distracting attention from the replicating pathogenic memes and thus deprive
them of sustenance. Even background music can be an infusion of memes coming
into the brain without awareness but effectuating change in it.
Music and dance therapy, together with play therapy and writing are often con-
sidered to be expressive therapy when they are used to express patients’ emotions
and thoughts. In such expressive form, memes are emitted by the patient in the form
of words, sounds, and motion. Such expressions may result in a decompression of
memetic pressure built by forceful replication. The replicated memes may be cre-
ative and salutary, or may be pathogenic. No matter what the nature of the memes
might be, relief of the memetic pressure may be beneficial.
17.6 Massage Therapy
There are writings on massage in such ancient civilizations as Rome, Greece, China,
Japan, Egypt, India, and Mesopotamia. Hippocrates wrote in 460 BC that “The
physician must be experienced in many things, but “assuredly in rubbing.” The
ancient Chinese medical textbook by the Yellow Emperor, Huangdi Neijing (also
known as the Inner Cannon of the Yellow Emperor), considered to date around two
to fourth century BCE, recommends “massage of skin and flesh.” Massage became
popular in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century and was based
on techniques developed in Sweden (NCCAM, 2006).
There are more than 80 types of massage therapy including the Swedish massage,
deep tissue massage, trigger point massage, and Shiatsu. In all of them, therapists
press, rub, and otherwise manipulate the muscles and other soft tissues of the body,
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often varying pressure and movement. They most often use their hands and fingers,
but may use their forearms, elbows, or feet. Typically, the intent is to relax the
muscles and tendons and to increase blood flow to the massaged areas.
Massage draws attention to the immediate sensations of touch and warmth in the
massaged area and away from the proliferation of pathogenic memes in the form of
thinking, worrying, and other preoccupations. The relaxation of muscles also may
produce a brain state incompatible with anxiety and/or depressive memes.
17.7 Exercise
Physical exercise tends to concentrate attention at the physical task at hand, and
reduce attention being paid to pathogenic memes. Furthermore, the endorphins that
are released with exercise enhance positive mood and general health (Bender et al.,
2007; Karacabey, 2005; Koseoglu et al., 2003). Exercise has been shown to be
effective in the rehabilitation of chronic psychiatric patients (Faulkner and Carless,
2006).
17.8 Bibliotherapy
Bibliotherapy or reading therapy is geared to providing the patient with reading
materials that may be helpful. The reading material may be information concern-
ing a medical or psychiatric condition, a “how to” book to overcome a condition,
or simple recreational reading. Bibliotherapy combined with cognitive-behavioral
therapy has been found to be effective in treating adolescent depression (Ackerson
et al., 1998) and in preventing and treating addiction (Pardeck, 1991).
Bibliotherapy involves attention to the reading material and away from the repli-
cating pathogenic memes, and the memes contained in the reading material are
absorbed and may counteract the pathogenic memes.
It may be possible to develop reading material that may be specifically geared to
neutralize or enhance specific memes in the brain, e.g., for depression, for anxiety,
or for health promotion. Of course, any reading material is capable of introducing
new memes, which is the essence of book learning.
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18.1 Psychotherapies as Memetic Therapies
Existing formal psychotherapies including counseling are essentially memetic, i.e.,
memes are transmitted back and forth between the patient and the therapist through
the process of talking. Psychotherapies work through meme manipulation in the
brain of the patient.
Psychotherapy and counseling have nonspecific and specific effects. The non-
specific effects have to do with the supportive presence of another human being,
the therapist, who is interested and committed in helping the patient. The spe-
cific effects have to do with the particular form of psychotherapy and its presumed
theoretical mechanism for helping, e.g., cognitive reframing, insight, or corrective
emotional experience. It is generally recognized that psychotherapy and coun-
seling work, especially in conjunction with medications in more serious mental
illness, but it is not entirely clear whether the nonspecific or specific effects are
more important in the effectiveness of psychotherapy, as the effectiveness does
not seem to depend on the form of psychotherapy (Bergin and Garfield, 1994;
Consumer Reports, 1995).
Nonspecific aspects of psychotherapy do have specific memetic effects including
(1) the therapist is ipso facto a role model, a model for imitation in thinking and
behavior, a source of memes; (2) during the regular therapy session, the patient
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feels protected and supported, i.e., the meme pool to which the patient is exposed
is benign and protective, and may neutralize the pathogenic memes in the brain;
(3) rational and critical thinking is encouraged during the sessions that enhance the
brain’s meme-processing abilities. We will now briefly discuss how some of the
prevalent psychotherapies may work from the memetic point of view.
18.2 Behavior Therapy, Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT),
Cognitive–Behavioral Therapy (CBT), Rational Emotive
Behavioral Therapy (REBT), Interpersonal Therapy (IPT)
Behavioral therapy is based on Pavlov’s classical conditioning and B.F. Skinner’s
operant conditioning paradigms and attempts to change the behavior of the patient
through association and contingency management. Behavior analysis is an impor-
tant part of the treatment. Techniques derived from behavior therapy include system-
atic desensitization, exposure and response prevention, various forms of behavior
modification, flooding, various operant conditioning, observational learning, habit
reversal training etc. (Skinner, 1971, 1991; Spiegler and Goevremont, 2003).
In memetic terms, behavior therapy engages perhaps the most fundamen-
tal aspect of meme formation – learning and memory. Through association
and approach-avoidance, the organism develops memory traces (see Chapter 8).
Behavior therapy attempts to synthesize as well as infuse new memes by
providing favorable conditions for learning salutary behaviors, and thus reinforce
existing salutary memes as well.
Dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) was first developed by Marsha Linehan
to treat borderline personality disorders, and has subsequently been used to treat
other conditions including substance abuse and binge eating. Borderline personality
patients exhibit emotional vulnerability to stimuli, i.e., excessive arousal of negative
emotions, and tend to blame others for the distress. On the other hand, they have
internalized the invalidating environment and show self-invalidation, i.e., have unre-
alistic and excessive expectations of themselves and develop self-blame and guilt
when they are not met. Emotional vulnerability and self-invalidation are the first
pair of “dialectical dilemmas.” Borderline patients frequently experience a series
of relentless crises, often contributed to by their own dysfunctional lifestyle and
tendency for emotional overreaction. Because of their inability to modulate emo-
tions, such patients have difficulty in facing the emotions associated with loss and
grief, and thus suppress negative emotions. The unrelenting crises and inhibited
grieving represent the second set of dialectical dilemmas. The final set of dilem-
mas consist of “active passivity,” i.e., they are active in finding others to help them
solve problems but are passive in helping themselves and “apparent competence,”
i.e., they have developed the appearance of competence in the face of invalidat-
ing environment without actually achieving a generalizable competence. A pattern
of self-destructive behavior often results due to the excessive painful emotions and
helplessness. DBT uses the dialectical use of acceptance on the one hand and change
on the other. The philosophical concept of dialectics involves the juxtaposition of
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thesis and antithesis, resulting in a resolution of the opposites through synthesis. In
DBT, there are individual and group sessions that consist of four training modules –
mindfulness, interpersonal effectiveness, distress tolerance, and emotion regula-
tion. Through mindfulness training derived from Buddhist meditation, the patients
learn to accept the here and now free from worries and thoughts. Through interper-
sonal effectiveness training that incorporates assertiveness training, patients learn
to develop more satisfying ways of dealing with others. DBT identifies the trig-
gers for distress and regulates the reaction to them and uses behavioral principles in
reinforcing healthful behavior and not reinforcing self-destructive behaviors (Chen
et al., 2008; Dimeff and Linehan, 2008; Kiehn and Swales, 1995; Linehan, 1993,
1987; Linehan et al., 2008; Lynch et al., 2007; Rizvi and Linehan, 2001).
In memetic terms, DBT explicitly augments the behavioral therapy components
already discussed with mindfulness training, which is a broad-spectrum anti-meme
therapy (see Chapter 17). Furthermore, the dialectical aspect of the therapy focuses
on the mutually contradictory selfplexes and attempts to develop more integrated
selfplexes through dialectical synthesis.
The basic tenet of cognitive–behavioral therapy (CBT) is that thoughts mediate
between stimuli and emotions, i.e., an external stimulus causes emotional responses
through a cognitive process that evaluates the stimulus. The cognitive processes
may be recognizable as thoughts, though sometimes they may be automatic and
barely recognized. Such a cognitive process may be distorted and not reflect reality
accurately, thus arousing inappropriate or excessive negative emotions. Treatment
is geared to identifying the thoughts that distort reality and to correct them through
realistic evaluation of reality. Behavioral techniques are often used both to test
reality and to enhance a sense of mastery (Beck, 1976/1979; Trower et al., 1988).
Schemas or core beliefs concerning the self and the world may be distorted in many
patients, and therapy may be effectively directed toward them (Riso et al., 2007).
Thoughts are memes, and schemas are memeplexes and often include selfplexes
as well as memeplexes that represent the external world, some of which are in con-
flict with each other. CBT may be seen as a process of identifying the memes and
memeplexes that are pathogenic, i.e., replicating and drawing attention causing dis-
tress. The cognitive and behavioral processes in CBT involve an augmentation of
the meme-processing ability of the brain by processing the faulty memes through
the newly acquired filter (which itself is a meme introduced by the therapist) of
rational thinking and reality testing. With the help of the modeling of the therapist’s
rational thinking and judicious inquires, the patients acquire reinforcement to the
hitherto less than effective faculties of their own.
In rational emotive behavioral therapy (REBT), which may be considered to be a
subset of CBT, the basic tenet is A-B-C, i.e., activating events or adversities are eval-
uated by beliefs that may be rational and flexible or irrational and self-defeating, that
lead to consequences that may be adaptive or pathological. The therapist attempts
to directly challenge the irrational beliefs of patients that often manifest themselves
as inflexible “musts” and “shoulds” and emphasize their ability to choose a more
flexible rational belief (Dryden, 2002; Ellis, 1962/1994). The therapist in essence
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attempts to classify the patients’ memeplexes into rational and irrational and directly
introduce memes to reinforce the “rational” memes.
Memetically informed CBT: CBT could be greatly enhanced with the concept
of memes. The therapist could explain to the patient the alien, infectious nature
of the pathogenic thoughts and beliefs. Then, such pathogenic thoughts, beliefs,
and schemas could be identified, and when possible, the source and circumstances
of the infection as well. Then, the therapist and the patient could jointly develop
a strategy of neutralizing the pathogenic memes through various exercises and
behavior as well as deliberate introduction of new counterbalancing or neutralizing
memes.
Interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT) identifies the interpersonal context in which
psychiatric distress arises. It then utilizes supportive and psychoeducational meth-
ods such as coping skills training to resolve and/or prevent problematic interpersonal
situations. The problem areas identified usually fall within four areas – unresolved
grief, role disputes, role transitions, and interpersonal deficits. In unresolved grief,
the therapist facilitates the mourning process. Assessment of role expectations and
realistic problem solving is utilized in role disputes, including the possibility of
recognizing the incompatibility of role expectations in some marriages or jobs. In
role transitions, such as parenthood or retirement, explicit issues about the change
are discussed so as to adapt to the new role. For patients who have interper-
sonal deficits, and thus often extreme isolation, therapy is geared to reducing the
isolation and to form new relationships through skills training (Weissman et al.,
2007).
In memetic terms, treating unresolved grief is a means of suppressing replication
of memes associated with the lost object. In role disputes and role transitions, IPT
enhances the more salutary and adaptive selfplex and equips it with better coping
skills (memes). For patients with interpersonal deficits, IPT tends to support the
development of a more interpersonally skilled selfplex.
18.3 Psychodynamic Psychotherapy
Psychodynamic psychotherapy, first systematized by Sigmund Freud as psychoanal-
ysis, has many schools, forms, and theories, but they all place importance in the role
of the unconscious in emotions and behavior. Most are developmentally oriented,
i.e., unconscious conflicts and traumas in childhood are important factors in psy-
chopathology, and making them conscious and dealing with them will result in a
resolution of the pathology. Psychoanalysis in its classical form is most intensive
and attempts to unveil the unconscious root of the psychological conflict through
free association and analysis of the transference phenomena. Analysis usually has
multiple sessions per week and lasts several years. Other forms of psychodynamic
therapies, such as supportive therapy, brief therapy, couples and family therapy, may
be briefer and more focused with less ambitious goals. Psychodynamic therapies
work through identifying the unconscious conflicts and the distressing emotions
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and behaviors they cause, often reliving the conflicts and attendant emotions in
the therapeutic relationship, until they are resolved through rational understanding
and letting go of the neurotic behavior pattern that has been analyzed within the
therapeutic setting (transference neurosis) (Nersessian and Kopff, 1996; Prochaska
and Norcross, 1999).
In memetic terms, free association, the technique used in psychoanalysis and
often in psychodynamic psychotherapy, is an excellent way of identifying the
unconscious (latent) meme content of the patient’s brain. Patients often remember
meaningful events of the past during therapy, both happy and traumatic memories,
and can trace the experience to particular emotions they experienced. This is an
excellent way of understanding how certain memes and memeplexes have formed
and how they may have remained relatively dormant but still replicating and in con-
flict with other memes. Psychodynamic psychotherapy derives its effect from two
sources – the insight the patient gains and the corrective emotional experience of
the patient in relation to the therapist. Insight involves the processing of conflictual
memes that arose from the experiences seen through the eyes of a child, through
the adult “ego,” i.e., a sorting and reassigning of values to memories and other
memeplexes (e.g., I was bad, I did accomplish it) for suppression or replication.
The corrective emotional experience with the therapist comes from the realization
that the therapist is consistently there and caring, unlike the authority figures that
the patient had always come to expect. This results in a dissonance in the meme-
plex schema, how the world is supposed to be (cold and hostile) vs. how the world
actually is. Thus, a more realistic memeplex concerning the world is eventually
constructed. The therapist also serves as an identification (memetic source) figure
of someone who is wise and caring.
18.4 Toward a United, Integrated Memetic Concept
of Psychotherapy
It should be clear that all psychotherapies are geared in some way or another toward
the manipulation of memes and can be explained in memetic terms. What, then, is
the contribution of memetics in psychotherapy?
I believe memetics can serve as a unifying concept of all psychotherapies and
would lead to the development of new psychotherapeutic concepts and techniques.
Currently, psychotherapeutic “schools” tend to be dogmatic about their particular
theory and emphasis. Thus, the therapist is either a cognitive–behavioral therapist or
a psychodynamic psychotherapist. Though emotions and behavior can be observed
and explained in either terminology, there is no common value-neutral terminology.
Memetics can provide that terminology which bridges among cognitive, behav-
ioral, psychodynamic, and neurobiological phenomena. A general understanding of
chemical phenoma became only possible with the discovery of the atoms and their
components, the protons, electrons, and neutrons. Until then, there was nothing in
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common between hydrogen, lithium, and sodium. Now we know that having only
one electron in the outer shell, these elements have in common certain chemical
properties such as being unstable in their elementary forms.
All psychotherapies, to a varying degree, attempt to identify pathogenic memes,
trace their origins, and neutralize them and build a salutary selfplex. Regardless
of the brand, the nonspecific effect of providing a memetic source (identification
figure) is an important ingredient of effectiveness. Could a memetic understanding
facilitate the psychotherapeutic process?
Memetic understanding could certainly lead to more efficient therapy, regardless
of brand. For example, the therapist may decide, during a psychodynamic psy-
chotherapy, that a meme infusion might facilitate the memetic exploration. The
therapist could then actively provide such an infusion, “You must have been very
angry and sad that your father ignored you. I would have been very proud of
you!”
Perhaps, there need not be opposing schools of psychotherapy if we accept
memetics as an underlying general concept of psychotherapy. The therapist could
utilize various techniques as they are called for, from free association to flood-
ing, provided the therapist and the patient understand the memetic rationale for
each technique as it is applied. For example, a patient could have a session of
free association and a Rorschach test to attempt to determine some unconscious
memetic material that may be relevant to a particular symptom, may have a Myers-
Briggs personality inventory, participate in mindfulness training and self-hypnosis
for broad-spectrum meme suppression and dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT) to
develop more integrated selfplexes.
Note that what I am proposing is not a simple eclecticism – a little of this
and a little of that without a particular theoretical orientation. Memetics is a the-
oretical orientation, and memetics should integrate psychology and neuroscience.
Memes are clusters of neurons that are associated through reinforcement (Edelman’s
reentry). It should be eventually possible to identify the memes and memeplexes
within the brain, and augment or suppress them through physical means such as
microinjections and/or stereotaxic electrical stimulation. This is not to say that the
neural clusters themselves are memes. Memes are the patterns of information that
the neural clusters embody, i.e., the patterns could also be encrypted in other media
including electronic, optical etc. Thus, memes can reside in brains, in computers,
and in books and other media.
Psychotherapy is a sophisticated pharmacotherapy of the brain. In my seminars
with medical students and other trainees, I say to them, “Please raise your left hand”
all raise their hands. Then, I say, “Please, Oh-reun pal ul olyu-yo.” They look at me
with a puzzled expression. I shout, “Please, Oh-run pal ul olyu-yo.” Still nothing,
but now with a fearful expression. Then, I say, “Please raise your right hand,” they
all raise their right hands, relieved. Then, I ask them, “What happened exactly?
Why did you raise the left hand when I said it in English, but not when I said it
in Korean?” “Because we don’t understand Korean.” “OK. Let’s see exactly what
happened. When I said, ‘raise your left hand’ I emitted a pattern of sounds, that
is, I vibrated the air molecules in the proximity of my vocal cords, right? Then
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the air molecules next to that area vibrated, and eventually, what happened?” “The
sound entered your brain” “No, the sound does not enter the brain. The sound or
the vibration patterns of air molecules causes the tympanic membrane to vibrate.
Then what?” “The tympanic membrane’s vibration is transmitted to the ossicles,
then to the fluid in cochlea, then the hair cells are stimulated, and an electrical cur-
rent is generated in the auditory nerve and after several relays through release of
neurotransmitters in the midbrain, eventually ends up in the auditory cortex in the
temporal lobe. Then neurotransmitters are released to cause electric currents to asso-
ciation neurons that are connected to the association areas in the temporal cortex,
and some electrical signal goes to the hippocampus and amygdala. Now, at which
point of this system, did the English and Korean version of my request differ? If
you recall, they were more or less the same duration and intensity, until I shouted
the Korean.”
“Well, actually, even though the pattern of air vibration had subtle differences,
until the electrochemical stimuli reached the auditory cortex, the process was more
or less similar. Then, in the auditory cortex, the English phrase was recognized, i.e.,
stimulated clusters of associated neurons (memes) and the Korean phrase did not.
If you knew Korean, then the phrase may have stimulated a different set of neurons
that has a connection with the memes standing for ‘raising’ and ‘right’ and ‘hand.’
The phrases caused differential emotional reactions, i.e., differential stimulation of
the amygdalae, as could be read by your fearful expressions when I shouted. And
when I said, finally, in English what puzzled you in Korean, you were relieved, i.e.,
your anxiety subsided. Psychotherapeutic, eh? Understanding, that is a selective
electrochemical stimulation of parts of your brain containing existing memes.”
18.5 Need for New Meme-Literate Psychotherapies
We alluded to new therapeutic techniques such as meme infusion and meme neutral-
ization. Certainly, much of this can be done with existing techniques such as talking
with patients, relaxation, meditation. However, could this be done more directly,
through an intravenous injection, as it were? Perhaps flooding may be considered
to be a brute method of meme infusion geared to generate an immune reaction.
Perhaps, some of the so-called brainwashing techniques should be reexamined and,
if used humanely and with full informed consent, might expedite certain forms of
therapy. Advertising is often geared to meme infusion through both conscious and
unconscious means. Certain techniques derived from successful advertising could be
utilized in a therapeutic fashion, perhaps in the form of multimedia including recur-
ring images and earworms. Physical environments might be specifically designed
to have a saturation of desired memes for some patients. Drugs may be developed
that might particularly enhance susceptibility to incoming memes and might be used
within the frame of psychotherapy. Hypnosis could be utilized more frequently and
effectively with meme manipulation in mind.
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Memeplex constructive therapy in the form of avatars is a very promising new
development. Constructing a more desirable digital self with physical and behav-
ioral characteristic that might be made to order, for example, more slender, more
assertive self who exercises more and is more sociable, can be an excellent role
model (meme source) and observing the digital self in cyberspace as a role model
is mimetically a wonderful therapeutic technique (Bailenson, 2006). Eventually,
such avatars could be created to order on a personal computer, and used for truly
individualized do-it-yourself psychotherapy.
Psychodrama and techniques derived from it such as role playing are used exten-
sively in psychotherapy. With an understanding of memetics, psychodrama could
be greatly expanded and systematized in diagnosis and treatment. For example,
by playing various scripted roles in either real or virtual groups, one might try
out different selfplexes or ways of behaving, thinking, and feeling, which in turn
may improve the facility with which different selfplexes may roll into each other
and by recognizing the utility of the different selfplexes reduce conflicts among
them.
For example, a patient has difficulty with her supervisor. She may be asked to
construct three avatars – descriptions of herself with tendencies to feel and behave
in three different ways, perhaps one being angry and impulsive, another assertive
and methodical, another sad and withdrawing. It is important to assign emotions
to the avatars, i.e., they must have clear emotional responses to any interactions
and happenings. She might then role play each of the avatars in cyberspace, i.e.,
her avatar interacts with the supervisor avatar (which was also constructed by the
patient). One may then let the patient direct the interaction and see which avatar has
most success. She might then “tweak” the avatars so that the success increases. Once
she has created a successful avatar in cyberspace, she may role play that avatar in
a real psychodrama session with feedback from live people. She may then practice
playing the newly constructed selfplex until she becomes completely comfortable
with it, then actually try it out in real-life situations. As Shakespeare said, the world
is a stage and we are all actors in it – we all know how to play the role of a successful
person (or a wise person or a villain) if that is what we want to be.
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19.1 Epigenesis in Prevention
Genes are turned on or off in early life in interaction with environment through the
mechanism of epigenesis discussed in Chapter 2. Epigenesis involves the inactiva-
tion of genes through methylation and reactivation through acetylation and through
modification of the histone configuration surrounding them.
For example, the short allele (s) of the serotonin transporter promoter gene
(SERT, 5-HTTLPR) may confer vulnerability to heightened stress response if the
individual had been exposed to abuse in childhood and to depression in adulthood
if exposed to stress. But the vulnerability largely disappears without the experience
of childhood abuse (Caspi et al., 2003; Pezawas et al., 2005). In rhesus monkeys,
the vulnerability associated with the short allele of the SERT gene was ameliorated
with good attachment relationships in childhood (Suomi, 2003, 2005).
With monoamine oxidase gene polymorphism, the MAOA-L that results in low
levels of the enzyme and thus high levels of monoamines in the brain during the
developing phase of the brain, childhood abuse was associated with increased risk
of violence and the development of antisocial personality in later life (Caspi et al.,
2002). In women, it is also associated with alcoholism and antisocial personality
(Ducci et al., 2008). MAOA-H, which causes increased levels of MAOA, buffered
against the effects of childhood abuse and neglect in causing later violence and anti-
social behavior in whites but not in nonwhites (Widom and Brzustowicz, 2006).
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Meyer-Lindenberg and her colleagues have shown, using MRI and fMRI, that
the MAOA-L variant predicted pronounced reductions in the volume of anterior
cingulate gyri and bilateral amygdalae and hyperresponsivity of the left amyg-
dala during emotional arousal, with diminished reactivity of regulatory prefrontal
regions, compared with the high expression allele (MAOA-H).
The MAOA gene is X-linked, and in men, the low expression allele (MAOA-L)
was also associated with changes in orbitofrontal volume, amygdala and hippocam-
pus hyperreactivity during aversive recall, and impaired cingulate activation during
cognitive inhibition. A pronounced effect of genotype and sex was found in left
amygdala and hippocampus, i.e., men, but not women, carrying the MAOA-L geno-
type showed increased reactivity during retrieval of negatively valenced emotional
material. In men only, MAOA-L genotype showed a pronounced lack of activa-
tion of dorsal anterior cingulate during response inhibition task (Meyer-Lindenberg
et al., 2006).
In addition to the gene–stress interactions discussed above, more vulnerability
genes have been identified for suicidality (Wasserman et al., 2007, 2008), obesity as
well as breast cancer (Wasserman et al., 2004), and somatic symptoms and violence
(Crofford, 2007).
Epistasis, or interaction between two different genes, may play an important
role in whether or not gene-associated vulnerabilities may actually manifest. For
example, the polymorphism in brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) gene,
BDNF-MET allele, is associated with reduced responsivity to 5-HT signaling and
protects against 5-HTTLPR s allele-induced effects on a brain circuitry encompass-
ing the amygdala and the subgenual portion of the anterior cingulate. Without the
BDNF-MET alleles (BDNF VAL/VAL), 5-HTTLPR s allele is associated with vol-
ume reduction in anterior cingulate, but with BDNF-MET, there was no decrease in
its volume (Pezawas et al., 2005).
Mental health or mental illness is a result of interaction among vulnerability and
resilience genes and salutary and pathogenic memes. Thus memetic prevention of
mental illness should focus on (1) reduction of stress memes for children with vul-
nerable genes and (2) prevention of pathogenic memes from taking up residence in
the brain.
19.2 Early Diagnosis and Treatment of Vulnerable Children
Should children with vulnerability genes be identified and treated? Experience with
genetic testing of children for risk of colorectal and breast cancer seem to indicate
that such testing does not generally have an adverse effect on children (Codori et al.,
1996, 2003; Eley, 1999; Michie et al., 2001; Tercyak et al., 2001). On the other hand,
whether identifying children at risk for mental illness would result in stigmatization
is another issue (Brody, 2002; Chipman, 2006; Hercher and Bruenner, 2008; Spriggs
et al., 2008; van Ommen, 2002).
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Stigmatization is particularly problematic if there is no remedy for the genetic
condition, but it seems that for mental illness, memetic intervention should be
possible once the vulnerability genes have been identified. Furthermore, we rec-
ognize that so-called vulnerability genes might also serve an adaptive function,
thus treatment may not be necessary for all individuals with such genes. Examples
are the heightened sensitivity to interpersonal cues in anxiety-associated genes
(e.g., 5-HTTLPR s/s) or assertiveness and novelty seeking possibly associated with
MAOA-L.
Prevention through reduction of extreme stress in childhood, especially child
abuse and neglect particularly geared to those with 5-HTTLPR s and MAOA-L,
however, should have significant beneficial effect as demonstrated in monkeys
(see Chapter 2). Perhaps genetic testing should be performed for all suspected child
abuse cases, and for those individuals with vulnerability genes, special attention
could be paid either to remove the child from the environment or to provide closer
attention, education, and care.
19.3 Early Protection from Pathogenic Memes
In addition to the stress of childhood abuse and neglect, which are often both
memetic and physical (i.e., direct physiologic and nutritional stress on the tissues),
prevention of pathogenic memes from taking up residence and multiplying in the
brain is an important issue.
Just like bacteria and fungi, all memes are potentially pathogenic if they are
allowed to multiply uncontrollably. On the other hand, like most normal flora, most
memes can enter the brain harmlessly and either take up residence as a relatively
harmless parasite or be rendered harmless by the filtering mechanism of the brain
and allowed to become dormant or die. Then there are memes that are both necessary
and salutary for the human brain – memes for knowledge and skills.
Unfortunately, most destructive memes take up residence in the brain from early
childhood and destroy or stunt the ability of the brain to develop adequate filtering
and processing mechanisms for incoming memes. These destructive memes accept
and exalt irrationality and blind faith and ask us to abandon critical thinking and
reasoning – the memes and memeplexes associated with superstition, religion, and
cultural traditions. Religion is particularly powerful and toxic if introduced early in
childhood as it provides ready and easy answers as dogma to a questioning mind.
Often religion, superstition, cultural traditions, and family are bound together ren-
dering it practically impossible for children to free themselves from one of the
components.
As it is impossible to isolate children from exposure to the pathogenic memes
of religion and culture, children should be exposed to as many different religions
and cultures as possible, so that they can develop the ability to compare and cri-
tique them. Children should be taught in what ways different cultures, traditions,
and beliefs differ from each other and what consequences they entail in terms of
social and family institutions and mores. For example, how did Christianity affect
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class and gender relationships? What was the role of Confucianism in an author-
itarian society? What is common between religions and superstition? What is the
difference? What are the value systems derived from Catholicism vs. Protestantism?
Buddhism and Islam? What are the functions of cultural traditions? Which traditions
are rational and which are irrational? Such critical thinking will lead to an ability to
process them, retaining the component memes that are salutary while quarantining
and neutralizing toxic memes.
Memes are stored in and transmitted by electronic and print media. The explosive
growth in media in recent years has resulted in a constant and relentless bombard-
ment of memes on the brain. In this environment of relentless competition of memes
for survival and replication, it is only natural that the most aggressive (and often
virulent) memes will be advantageous. Thus, memes that strongly appeal to emo-
tions, basic drives, and basic fears tend to be more successful. Such memes are
those of violence, sex, and fear of death, and the irrational security promised by
religion.
In addition to enhancing the skills of critical thinking in children, it would
be important to teach them how to take “time out” from the bombardment of
memes from the environment. Teaching children techniques of broad-spectrum
meme reduction as discussed in Chapter 16 would be an important step. Children
should also be taught general stress management and coping skills.
It is neither desirable nor possible to limit or censor the memetic content of the
media, but it may be possible to introduce salutary memes in the media that may
neutralize or attenuate extremely toxic memes. For example, empathy memes might
be introduced together with violence memes, and memes for rational thinking may
be introduced with religious memes. Just how to do this would depend on the con-
text and content of the media – for example, the hero of an action movie might be
multidimensional with an empathic and loving side.
19.4 Vaccination
Is vaccination possible for toxic memes? Gold and Shanks argue that cultural diver-
sity will confer immunity to toxic conformity memes as genetic diversity tends
to confer enhanced immunity to infection (Gold and Shanks, 2002). In a fasci-
nating webpage, Kubiak describes how foreign ideas (memes) were quarantined
in Asia (for example, those who traveled to foreign countries were isolated from
others until they re-acculturated themselves with the indigenous one) and how the
McArthur reforms after World War II might have served as a memetic vaccination
against democracy in Japan when they had to be to a large extent reversed for fear
of communism (Kubiak, 1998).
It seems clear that quarantining memes in the age of the Internet and infor-
mation explosion is untenable and undesirable, considering that even Burma and
North Korea may be on the brink of change. Natural vaccination in the form of
enhancing cultural diversity in the society is both effective and desirable. It should
also be possible to deliberately vaccinate people, especially children, against toxic
memes.
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Vaccination involves boosting the immune system, and the immune system for
memes relies on reason and critical thinking. Thus, general boosting of these abili-
ties through education would be a first step. Then, irrational and toxic memes should
be introduced in an attenuated form. How to attenuate toxic memes? By divesting
them of the aesthetically pleasing adornments, such as music, art, and edifices that
usually accompany them as in religious hymns, art, and churches and mosques. Just
present the basic mythologies of any religion or tradition or blind belief to a critical
and questioning mind, and immunity will develop pronto. Then, the adornments can
also be presented and can be appreciated for their own sake, without being suckered
into the irrational and toxic memes.
Infusion of antibodies in the form of critiques of toxic memes may also be use-
ful. One danger of such infusion, however, may be that immunity may develop
against the critiques if they are introduced in an authoritarian manner. Thus, intro-
ducing both the toxic memes and the critiques at the same time would be more
effective.
“Flooding” with toxic memes may be another means of vaccination in certain
situations. For example, persons who might be somewhat attracted to specific toxic
memes, for example, a cult, might be invited to participate in an intensive simulated
or virtual reality indoctrination experience. Strong counter-memes (antibodies) are
likely to develop very quickly.
19.5 Education
It should be obvious from our discussion so far that education must be the center-
piece in the prevention of multiplication of toxic memes in the brain, and thus of
mental illness. Education from an early age in the acquisition and practice of ratio-
nal and critical thinking will enhance the development of the sorting and filtering
process for incoming memes.
Once identified, toxic memes must be processed so that they are rendered harm-
less. The techniques of doing this must be a part of the educational process. Such
methods would include analyzing the components of the toxic memes, recogniz-
ing the capsules and adornments associated with such memes that are meant to be
attractive and aesthetically pleasing, and relegating them to the pool of irrational
memes that can be a source of amusement rather than threat. For particularly viru-
lent memes, techniques discussed in Chapter 17, broad-spectrum memetic therapy
may be utilized to reduce their proliferation. Such techniques include relaxation,
meditation, music, and exercise, among others.
19.6 Gene–Meme Cooperation vs. Gene–Meme Conflict: “Mind”
and “Body”
An important aspect of education should be to discuss the “mind–body” problem in
memetic terms. The “body” is the manifestation of the genes in action. The “mind”
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
218 19 Genetic–Memetic Prevention
is the activity of the brain processing memes. Since the brain is made of genes and
their products, it is geared to be on the side of the genes if there is a conflict between
genes and memes. Memes are, of course, concerned only with their own replication
even at the expense of genetic interests. Infectious martyrdom is an example of a
virulent meme that spreads at the expense of the individual and his/her genes.
Recognition of the potential conflict of interest between genes and memes can
result in a rational analysis of the conflict, and thus identify the self-interest of the
meme masquerading as altruism or a “holy cause.” On the other hand, reason may
be on the side of the memes when an impulse generated by genes threatens to take
hold of the brain and result in an injudicious action.
A memetic analysis of history will reveal how human beings have been exploited
by virulent memes in various epochs, in the forms of oppressive religion, national-
ism, racism, and communism, among others, resulting in holy wars, holocausts, and
genocides.
Memes arose from genes in the course of evolution. With Homo sapiens, memes
have evolved exponentially while genes remained stagnant. As memes evolved, i.e.,
became more sophisticated in replication, they co-opted the gene-based bodies for
their own purpose and dictated individuals to obey their bidding. Now memes may
have matured enough and developed enough not to require human brains to repli-
cate. This may have a liberating effect on the humans, as those memes that remain in
human brains may become more symbiotic rather than virulently parasitic. If memes
can live independently and thrive outside of the brain in computers and cyberspace,
then they do not have to take over the brain, but could cooperate with the genes of
the brain for mutual benefit. The brain may be just a temporary residence for some
memes. While memes may no longer need the brain, the brain may still be able to
contribute to memes, perhaps by creating novel ones.
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20.1 Introduction
In subsequent chapters in Part IV, we will briefly discuss specific psychiatric
syndromes and their treatment. We will here use a model of mental illness that
represents a dysregulation of normal brain function as a result of gene × meme ×
environment interaction through development (Chapter 12, 13, and 14). The diag-
nostic nomenclature is phenomenological and memetic, and depending on the
degree of the dysregulation, gradations of diagnosis could be made, e.g., from anx-
iety as a symptom to anxiety neurosis to major depression and/or psychosis (Axis I
in my scheme, see (Chapter 14).
It should be emphasized that by “genetic,” I do not mean just the DNA but also
the products of the genes in action, i.e., the organism. By “memes,” I mean the
information processed by the brain that is or potentially is transmitted (i.e., leave
the brain) to the outside.
Thus, an Axis I phenomenological (neurophysiomemetic) classification clustered
around presumed brain function/dysfunction may be as follows:
A. Attention-cognition spectrum syndromes (delirium, dementia, impulse control
syndromes, ADHD, antisocial personality, obsessive-compulsive personality
traits, obsessive-compulsive syndrome);
B. Fear–anxiety–depression spectrum syndromes (anxiety, panic, ASD, PTSD,
depression – neurotic and syndromic, borderline syndrome, mania, adjustment
disorders, avoidant traits and personality, phobias);
C. Reality perception spectrum syndromes (psychosis, dissociation, conversion,
somatoform, misattribution somatization);
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D. Pleasure-motivation spectrum syndromes (substance use/abuse, addictions to
substances and beliefs, fanaticism);
E. Primary memetic syndromes (eating disorders, factitious syndromes, malinger-
ing, meme-directed irrational acts).
20.2 Gene–Meme Symbiosis and Mental Illness
Memes originally arose to aid the particular genes that either created them or
as genes found the incoming meme(s) to be advantageous. Thus there devel-
oped a symbiotic relationship between genes and memes. Such symbiotic memes
may serve the function of nurturing the organism or primarily serve to facili-
tate the reproduction and replication of the genes and memes together. With the
advent of language and symbols, memes arose that transcend immediate perception.
Imagination and fantasy are alternate realities which are created by memes and pop-
ulated solely by memes. Abstraction is another purely memetic process that brings
a memetic order to the universe.
Abstract memes are complex and often recruit and incorporate various memes as
they become larger (having more memes in it), more powerful (drive to replicate),
and thus more competitive. This is particularly so when the memeplex is competing
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for whole populations. One can be both a farmer and a carpenter, but one cannot be
both a Christian and a Muslim.
Memes that are primarily geared to replication of themselves often at the expense
of the genetic needs of the organism may be toxic to the individual. Such memes
include most fanaticisms and fanatical religions and superstitions. They are toxic
because they suppress, paralyze, and stunt the development of the filtering and
sorting function of the brain (ego).
The state of symbiotic relationship between genes and memes in the brain rep-
resents the state of mental health or illness (Chapter 12 and 13). When there is a
harmonious relationship among the memes in the brain, and their overall function is
in the service of the genetic needs of the organism, and when there is a harmonious
relationship among the genes in the brain as a result of epigenesis, and they have a
harmonious relationship with the goals and plans that the selfplexes are striving for,
there is mental health. When there is conflict between the needs of the genes and the
memes, or among the memes and genes, then there is distress of varying severity.
When the distress reaches a certain threshold, an autonomous syndrome may ensue,
which represents a final common pathway brain dysfunction (Chapter 13). Exactly
which symptom or syndrome occurs depends on specific gene × meme interaction
and vulnerability determined through epigenesis and development of selfplex. Thus,
there may be individuals primed to develop anxiety, depression, dissociation, psy-
chosis, etc., due to the genetic trait in interaction with the memetic environment,
e.g., Is it more acceptable to express distress with a somatic symptom? By acting
crazy? Withdrawing?
20.3 Toward a Dimensional Approach in Identifying
and Treating Mental Illness
All the conditions in the five categories of mental illness listed in Section 20.1
may coexist with each other and may overlap as the categories are simply repre-
sentations of important brain functions. Each of the categories except the primary
memetic/imitation conditions can be represented in a continuum using scales and
subscales of assessment as below. Scales for many of these items are currently
available, others need to be developed.
It should thus be possible to develop treatment strategies geared to improving
each dimensional scale representing dysfunction or symptoms. Thus, for a patient
who has a severe dysfunction in Af. Obsessiveness scale, Ag. Compulsiveness ccale,
Bb. Depression scale, Bf. Neurovegetative symptoms scale, and Cb. Dissociation
scale may be best treated with a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) which
is known to reduce both depressive and obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The dis-
sociative symptoms may be treated with meme-oriented therapies to reduce anxiety
and to experience the obsessive thoughts as a dysfunction in meme-processing loop,
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and through self-hypnosis to gain mastery over the dissociative experience and to
strengthen a sense of selfplex.
The degree of efficacy of treatment may be monitored through repeated admin-
istration of relevant scales.
Diagnostic Scales (Normal—Neurosis/Trait— Major Syndrome)
A. Attention-cognition spectrum conditions
a. Attention scale
b. Hyperactivity scale
c. Cognitive achievement/impairment scale
d. Rationality scale
e. Impulsiveness scale
f. Obsessiveness scale
g. Compulsiveness scale
h. Antisociality scale
B. Anxiety-mood spectrum conditions
a. Anxiety scale
b. Depression scale
c. Stress disorder scale
d. Mania scale
e. Self-esteem scale
f. Neurovegetative symptoms scale
Sleep subscale
Appetite subscale
Libido subscale
g. Avoidant trait scale
h. Specific phobia scale with specification of phobic object
C. Reality perception spectrum conditions
a. Selfplex integrity (smoothness of selfplex transition) scale
b. Dissociation scale
c. Psychosis scale
Hallucination subscale
Delusion subscale
Association subscale
d. Eccentricity/unconventionality scale
e. Misattribution/somatization scale
D. Pleasure-motivation spectrum conditions
a. Anhedonia (reward deficiency) scale
b. Substance use scale
c. Memetic pleasure scale
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Rationality subscale
Hobby subscale
Idealism subscale
Sprituality/religiosity/fanaticism subscale
E. Primary memetic/imitation conditions
a. Eating disorders
Body weight perception scale
Attractiveness perception scale
b. Suggestibility/Gullibility Scale
c. Conformity Scale
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21.1 Gene × Meme Interaction, Evolutionary Adaptation,
and Syndromes
Attention is a basic brain function necessary for any action from finding food to
fight/flight reaction. Attention to internal physical stimuli such as distended bladder
is also important to maintain health. Cognition is essentially the brain’s meme-
processing function and developed extensively with the growth of the neocortex.
Attention system seems to be separate from the data-processing systems of the
brain and involves specific neural networks that carry out specific functions related
to attention (Posner and Petersen, 1990). Posner and Peterson (1990) describe the
components of the attention system as (1) orienting to sensory stimuli involving the
parietal lobes and midbrain structures, (2) detecting signals for processing involving
the parietal lobes and their connection to the frontal lobes and the anterior cingulate
gyrus, and (3) maintaining an alert, vigilant state, involving the locus ceruleus and
the right hemisphere.
There are normal degrees of attention and inattention depending on the nature
and amount of external and internal stimuli, physiologic state, and the amount
of internal processing of data that may require attention. It is obvious that well-
functioning attention system has evolutionarily adaptive value, but the ease of shifts
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of attention vs. ability to stick to a task without distraction may have differential
adaptive value depending on the habitat. When one is in constant threat of being
attacked by a predator, easy shift of attention to a footstep may be lifesaving, on the
other hand, if one has to concentrate to sharpen a sword before a battle, being able to
ignore distractions may be all important. Thus, attention-regulating genes adapted
for one environment may prove to be maladaptive for another.
Thinking, or cognition, is mainly a function of the frontal cortex with contribu-
tions from the sensory and association cortices. Working memory, associated with
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and its connections (see Chapter 9) plays an essen-
tial part in cognition. The left brain is generally considered to be involved in logical,
linear thinking, while the right brain is more involved with global, holistic, and intu-
itive thinking. Cognition is greatly affected by attention and arousal, as well as by
emotions.
With the rapid growth of the neocortex with hominids that parallels the devel-
opment and multiplication of memes, our brain’s activity has become increasingly
that of cognition. With ever increasing influx of memes in the form of language and
information, the brain is challenged with the need for ever increasing efficiency in
meme processing that we call cognition.
Prolongation of human life through technologies developed by memes may be
responsible for the prevalence of degenerative dementias. As evolutionary adapta-
tion functions exclusively during the reproductive period, there is no evolutionary
disadvantage for diseases of the post-reproductive period in life.
In discussing treatment for syndromes in this section, we will first briefly deal
with global dysregulation of meme processing associated with clear physiologic
and/or structural aberrations, i.e., delirium and dementia, as it is beyond the scope
of this book to discuss this large and important area in detail. Then, we will discuss
in some detail the conditions associated with attention-deficit hyperactivity, impulse
control problems, obsessions, compulsions, and preoccupations in two separate
subsections.
21.1.1 Global Dysregulation of Meme Processing: Delirium
and Dementia
Global dysregulation of meme processing occurs when there is a metabolic or
toxic dysfunction of the brain as a whole. In delirium, which is characterized by
relatively acute fluctuations in global brain function, the memetic content is con-
fused and erratic. Because of the disturbances in neural circuitry and in neural
firing and conduction due to electrolyte imbalance, toxins, etc., there are distur-
bances in the functions they serve, including perception, memory, thinking process,
judgment. Hallucinations, delusions, preoccupations, etc., are common as well as
emotional lability, agitation, and altered levels of awareness, e.g., sleepiness and
stupor.
In dementia, there is often progressive degeneration of brain structures and thus
reduction in their meme-processing function. Higher cortical functions necessary
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for higher level meme processing, such as logical thinking and judgment are often
impaired, and often results in disinhibition of normal memetic demands such as
following social conventions of dress and behavior. Delirium is often superimposed
on dementia resulting in more impairment and confusion.
The memetic diagnosis for delirium and dementia is based on recognizing the
global deficits in meme processing, and the treatment should be geared to providing
a nonthreatening and easy to comprehend memetic environment. Memetic treatment
should be accompanied by drugs as needed. In delirium, the underlying metabolic
or toxic cause must be identified and treated. Drug treatment may be geared toward
immediate agitation and confusion as well as possible specific dementias.
21.1.2 Dysregulation of Infrastructure for Meme Processing:
Attention-Deficit Disorder (ADHD), Impulse and
Aggression Dyscontrol, Antisocial Personality
This dysregulation spectrum involves the infrastructures for meme processing, i.e.,
the tools needed to think and behave normally. This involves being able to shift and
maintain attention, recognize and modulate impulses that may arise from gene- or
meme-determined needs and to modulate and channel aggression which may also
be determined by genes, memes, or both.
Neuropsychological and imaging studies indicate that attention-deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder (ADHD) is associated with alterations in prefrontal cortex (PFC) and
its connections to striatum and cerebellum. PFC is critical for utilizing representa-
tional knowledge in the regulation of behavior, attention, and affect. PFC is involved
in sustaining attention, inhibiting distraction, and dividing attention, while more
posterior areas are necessary for perception and allocation of attention. The right
PFC seems especially important in behavioral inhibition as its lesions produce dis-
tractibility, forgetfulness, impulsivity, poor planning, and motor hyperactivity. PFC
is very sensitive to levels of dopamine and norepinephrine. Norepinephrine may
enhance signals through postsynaptic alpha-2A receptors in PFC, while dopamine
decreases noise through D1 receptor stimulation (Brennan and Arnsten, 2008).
A number of candidate genes for ADHD have been identified, including
the dopamine transporter gene (DAT1 or SLC6A3), the dopamine D2, D4, and
D5 receptor genes, the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4 or 5-HTT), the
serotonin 2A receptor gene (5-HT2A), and SNAP25. Other genes that have
received significant study include the norepinephrine transporter (NET), catechol-
O-methyltransferase (COMT), and the nicotinic acetylcholinereceptor alpha 4
subunit (CHRNA4).
Gene–environment interactions have been studied in ADHD. Interestingly, given
childhood abuse, the long allele of the serotonin transporter promoter gene, rather
than the short allele which is associated with neuroticism and later depression, was
associated with ADHD (see Chapter 1 for further discussion of serotonin trans-
porter promoter gene). It is possible that individuals with the long allele might cope
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with stress through inattention while those with the short allele might be unable
to cope and thus become more fearful and depressed. The short allele was associ-
ated with more severe ADHD pathology if the stresses were early in life (Muller
et al., 2008). 5-HTTLPR thus may act as a moderator of environmental influences
in ADHD (Muller et al., 2008).
Smoking seems to contribute to gene–environment interaction in the risk
of ADHD and impulsive behavior (Wallis et al., 2008). Child hyperactivity–
impulsivity and oppositional behaviors were associated with a DAT polymorphism
but only when the child also had exposure to maternal prenatal smoking. In addition,
interaction between DAT1 genotypes and maternal use of alcohol during preg-
nancy suggests that DAT1 moderates the environmental risk. Prenatal exposure
to smoking and variations in the DAT1 and DRD4 loci seem to interact in chil-
dren with the ADHD combined subtype. CHRNA4 gene polymorphisms interacted
with prenatal smoking exposure on risk for severe combined type ADHD. Gene–
environment interactions have been reported for DRD2 genotypes as well as COMT
polymorphisms for ADHD and conduct disorder.
The short allele of the MAOA (MAOA-uVNTR) has been associated with
aggressive behavior, violence, and antisocial behavior (Reif et al., 2007).
Carrying a short allele of the MAOA-uVNTR acted as a true and independent
risk factor for later-life aggression, further adding to the risk conveyed by childhood
maltreatment. Other behavioral traits such as disruptiveness and cluster B personal-
ity traits (dramatic, colorful, histrionic, antisocial, borderline) but not cluster C (shy
and fearful) may be contributed to and regulated by the MAOA gene as well.
MAOA short allele has also been associated with hyperreactivity of the amygdala
in response to emotional arousal, associated with impaired response of the prefrontal
and anterior cingulate cortex in fMRI studies. In fact, stronger coupling between
amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex through the rostral cingulate cortex
predicted increased harm avoidance and decreased reward dependence (Buckholtz
et al., 2008).
In pathologically aggressive individuals, serotonin transporter concentration was
significantly reduced in the anterior cingulate cortex (Frankle et al., 2005). As the
short allele of the 5-HTTLPR is associated with decreased levels of serotonin trans-
porter, it may play a role in aggression. Homozygotes for the long allele have been
shown to be less likely to develop later-life aggressive behavior, while the short
allele homozygotes do. Most interestingly, only heterozygotes were influenced by
environmental factors, that is, this polymorphism might have a role in balancing
aggressive behaviors in differing societies (Reif et al., 2007).
21.1.3 Dysregulation of Meme-Processing Loop: Preoccupations,
Obsessions, Compulsions
An evolutionarily important event was the development of romantic love, which
serves as an example of memetic preoccupation, obsession, and compulsion, usually
but not always within normal range. Helen Fisher studied romantic love
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extensively. She states, “The sex drive evolved to motivate individuals to seek a
range of mating partners; attraction evolved to motivate individuals to prefer and
pursue specific partners; and attachment evolved to motivate individuals to remain
together long enough to complete species-specific parenting duties. These three
behavioural repertoires appear to be based on brain systems that are largely distinct
yet interrelated, and they interact in specific ways to orchestrate reproduction, using
both hormones and monoamines. Romantic attraction in humans and its antecedent
in other mammalian species play a primary role: this neural mechanism motivates
individuals to focus their courtship energy on specific others, thereby conserving
valuable time and metabolic energy, and facilitating mate choice” (Fisher et al.,
2006).
The neural circuit underlying romantic love involves the right ventral tegmental
area of the brain stem and right posterodorsal body of the caudate nucleus. The
dopaminergic reward and motivation pathways contribute to aspects of romantic
love.
The complex neurotransmitter network of the cortico-striatal-thalamo-cortical
(CSTC) circuit involving dopamine, serotonin, glutamate, and gamma-amino
butyric acid (GABA) may be dysfunctional in obsessive-compulsive syndrome
(Harvey et al., 2001). The dysfunction in this loop may arise from an attenuation of
feedback signal indicating reward which results in compulsive lever pressing in rats,
which is further enhanced by lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex (Joel et al., 2005).
Compulsions may also develop from an operant conditioning (memetic) paradigm
as in compulsive gambling, which in turn may result in functional changes in the
brain such as impairment of decision-making capacity (Fellows, 2007; Hariri et al.,
2006; Kalenscher et al., 2006).
Tourette’s syndrome is an example of brain dysfunction that involves dysregu-
lation of both meme processing and motoric function illuminating the role of the
basal ganglia in both. In this syndrome, there are simple and complex motor tics,
vocal tics, and frequently obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Its onset occurs before
the age of 21 and the course is waxing and waning. Tourette’s syndrome occurs
mainly in boys and is genetically transmitted with variable penetrance but it has
also been associated with various infections and immunological conditions such
as the PANDAS (pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorder associated with
streptococcal infection). The neuropathology seems to involve a disturbance of the
dopaminergic system in the basal ganglia.
Gene–environment interaction involving the serotonin transporter promoter gene
(5-HTTLPR) has also been reported in OCD, i.e., those with the s/s allele and
childhood trauma were more likely to develop OCD with dissociative experiences
(Lochner et al., 2007). Clearly, same gene–environment interaction may lead to
multiple vulnerabilities in the CNS, including OCD, dissociation, anxiety, and
depression.
In our discussion above, it seems that we are at a threshold of understanding
the neurobiological mechanisms of normal functioning such as attention, think-
ing, aggressivity, and impulse control. Normal thinking process may become
abnormal if stuck in a loop, as in preoccupations, obsessions, and compulsions.
Structural and metabolic change in the brain may cause temporary or permanent
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loss of the ability to perceive and process memes in the form of information and
memory.
Attention deficit and hyperactivity are behavioral observations, i.e., what do the
patients look like and how do they behave? Individuals with these problems may
not initially complain of any distress, but their grades may suffer, and family and
friends may be frustrated. The memetic content may be those of puzzlement and
bewilderment. “Why do I forget so easily? I can’t focus” Low self-esteem memes are
introduced and proliferate, “I am not good at studying, math, . . .” With hyperactivity
and impulse control problems, “badness” memes will be introduced and replicate –
“I am a trouble-maker” “I am bad” “Nobody likes me.”
With ADHD, however, the individual often fails to store sufficient variety and
number of memes in the brain to function well, as well as being distracted by dif-
fering memes in the environment vying for attention to get into the brain. Many
such memes may be poorly processed in the brain, and thus poorly integrated with
existing memes.
With aggression, violence, and antisocial personality, the environment in the
gene × meme × environment interaction infuses abuse and neglect memes that
cause the epigenetic changes for poor impulse control through attenuation of
meme-processing abilities. Furthermore, the abuse and neglect memes take up res-
idence in the brain providing a model for future selfplexes – to be uncaring and
abusing.
Preoccupations are excessive memetic replications in the brain. By replication,
I do not mean that the neurons are replicating themselves – rather, the intensity
of the firing of the neuronal cluster that makes the meme is increased, it recruits
other clusters of neurons to fire and develop long-term potentiation like themselves,
which is how memes replicate (Chapter 9). The enhanced firing may recruit the
motor neurons to fire, thus expressing the meme to the outside, and when this is
in the form of language, it is likely to infect the receiver. In other words, if I am
preoccupied with love, I may say it aloud, may write an e-mail, and perhaps a poem.
All of these will transmit my “love” meme to myself, my beloved, my friends, and
the world at large.
Preoccupations, obsessions, and compulsions may occur unwantedly and unex-
pectedly, depending on the state of the brain and the memetic nature of the
thought. In the obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), there may be a primary
dysfunction of the cortico-striatal-thalamo-cortical network involving dopamine
and serotonin discussed above. Symptoms of OCD may also occur because the
meme representing the thought may be particularly strong because it is fed by
energies from related preexisting memes in the brain. For example, a suicide
meme may be introduced by seeing a film to a depressed brain that has many
preexisting self-punishment and guilt memes, thus the suicide meme may gain
strength, proliferate, and recruit the motor neurons to carry out suicide. Other
memes, like earworms which are unwanted melodies or sounds that keep on occur-
ring in the mind, may replicate because of the strength of their vehicles (the
rhythm, melody, form of presentation, color, smell, texture, etc.). Some such memes
may represent “supernormal stimulus,” the kinds of stimuli that are evolutionarily
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determined to elicit strong preferences, or results of early imprinting (Burkhardt,
2005).
The diagnosis of obsessions, compulsions, and OCD is made on the basis of
the severity of the phenomena and the degree of distress. Earworms are nuisances
but not necessarily distressing, ego-alien obsessions can be very distressing, and
compulsions may be disabling.
21.2 Treatment
Genetic and pharmacologic treatment should be geared to the suspected or demon-
strated brain dysfunction, and may include SSRIs, often in high doses, and surgical
interventions including deep brain stimulation and capsulotomies have been used
successfully in treatment-resistant OCD (Cecconi et al., 2008; Dowling, 2008;
Nuttin et al., 2008). Treatment of delirium and dementia involves providing memetic
environment that is stable and protective and appropriate medications. For ADHD,
stimulants are effective as well as meme-oriented broad spectrum and specific
therapies enhancing positive selfplexes.
Several symptom subtypes of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) have been
identified on the basis of the predominant obsessions and compulsions. Overt com-
pulsions have been associated with a relatively good response to the exposure and
response prevention (ERP) therapy and with poorer response to serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs). Washing and cleaning and checking compulsions tend to respond
well to ERP, but and rather poorly to SSRIs. Patients with symmetry, ordering,
and arranging subtype do tend to respond equally well to ERP and SSRIs. Some
studies suggest that obsessions might respond to SSRIs somewhat better than to
ERP. Hoarding and the subtype characterized by sexual or religious obsessions and
absence of overt compulsions have been associated with poor response to ERP and
SSRIs (Starcevic and Brakoulias, 2008).
Cognitive–behavioral therapy and antipsychotic medications have also been used
effectively in OCD.
The memetic approach to preoccupations, obsessions, and compulsions should
involve an analysis of the memetic content of the thoughts, and their memetic con-
nections (and vehicles) such as the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile
associations. One might find that the energy for replication of the obsessive meme
may indeed come from a conflict with a nondominant (repressed) meme that is
associated with it.
Treatment should then include, in addition to cognitive behavioral and exposure
and response techniques, direct memetic neutralization of the replicating thought
(obsession) through infusion of new memes and/or strengthening of existing ones
as with repetition of a word or phrase, visualization, and music therapy. Such spe-
cific treatments may be in conjunction with broad-spectrum anti-meme therapy (see
Chapter 17) to reduce the unchecked proliferation of memes seen in OCD.
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22.1 Gene × Meme Interaction, Evolutionary Adaptation,
and Syndromes
Anxiety is ubiquitous and is a natural function of the brain structure, conserved and
evolved over time in animals to be aware of danger situations. The limbic system,
particularly the amygdala, hippocampus, and the cingulate gyrus, is involved in anx-
iety and depression (see Chapters 1 and 2). Like a smoke detector, the generation
of anxiety allows an animal to prepare for fight or flight, conferring survival and
thus reproductive advantage. Sad expression and withdrawal behavior in depression
draw attention and support from others and thus may confer survival value.
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We examined at some length in Chapters 1 and 2 how stress may affect certain
genes, which may in turn affect the morphology and function of brain structures
such as the connection between the amygdala and the cingulate gyrus. Anxiety is the
experience of stress within the brain – how the sensory input is processed within the
brain as a danger signal. When a sensory input, which may be either physical (e.g.,
cold weather) or memetic (e.g., words), enters the sensory cortex, it is presented to
the amygdala, to the hippocampus, and to the association cortex where the sensory
input is compared with memory (existing memes), then an interpretation is made as
to whether it is dangerous or not, and this information is fed back to the amygdala.
Many sensations turn out to be not very dangerous, and the feedback will tune down
the amygdala in most persons. In individuals with the short allele of the serotonin
transporter promoter gene (5-HTTLPR), especially in those who had been exposed
to abuse as a child, there is a reduction in this feedback loop back to amygdala.
Thus, such individuals tend to have heightened and more frequent anxiety responses
to stress in adult life and eventually an increased risk of depression and suicidal
behavior (Caspi et al., 2003; Pezawas et al., 2005; Ribases et al., 2008; Stein et al.,
2008). It appears that repeated and unabated activation of the anxiety-fear circuit
eventually results in depression.
Abuse in childhood represents not only physical stress from trauma, but also the
infusion of memes into the immature brain. The memes associated with childhood
abuse are exactly the kinds of memes that are associated with fear, anxiety, and
depression – “The world is a dangerous and hostile place” “I am not worthwhile”
“I deserve to be punished,” etc. Stress in adult life, with infusion of similar memes,
may result in an unchecked proliferation of anxiety and depressive memes.
In rhesus monkeys, animals heterozygous for the s allele were shown to exhibit
exaggerated stress responses only in already stressful situations, such as being in
a new cage, while in their home cages, they exhibited similar responses as the l/l
allele monkeys (Kalin et al., 2008).
Recent studies have shown that fear conditioning and extinction involve two dif-
ferent sets of neurons in the amygdala with connections to the medial prefrontal
cortex and the hippocampus (Herry et al., 2008). The fear neurons received input
from the hippocampus and projected to the medial prefrontal cortex, while the
extinction neurons had bidirectional connections to medial prefrontal cortex. During
extinction of fear response, the extinction neurons were active even when the fear
neurons were not. In effect, extinction occurs through the creation of memory, i.e.,
a meme. The introduction of a meme could thus extinguish fear.
22.1.1 Anxiety
Anxiety is identifiable through the transmission of memes indicating its presence,
which may be in words, facial expression, or behavior. It may be experienced as
pure emotion, a subjective sense of anxiety which is not expressed, or it may be
feigned or mimicked, as in playacting. Even when anxiety is not communicated, the
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pure experience may replicate inside the brain as a meme, eventually building up
pressure to be expressed.
While anxiety is usually experienced as a negative emotion, it is necessary and
desirable as a warning signal of an impending danger (both external and internal,
which may be a result of a memetic conflict). As anxiety involves arousal and atten-
tion, it facilitates performance in moderate amounts. When anxiety is excessive,
however, there is a decline of performance, sometimes to the point of paralysis or
extreme purposeless agitation.
Locus ceruleus, the nucleus of a majority of noradrenergic neurons in the brain,
plays an important role in anxiety. Activation of the locus ceruleus is an important
aspect of the physiologic activation associated with anxiety. This response may be
explosive and if unchecked, results in the panic syndrome. Panic may be precipitated
by a memetic stimulus, such as a thought or perception of an open space in an
agoraphobic patient.
Phobias represent severe anxiety and fear associated with memes and memetic
stimuli.
22.1.2 Panic Syndrome and Agoraphobia
In panic syndrome, there is unexpected and repeated episodes of intense fear
accompanied by physical symptoms that may include chest pain, heart palpitations,
shortness of breath, dizziness, or abdominal distress. The symptoms usually last
minutes, peaking in about 10 min, though sometimes longer. This may be accom-
panied in about a third of cases by agoraphobia, the fear of public or unfamiliar
places, or even going out of the house lest a panic attack might occur. Various genes
have been identified that might contribute to anxiety proneness in general and panic
syndrome and agoraphobia in particular (Domschke et al., 2008a, b; Hettema et al.,
2008; Strug et al., 2008). It appears that panic syndrome with agoraphobia may have
a stronger genetic component.
Panic syndrome clearly represents a severe and episodic dysregulation of the
fear-anxiety apparatus, probably determined by an unstable regulatory mechanism.
Memetic stimulus such as being in an unfamiliar place might provide the initial
ignition of anxiety that results in a full blown panic attack.
22.1.3 Specific Phobias
Phobias to specific objects, such as acrophobia, misophobia, arachnophobia, and
ailurophobia probably represent conditioned anxiety to memetic stimuli. The phobic
object may be symbolic of a meme that one fears, such as a feared person. Phobic
memes are common in most cultures and some may be even inherent, such as the
fear of spiders and snakes. Others, such as the fear of germs and contamination
(misophobia) are results of modern civilization.
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Phobic symptoms are more likely to develop in individuals with genetic predis-
position for anxiety, and who also had exposure to the phobic memes. Most phobic
objects can be avoided and thus not a source of great distress, but when a person is
unexpectedly exposed to a phobic object, panic may ensue. Such exposure may be
traumatic enough to leave lasting consequences.
22.1.4 Acute Stress and Posttraumatic Stress Syndromes
These represent the effects of overwhelming stress on the brain, i.e., overwhelming
infusion or activation of stress memes that take over the function of the brain. The
stress reaction involves the activation of the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenocortical
axis and massive production of glucocorticoids which are neurotoxic to the hip-
pocampus, and may result in a smaller volume and difficulty in processing memory
(see Chapter 2).
With PTSD, there may be a permanent damage to the meme-processing ability
of the brain, setting the stage for a labile equilibrium among conflicting memes
and susceptibility to be overwhelmed with new incoming memes or an inability to
process new and useful memes. The stress memes that overwhelmed the brain are
likely to reside in the brain and proliferate at every opportunity. Note that strong
emotions may enhance long-term potentiation and thus memory formation through
dopaminergic and serotonergic mechanisms (“flashbulb memory”; see Chapter 9).
Persons who have no memory of a traumatic event in 24 h were shown to be less
likely to develop PTSD in 6 months than those who had memories of the trauma (Gil
et al., 2005). This finding supports the notion that the ability to inhibit the traumatic
meme proliferation (memory) prevents PTSD.
Once PTSD has been established, reservoirs of traumatic memes may prolifer-
ate unpredictably and uncontrollably as in flashbacks and nightmares. EMDR (eye
movement desensitization and reprocessing therapy) might be effective as it simu-
lates the saccadic eye movements of the REM (rapid eye movement) sleep during
which traumatic memes may be processed in the cortex (Stickgold, 2002).
22.1.5 Borderline Syndrome and Traits
Characterized by emotional instability, stormy relationships, and tendency for
dissociation, this syndrome overlaps considerably with the symptoms and neuro-
physiology of PTSD and depression, and may indeed represent the sequelae of
childhood traumas interacting with genetic vulnerability (Hunt, 2007; Minzenberg
et al., 2008). Nightmares and dream anxiety are quite common in borderline syn-
drome and may represent intense replication of trauma memes as in PTSD (Semiz
et al., 2008).
Borderline syndrome patients often have identity diffusion, or a fragmented sense
of self (Brenner, 1996; Charry, 1983; Fuchs, 2007; Jorgensen, 2006). This may
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represent a failure to develop harmonious relationships among several competing
selfplexes (the memes that constitute the sense of self, see Chapter 12). Thus, there
may be no consistent selfplex that presides over other selfplexes and use them as the
occasion demands, and the contradictory selfplexes may alternate or shift unpre-
dictably instigated by otherwise insignificant stress memes. Depending on which
selfplex is dominant at the moment, the individual may feel different emotions and
exhibit different behavioral traits.
22.1.6 Dependent Personality Traits and Syndrome
This is characterized by degrees of psychological dependence on others for decision
making and submissive and clinging behavior and a lack of initiative.
Everyone has some dependency needs – in fact, all mammals are dependent on
their mothers in the early stages of life. There are, however, genetic polymorphisms
that may predispose an individual to various personality traits including extraver-
sion, novelty seeking, withdrawal from angry faces, tendency for drug use (Han
et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2008; Perlis et al., 2008). As in borderline personality,
there may be specific gene × meme interactions in the development of dependent
personality traits and syndrome.
Early memetic environment that discouraged independence and fostered depen-
dence would strongly contribute to the development of dependent personality. This
would be particularly so if dependence was expected because of the gender, race, or
social class of the child, and there were numerous memetic models (identification
figures) for this.
22.1.7 Avoidant Personality Traits and Syndrome, Social Phobia
Avoidant persons show pervasive social inhibition, feelings of inadequacy, extreme
sensitivity to negative evaluation and avoidance of social interaction. They often
consider themselves to be socially inept, and avoid social interactions for fear of
being rejected. They often consider themselves to be loners and feel alienated.
In Social Phobia, there is excessive anxiety in social situations for fear of being
humiliated or ridiculed. Such persons may show physiologic signs of anxiety such
as blushing and sweating, which may further cause embarrassment and anxiety.
Avoidant personality may be a more pervasive type of social phobia (Chambless
et al., 2008). Like any other anxiety conditions, these traits develop over develop-
ment through interaction between genetic disposition and memes introduced from
the environment. Repeated exposure in childhood to critical memes in social situa-
tions, or the stress of having to repeatedly adapt to new and strange environments
in an anxiety-prone person would set the stage for social phobia and avoidant
personality.
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22.1.8 Bipolarity and Mania
Bipolar disorder in current terminology means one or more episodes of abnor-
mally elevated mood, either hypomania or the more severe form, mania. Hypomania
or mania often occurs in persons who also have episodes of depression, thus the
original term, bipolar. There may also be mixed episodes of both depression and
mania/hypomania. These episodes are usually separated by periods of euthymia,
but in some individuals, depression and mania may rapidly alternate. During manic
states, the person may be very speeded up, with rapid thoughts, pressured speech,
and the mood may be irritable rather than euphoric, sometimes with grandiose
delusions and hallucinations.
There is considerable overlap between borderline personality and bipolar disor-
der (Hunt, 2007; Smith et al., 2004). Seventeen percent of first degree relatives of
borderline personality had bipolar disorder according to one study (Akiskal, 1981).
The rate of bipolar disorder among first degree relatives of unipolar depression was
3.5% (Andreasen et al., 1987).
Affective instability may be seen to be an underlying mechanism for both
(Mackinnon and Pies, 2006). The mechanism of switch between depression and
mania is unclear. In one study, 9 of 11 patients with bipolar depression switched to
an elevated mood state with the administration of S-adenosyl methionine (SAM),
indicating the involvement of dopamine and serotonin (Carney et al., 1989).
While mania may be considered to be a dysregulation of mood, it has also been
proposed that mania may represent a dysfunction of reentry described by Edelman
(see Chapter 9), the process of ongoing parallel and recursive signaling between
separate neuronal groups along parallel reciprocal fibers that link these groups
anatomically. According to this view, reentry is speeded up through some bio-
chemical mechanism, resulting in rapid recursive signaling and thought (Mellerup
and Kristensen, 2004). As reentry is the process through which memes are con-
solidated and replicate, there would be a rapid proliferation of memes under those
conditions. The kinds of memes that would proliferate would depend on the mood
state, which is elevated in manic states. Thus, there is proliferation of euphoric,
high self-esteem, and grandiose memes, at times to the point of delusions and hal-
lucinations when a psychotic process is activated when the manic state reaches a
threshold.
22.1.9 Depression – Neurotic and Major Depressive Syndrome
How do you know a person is depressed? By simply looking at a person, then,
by talking with the person. Depression is perhaps one of the states that illus-
trates the meme as something imitatable. We know how to look depressed and feel
depressed, and when we imitate someone’s depressed expression, we feel depressed.
This empathy, feeling what another feels by imitation, is in fact the first mode of
communication between a preverbal child and caregiver and involves the activation
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of the mirror neurons, prefrontal cortex, and the limbic system through the insula
(Carr et al., 2003; Lenzi et al., 2008).
The verbal communication of a depressed person is, of course, full of depres-
sive memes and represents a state of unchecked proliferation of such memes. In
other words, the neurobiology of depression permits explosive replication of depres-
sive memes. It is important, however, to recognize that in very severe depression,
there may be sufficient psychomotor retardation such that the depressive memes are
predominantly nonverbal.
Common memes replicated in depressive states are sad, crying, helpless, hope-
less, pessimistic, self-reproach, self-punitive, uncaring, apathetic, self-destructive,
and suicidal memes.
With severe depression or depressive syndrome, there is often physiologic signs
such as insomnia, fatigue, anhedonia, and anorexia. Anhedonia is also associated
with a dampening of feedback information, such as reward for an action. This is
associated with functional changes in the brain, such as activation of ventral striatum
that indicates a reward stimulus (Steele et al., 2007). There may also be psychotic
symptoms, such as depressive delusions and hallucinations.
Sadness is often a consequence of an event about which one had felt anxious –
inability to master a threat may result in sadness and helplessness and may trigger
the depressive syndrome in vulnerable individuals. Depression may occur purely
from memetic processes, such as the recognition of an inability to meet the demands
of a memeplex (ego ideal) (Busch et al., 2004).
Depressed mood, cognition, and behavior are memes that can be imitated and
feigned, and serve a communicative purpose. They draw attention to the helpless-
ness of the individual and may elicit support and protection by others. Depressed
memes may also represent submissiveness, as displayed by some animals toward a
higher ranking one, thus avoiding confrontation and harm. “Learned helplessness”
to unavoidable danger situations may protect the organism from futile expenditure
of energy and effort. Such “learning,” however, may be maladaptive as the situ-
ation may have changed, and there may indeed be ways of mastering the current
situation. There is evidence that the experience of learned helplessness may lead
to specific activation of the amygdala and the mammillary bodies (Schneider et al.,
1996; Seligman, 1972).
Depression may vary in severity from sad affect to depressive neurosis to major
depressive syndrome. Sad affect is generally associated with an identifiable loss or
an anniversary of a loss and is temporary. Depressive neurosis represents a depres-
sive trait – a tendency to experience mild to moderate depressed mood with minor
stresses. They may have a pessimistic outlook, and may feel helpless in warding off
depressogenic stresses.
In major depression, which often arises in persons with depressive neuro-
sis, there are several categories of symptoms and signs – (1) affective (sad,
blue, apathetic, crying), (2) cognitive (pessimistic, helpless, hopeless, low self-
esteem, self-reproach, guilt, suicidal ideation and plans), (3) neurovegetative and
physiologic (anhedonia, insomnia, hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation/retardation,
constipation, fatigue, vague pains and discomfort), (4) Behavioral (self neglect,
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
244 22 Anxiety-Mood Spectrum Syndromes
neglect of hygiene, social withdrawal, substance use/abuse, suicidal behavior). Once
major depressive syndrome develops, it usually has an autonomous course lasting
on the average 6–12 months without specific treatment and suicide is a serious risk.
Major depressive syndrome is a final common pathway brain dysfunction requiring
coordinated psychiatric treatment.
22.1.10 Adjustment Disorders
In a sense, all psychiatric syndromes may be considered to be adjustment disorders,
but the term is generally reserved for relatively mild and transient symptoms of
distress to stressful situations that do not reach the threshold for diagnosing a more
serious and persistent conditions such as neurosis or major psychiatric syndromes
(e.g., major depression, psychosis).
In adjustment disorders, the symptoms, while distressing, is usually within the
boundaries of normality and the autonomous course of a final common pathway
syndromes has not been triggered.
Adjustment disorders may be characterized with prominent anxiety and/or
depressed mood and/or behavioral problems including acting out, substance use,
which may be a maladaptive way of coping with the stress.
There is a proliferation of stress and distress memes in adjustment disorders
which may threaten to trigger a proliferation of depressive and/or psychotic memes
if these are already present in the brain in relatively large quantities. The stress
memes may also induce certain physiologic symptoms such as insomnia and other
manifestations of anxiety.
22.2 Treatment
22.2.1 Prevention
There has been little genetic evolution in humans during the eyeblink of time
between the stone age and the modern age, though the memes have evolved at
an exponential rate. It is no wonder, then, that the genetic machinery of our brain
is often mismatched for the memetic onslaught through our perceptual apparatus.
Thus, brains well adapted to generate anxiety at the slightest sensation indicating
the presence of a predatory animal may find itself generating anxiety signals at vari-
ous sensations arising from memetic (e.g., images, voice, words) and physical (e.g.,
speeding vehicles, being in tall buildings) stimuli that are commonplace and benign.
The anxiety-prone genes may have been adaptive in the stone age, but may cause
vulnerability to anxiety in modern age. Identification of children with highly threat-
sensitive genes and providing them with training on stress management and coping
skills may prevent future development of symptoms and syndromes.
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22.2.2 Mild Symptoms (Problems of Living and Adjustment
Reactions)
Mild anxiety and depressive symptoms may arise as a function of the individ-
ual vulnerability interacting with perceived stress. Intervention should be geared
toward reduction of perceived stress through reframing if the perception of danger
is excessive, or through more effective coping. Broad-spectrum meme-oriented ther-
apy, such as relaxation, meditation, and massage therapy may be particularly useful
(Chapter 17), as well as certain specific meme-oriented therapies (Chapter 18).
Enhancing coping ability and thus reducing helpless feelings may be particularly
useful for mild depressive symptoms.
22.2.3 Neurosis
Neurosis indicates the presence of a pattern of behavior and emotional arousal that
is distressing and that is often the patient’s own making. Such patients are often
self-defeating and pessimistic. Neurosis may be truly memetic, i.e., learned (imi-
tated) way of living patterned after a parent or surrogate, or arise out of repeated
adjustment reactions with failure to cope.
Specific meme-oriented therapies should be used for neurosis, augmented with
broad-spectrum therapies and medications as needed. The medications may be
antianxiety agents when the patients find themselves in an excessively anxiety-
provoking situation, even if it is of their own making, or antidepressants or hypnotics
as the occasion demands.
Therapy for neurosis should be geared toward the memes that constitute the pat-
tern of behavior and emotional arousal by modifying and replacing them with more
effective memes and thus creating a healthier selfplex.
22.2.4 Major Syndromes
Major syndromes of the fear–anxiety–depression spectrum syndromes include
panic syndrome, phobias, acute stress disorder (ASD), posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), borderline syndrome, mania, and major depressive syndrome.
Gene-oriented treatment should be ideally geared to turning off the expressed
genes that may cause the dysfunction of the brain structures. This may be possible
through drugs that might be developed for specific genes or choice of drugs in a
pharmacogenetically informed way. For example, SSRIs may be more effective for
specific genomic groups, while alpha II agonists such as clonidine might be more
effective for others whose locus ceruleus may be hypersensitive.
Current gene-oriented therapy, unfortunately, remains at the level of trial and
error of drugs that have been shown to be effective for a significant but less than sat-
isfactory percentage of patients with overlapping symptoms and that are associated
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with often highly undesirable and dangerous side effects. They include antidepres-
sants (tricyclics, SSRIs), serotonergic-noradrenergic drugs (SNRIs, mirtazapine),
mood stabilizers (lithium, anticonvulsants, antipsychotics), and benzodiazepines.
All of these drugs except lithium (which is used more specifically for bipolar and
recurrent depression) have been used for any of the above syndromes largely on a
trial and error basis.
There is clearly a need to develop more specific gene- and genome-oriented
drugs. Gene-oriented therapy is not confined to pharmacotherapy. As has been
shown in rhesus monkeys (Suomi, 2003, 2005), good nurturance can reverse
the adverse effects of genes such as the short allele of 5-HTTLPR. Long-term
psychotherapy and/or nurturing environment in adulthood may also affect genes.
General meme-oriented therapy for anxiety and depression would include all
broad-spectrum therapies outlined in Chapter 17. Meme-oriented therapy includes
all of the specific therapies discussed in Chapter 18. Specific therapies such as
cognitive–behavioral therapy (CBT) and interpersonal therapy (IPT) for anxiety
and depression should be used, as well as dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT) for
borderline syndrome.
Memetically, anxiety symptoms may represent a tension among existing memes
in the brain or between an incoming meme and existing memes. Specific techniques
could be developed to examine recently introduced memes and their relationship to
existing ones, so as to achieve a reconciliation if a conflict is found. Note that the
newly introduced meme may have arrived unconsciously or semiconsciously, some-
times as a part of a complex meme such as a song or other works of art. Resident
memes that may tend to generate anxiety easily, such as rigid and punitive moral
codes, may be reexamined and reprocessed rationally if they are identified.
When anxiety remains unabated, or the stressful situation is perceived to be
hopeless, hopeless and helpless memes replicate and predominate and depressive
syndrome ensues. Depressive syndrome may also be the result of new infusion
of depressive memes or the replication of existing depressive memes because of
a change in the brain environment (e.g., cytokines associated with a viral infection)
or triggered by incoming depressive memes.
Specific antianxiety and/or antidepressive memes could be infused through
words (e.g., mantra, self-suggestion), song, visual imagery, or physical activity (e.g.,
flexing and relaxing muscles).
Combined gene- and meme-oriented therapy may be used. For example, desen-
sitization to an anxiety-provoking meme may be conducted through exposure
after medication with an anxiolytic drug. Antidepressive memes could be infused
after medication with a stimulant drug. In ASD and PTSD, neuroprotective drugs
should be used as well as treating the proliferation of unintegrated trauma memes
through broad-spectrum therapies as well as specific meme-oriented therapies that
may include reexperiencing trauma with beta blockade or controlled exposure
therapy.
Virtual reality therapy can be used effectively to treat situational anxieties includ-
ing social anxiety and phobias through desensitization. Avatars may also be used
to introduce new memes, such as mastery of fear and assertiveness in social
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situations. An avatar is a virtual image of oneself, and there is nothing more effective
than watching and imitating oneself actually doing the things one wished one could
do. Avatars could show the patient how he/she can interact with people confidently,
become physically fit, and enjoy life. A new selfplex could be built.
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23.1 Gene × Meme Interaction and Evolutionary Adaptation
What is reality? In humans, reality is a representation, integration in the brain of
complex perceptions. Once perception is encoded in memory as a percept, it is a
meme, i.e., it is capable of reproduction and multiplication. Imagination is also a
representation – a creation or reassembly of percepts within the brain. Imagination
may be directed (e.g., imagine a smiling face) or nondirected. There is evidence that
similar areas of the brain are activated in actual perception and in imagination (Iseki
et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2007; Qiu et al., 2008).
Reality is a complex memeplex, i.e., it consists of sets of memes or percepts that
have been accepted by the selfplex as “real,” as opposed to other sets of percepts
that the selfplex has either ignored or adjudged to be “unreal” or illusory.
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Existing perceptual memes replicate and gain force when attention is paid to
them internally and when they are reassembled as imagination. When this process
is intense as in fantasy, the perceptual memes being manipulated or processed by
the brain may replicate to the extent that their intensity may equal those of “real”
perception.
23.1.1 Imagination and Dreaming
Normal persons can differentiate between imagination and reality in spite of sim-
ilar activation of brain areas, but in the dreaming state, normal persons actually
experience hallucinations and delusions as reality. The REM state during which
dreaming usually occurs is phylogenetically ancient and probably serves impor-
tant physiologic function. Dreaming is significantly influenced by the activity of
the frontal cortex (Solms, 2000) and may serve the function of rehearsing coping
with threatening stimuli (Revonsuo, 2000).
Imagination and dreaming are necessary (see Chapter 2 for more about dreaming)
for problem solving and creativity. Being unable to distinguish between imagina-
tion, dreaming, and reality and being unable to return to reality result in distress
and thus mental illness. The inability to distinguish may arise from either reduc-
tion in the evaluative aspect of meme processing, attenuation of reality perception,
or excessive attention to the internal processing of memes at the expense of the
patency of the perceptual apparatus as in dreaming.
23.1.2 Dissociation
Dissociation, and the associated phenomena of depersonalization and derealization
are not uncommonly experienced in normal persons when absorbed in a task or
under stress. Dissociation may be adaptive and may be hardwired as an adaptive
mechanism (Berrios and Sierra, 1997; Sierra and Berrios, 1998). In the face of acute
stress situations where the individual lacks control over the environment and can-
not localize the source of threat, the inhibition of nonfunctional emotional response
may serve an adaptive function, i.e., not engage in useless fight/flight but height-
ening alertness for the environment. Such inhibition of emotional responses and
suppression of autonomic arousal creates a feeling of unreality – depersonalization
seen in dissociative states (Seligman and Kirmayer, 2008). In both trauma-related
dissociation and hysterical conversion, there seems to be a sense of distancing or
disconnection from self and the world that characterizes depersonalization and dere-
alization, related to cortical inhibition of emotional processing. The experience of
subjective loss of voluntary control over parts of the body appears tied to cortical
inhibition of attention and awareness as well as disruption of the link between voli-
tion and execution. This is consistent with studies of hypnosis which show that,
in highly hypnotizable individuals, specific suggestions can reduce conflict between
ordinarily competing attentional processes (Raz et al., 2005). Functional brain imag-
ing in this situation shows an effective disconnection between anterior cingulate
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
23.1 Gene × Meme Interaction and Evolutionary Adaptation 251
cortex, thought to be involved in monitoring cognitive conflicts, and other cortical
regions involved in the cognitive or perceptual task.
Through these mechanisms, hypnotic suggestion can cause a functional disso-
ciation that reduces conflict between otherwise incompatible cognitive processes
(i.e., conflicting memes), allowing potentially contradictory streams of information
processing to coexist.
Under circumstances that increase suggestibility, and in susceptible individuals,
misattribution of distress to parts of the body rather than to a memetic stress may
occur as in conversion and somatization syndromes, as well as misattribution of
percepts from within the brain (imagination) to outside of the brain (hallucination).
Hallucinations and delusions occur regularly in “normal” individuals in hypnotic
trance or religious frenzy.
Memetic environment often determines the content of dissociative and misattri-
bution experiences, e.g., “possession” by spirits, fibromyalgia.
23.1.3 Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, Multiple Personality)
In one study, some 18% of women in the general population had some dissociative
disorder, while about 1% had a diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder (Sar et al.,
2007).
In Chapter 11, I argued that we are all multiple personalities, that our brain con-
tains a number of different selfplexes that are hopefully coexisting in a democracy.
In such a state, each selfplex is experienced as a part of me. So, I sometimes say,
“A part of me agrees with your idea, but another part of me is in violent disagree-
ment.” This is akin to a country in which there are strongly opposing forces toward
an issue, for example, a war. Problems arise when authoritarian governments take
over in succession and forcibly suppress other points of view, often even suppressing
historical memory. Such is the state in dissociative identity disorder when there is
a disturbance in the formation of a coherent set of mutually recognized selfplexes.
At times of stress or vulnerability, a suppressed, unrecognized selfplex may take
over and suppress other selfplexes. The newly dominant selfplex may not be con-
nected to the memory memes of previous selfplexes, thus may suffer from global
amnesia. More often, there is a mostly dominant selfplex which is from time to time
overwhelmed by one or more selfplexes that incorporate memes disavowed by the
mostly dominant selfplex.
Why does tolerant democracy of selfplexes fail to develop in certain brains?
Childhood physical and sexual trauma is usually considered to be associated with
DID. With severe trauma, there may be a degeneration of the hippocampus which
in turn reduces the meme-processing ability of the brain (Ehling et al., 2008;
Kihlstrom, 2005). There may also be a developmental arrest of the orbitofrontal
cortex involved with the sense of self (Forrest, 2001). The ventromedial cortex
including the orbitofrontal cortex, the cingulate gyrus, and areas of temporopari-
etal cortex seem to be intimately involved in the sense of self (David et al., 2006;
Devinsky et al., 1995; Lou et al., 2005). Thus, normal, integrated sense of self with
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different personality aspects may represent a democracy of selfplexes that control
the ventromedial cortex and associated brain areas.
In DID, competing and contradictory selfplexes may take over the brain areas,
often incompletely. As selfplexes are clusters of meme-representing neurons,
“taking control” means that the meme-containing neural clusters strengthen their
connection to the sense of self areas of the brain.
In certain meme pools such as the Afro-Brazilians with the Candomblé religion,
the religious memes provide a normalizing explanation for dissociative identity dis-
order and the stress that precipitates it. The Candomblé belief system involves the
idea that a pantheon of deities, called the Orixas, control human destinies and human
bodies. Orixas may choose to possess particular individuals. Hence, individuals
experiencing acute psychosocial stress and dissociation may interpret these expe-
riences as products of a spiritual disturbance caused by the Candomblé deities. By
facilitating such interpretations, Candomblé encourages the belief that individuals
may experience discontinuity among aspects of the self, including body, memory,
responsibility, and personal identity. Such attributions allow individuals to under-
stand their stressful experiences as non-self-implicating, thus alleviating the need to
face the trauma directly. Belief in possession also allows them to embrace their dis-
sociative experiences as spiritually productive, as such alterations in consciousness
represent the replacement of their own self with that of a possessing deity. In fact,
individuals learn how to induce such states of awareness in ritual contexts (Seligman
and Kirmayer, 2008).
23.1.4 Misattribution Syndromes: Conversion, Somatization,
Hypochondriasis, Chronic Pain (Somatoform Disorders)
Bodily symptoms without obvious physiological explanation are considered to be
somatoform disorders. They presumably have psychological explanations.
Conversion disorder, or hysteria, is an age-old entity, first attributed to wander-
ing uterus by Hippocrates. Conversion symptoms are such physical symptoms as
anesthesia, paralysis, syncope, ataxia, globus hystericus, and seizures. Somatization
disorder or Briquet’s syndrome consists of physical symptoms in various parts of the
body without demonstrable underlying pathophysiology. Chronic pain syndrome, or
psychogenic pain, is pain without organic pathology or in excess of what is expected
from organic pathology. Hypochondriasis is a preoccupation that one has the symp-
toms of a serious disease. There are other somatic symptoms such as chemical
intolerance, fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue.
Some of the disorders arise relatively early in life, often in families, and
associated with stress. Freud considered hysteria to be a result of unconscious
psychological conflicts: the symptom represents a compromise resolution of
the unconscious conflict between an unacceptable wish (such as a gene-driven
aggressive wish toward an authority figure) and a meme-driven inhibition (con-
science), which compromise allows the conflict to be unconscious and thus avoid
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experiencing the anxiety had it become conscious, but also drawing attention to the
prohibited wish by the symptom itself, such as the paralysis of an arm that would
have struck at the authority figure.
Conversion symptoms tend to occur more easily in patients with brain injury,
and conversion seizures often coexist with electrical seizures. There may be specific
cortical inhibition in certain conversion symptoms (Aybek et al., 2008).
In somatization, hypochondriasis, and chronic pain, there may be an amplifica-
tion of mild discomfort into more severe one in the brain (Barsky and Borus, 1999;
Barsky et al., 1988; Barsky and Wyshak, 1990).
Early-life stress and negative parental relationships have been associated with
chemical intolerance syndrome in women (Bell et al., 1998). It is well known that
fibromyalgia, chemical sensitivity, and hypoglycemia achieved epidemic propor-
tions in recent time (Ross, 1999).
In general, the symptoms may arise through a process of brain’s misattribution
of distress to somatic (sensory and visceral) sources when they are central and often
memetic in origin. This distress misattribution process may be facilitated in certain
individuals through epigenetic factors, early memetic infection from another person
who somatizes or is in the sick role, or both, and current stress that both causes the
distress and reawakens the sick role memes.
23.1.5 Psychosis
Psychosis is an alternative mode of experiencing reality, often occasioned by an
inability to distinguish fantasy and dreaming from reality. Drugs such as LSD
as well as prolonged sensory deprivation can produce symptoms of psychosis.
Susceptibility to psychosis may arise from genetic and epigenetic factors during
the maturation of the brain. Auditory hallucinations may be a misattribution of
the source of memes to the outside when it is actually a perception of memetic
proliferation within the brain, particularly in the nondominant hemisphere. The
“inner voice” may be actually heard as auditory hallucination in affected individ-
uals. Crow proposed that such hallucination may be a result of failure of the left
brain to exert complete dominance in language production and thus an inability
to differentiate between self-generated thoughts and voices coming from outside
(Crow, 2000).
The memetic content of psychosis is clearly dependent on the meme pool to
which the individual has been exposed. Thus, delusions and hallucinations may be
religious in religious societies, paranoid in secular societies, etc. (see Chapter 4).
23.1.6 Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a group of chronic psychotic syndromes characterized by a rela-
tively early age of onset and a general decline in function without treatment. The
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risk of developing schizophrenia in the general population is somewhat less than
1%, while the prevalence for parents of children who are known schizophrenics is
12%. The morbidity risk for schizophrenia for full siblings of schizophrenic patients
is 13–14%. The risk for children with one schizophrenic parent is 8–18%. If both
parents are schizophrenic, the morbidity risk for their children may be as high as
50%. In the case of twins, heterozygous twins have the same risk as other siblings,
while homozygous (identical) twins have a concordance rate for schizophrenia of
approximately 50%. (However, there is much variability in the concordance rate
depending on the study, from practically 0 to 86%.)
In spite of the demise of the term dementia praecox, cognitive disturbance
has recently become a cornerstone of understanding schizophrenia. Schizophrenia
is conceptualized as a neurodevelopmental disorder resulting in a reduction
in cortical volume and dysfunctions in glutamatergic, GABA (γ-aminobutyric
acid)ergic, and dopaminergic transmission. There seems to be a hyperfunc-
tion of the mesolimbic and a hypofunction of the mesocortical dopaminergic
transmission.
Mesocortical dopaminergic transmission is stimulated by glutamatergic trans-
mission and reduced by GABAergic transmission, and it plays an important role in
working memory often disturbed in schizophrenia (Romanides et al., 1999). There
is evidence of dysfunction in schizophrenia of the GABAergic cortical chande-
lier cells that synchronize the firing of the glutamatergic pyramidal cells, which
are necessary for proper functioning of the working memory (Lewis et al., 2004).
A fundamental disturbance in schizophrenia seems to be an inefficiency of the
prefrontal cortex, particularly the dorsolateral area, in processing information, and
increased “noise” in the local microcircuit function (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005;
Weinberger, 2005).
A number of genes have been identified as candidate genes for the sus-
ceptibility to schizophrenia: catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) (chromosome
22q), dysbindin-1 (chromosome 6p), neuregulin-1 (chromosome 8p), metabotropic
glutamate receptor 3 (GRM-3) (chromosome 7q), glutamate decarboxylase 1 (chro-
mosome 2q), and disrupted-in-schizophrenia 1 (DISC1) (chromosome lq).
The COMT gene affects prefrontal cortical function by changing dopamine sig-
naling in the prefrontal cortex and brainstem. GRM-3 shows similar results on
prefrontal function and has an effect on expression of various glutamate synaptic
markers. DISC1 affects hippocampal anatomy and function. Dysbindin-1 seems
to be a general cognitive capacity gene that is underexpressed in the cortex of
schizophrenic patients.
As should be obvious from this discussion, schizophrenia is not a simple genetic
disease; rather, it is a syndrome contributed to by susceptibility genes that have func-
tions other than conveying susceptibility to schizophrenia. Such susceptibility may
include susceptibility to psychosis in general including psychosis in bipolar disorder
(Goes et al., 2008; Nickl-Jockschat et al., 2008; Prasad et al., 2008; Sullivan, 2008;
van Haren et al., 2008).
Intrauterine infections may also play a role in the development of schizophrenia
as well as early memetic environment and stress.
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Schizophrenia has conferred a reproductive disadvantage on the afflicted. Why,
then, is schizophrenia extant at more or less a constant rate across human popu-
lations? An obvious explanation is that the alleles that, in certain combinations,
may predispose one to schizophrenia may be involved in other functions that are
adaptive. Some of these may be involved in creativity and eccentricity.
In addition, the susceptibility genes may represent variations of ubiquitous genes
subserving basic functions of the human brain. Crow proposed that schizophre-
nia may represent an extreme of normal genetic variation in the communication
between the two hemispheres that is critical in language, a uniquely human acquisi-
tion. He postulates that Schneiderian first-rank symptoms such as thought insertion
and withdrawal may represent a dysfunction of the coordinated hemispheric com-
munication – a right hemispheric intrusion into left hemispheric linear thinking
(Crow, 1997, 2007). Schizophrenia may represent an extreme of variations in the
interconnectivity of various structures of the brain, particularly those involved in
social cognition and the working memory.
In sum, certain individuals with problems in the normal development of the brain
functions involved in meme processing may be susceptible to difficulty in distin-
guishing between internal and external sources of meme presentation, such that
internal memes are perceived as external perception (hallucinations).
Psychotic symptoms, therefore, may represent an intrusion into consciousness of
internal existing memes that are ordinarily unconscious but are available in adaptive
processes such as fantasy and creativity. In some individuals, psychosis may also
be a result of disorganization of the meme-processing functions of the brain due to
severe internal or external stress. In such states, certain memes that are in conflict
with the dominant selfplex may proliferate, having gained strength by recruiting the
perceptual apparatus in the form of hallucination. It is one thing to hear your own
conscience, quite another to hear God admonishing you.
Delusions may occur when the meme-processing ability is impaired such
that irrational memes are reinforced and become convictions, beyond the con-
trol of the meme filter for unreasonable memes. Delusions are irrational memes
that have either severed themselves from the rational meme-processing appara-
tus or overwhelmed it, and have taken up residence as a part of the dominant
selfplex. No contradictory memes will then be able to enter the brain and
take hold.
The meme pool of the environment may then determine the presentation of
the psychosis, i.e., what is the “normal” way to become psychotic in that cul-
ture? Thus, in some cultures, presenting with acute agitation and uncontrolled
behavior may be the accepted way of “being crazy,” while in another cul-
ture, it may be becoming hypervigilant and paranoid. See Chapter 3 for further
discussion of the interplay among culture, stress of migration, and psychiatric
symptoms.
The confusing hallucinations and/or delusions arising from faulty meme process-
ing may force the patient to assume the “crazy meme” in the culture, which may in
turn serve to reduce the distress, being labeled “crazy” and thus accepted in that
role.
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The clinical course of schizophrenia is clearly influenced by memetic stress.
Memes in the form of expressed emotions, particularly negative ones, have been
associated with exacerbations and hospitalizations both on a short-term and long-
term basis (Kymalainen and Weisman de Mamani, 2008; Marom et al., 2005).
23.2 Treatment
23.2.1 Mild Dissociative Symptoms, Dissociation in Borderline
Syndrome, PTSD
Generally, no treatment is necessary for mild dissociative symptoms including
depersonalization and derealization as they tend to be time-limited and do not cause
serious distress.
Severe, uncontrolled, and distressing dissociation may occur concomitant to
strong emotional arousal with associated autonomic and endocrine arousal, often
in the borderline syndrome and PTSD. Management and prevention of strong emo-
tional arousal, especially anxiety, is through broad-spectrum anti-meme therapy and
medications when indicated.
Memetic reinforcement of the selfplex may be helpful for the relatively transient
dissociative symptoms, in the form of repetition of words or phrases asserting the
identity or attributes of the selfplex, e.g., “I am Helen Stein, I am an internist, I am
competent and respected.” Such repetition will enhance replication of the desired
selfplexes in the brain, and facilitate their regaining control over the sense of self
brain areas. Memetic reinforcements in the environment, such as comforting photos
and mementos may be also helpful.
Learning self-hypnosis may also provide a sense of mastery over the dissociation
susceptibility.
23.2.2 Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, Multiple Personality
Syndrome)
Recognition that we are all multiple personalities at some level may provide the
basis for acceptance of the multiple personality aspects within one’s brain and pave
the way toward a more cooperative selfplexes (see Chapter 11). The task is how to
change a culture of successive oppressive authoritarian regimes to one of tolerance
for differing and contradictory ideas and democratic power sharing and peaceful
regime change in the brain.
Rational discussions concerning the existence of multiple selfplexes and the phe-
nomenon of dissociation, and the need to accept their existence as one’s own may
lead to a strategy of treatment. Various psychotherapeutic techniques have been used
successfully in treating DID – all the successful techniques eventually result in an
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“integration” of the personalities, or an acceptance of different selfplexes to reside
in the brain in a more harmonious way.
Hypnosis is a useful tool in inducing a dissociative state in which tolerance for
coexistence of contradictory memes might be achieved as well as in investigating
the presence of selfplexes that may be latent.
Some have argued that DID is an iatrogenic disorder that develops in the course
of psychotherapy by therapists who are interested in the multiple personalities (Piper
and Merskey, 2004; Reinders, 2008). As we are all “multiple personalities” as
discussed previously in this chapter, it stands to reason that an emphasis on the dif-
ferences of the selfplexes can lead to a diagnosis of DID in many “normal” people.
Nevertheless, DID patients who seek help indeed suffer from the lack of commu-
nication among the different selfplexes, and treatment is often effective. DID may
also be accompanied by a more serious syndrome such as PTSD and borderline syn-
drome – the treatment of the more serious syndrome may also reduce the symptoms
of DID.
As proneness to dissociation is associated with childhood abuse and trauma,
prevention should play an important role.
23.2.3 Misattribution Syndromes: Conversion, Somatization,
Hypochondriasis, Chronic Pain, Fibromyalgia, etc.
A rational discussion concerning how stress, both external and internal memetic,
can cause a dysequilibrium in the brain, which may in turn result in a misattribution
of the source to a body part, can help the patient to recognize the presence of stress.
This can also result in a discussion concerning the physiologic arousal accompa-
nying stress which may further contribute to the distressing symptoms. The role of
helplessness and depression should also be explored and discussed.
A careful history will usually reveal the original model for misattribution – e.g.,
a family member who always had a headache when stressed.
Through this process, the fear that the patient has a serious medical disease can
be alleviated, at the same time recognizing that the patient has “real” physically
experienced distress because of the brain’s processing problems. Then methods can
be developed to alleviate the distress through stress management, relaxation, and
other broad-spectrum anti-meme therapies (see Chapter 17) as well as specific ther-
apies such as cognitive–behavioral therapy as indicated. Pharmacotherapy may be
indicated targeting anxiety and/or depression as well as pain.
23.2.4 Psychosis and Schizophrenia
Persistent psychosis and schizophrenia are major final common pathway syndromes
that require both gene- and meme-oriented therapies. Pharmacotherapy is often crit-
ical in treating the symptoms of psychosis and standard textbooks of psychiatry
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should be consulted for details. Broad-spectrum meme-oriented therapies include
music, art, exercise, and dance therapies. Also useful are specific therapies geared
to enhance positive selfplexes as well as specific problem-solving and coping skill
enhancing therapies.
Acutely psychotic patients are hypervigilant and their meme-processing appara-
tus is flooded with threatening and confusing memes.
In acute psychosis or acute exacerbations of schizophrenia, temporary removal
from the stressful memetic environment through hospitalization may be necessary.
Psychoeducation of the patient and family concerning the nature and symptoms
of schizophrenia, need for reducing stress, adherence to medications, and follow-up
visits is also important.
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24.1 Gene × Meme Interaction, Evolutionary Adaptation,
and Syndromes
Pleasure is the motivation for all living activity. Volitional action actively seeks
pleasure and avoids unpleasure; nonvolitional autonomic dysfunction may cause
unpleasure, which then stimulates the organism to correct the dysfunction.
For humans, there are certain activities that predictably produce pleasure, e.g.,
a good meal, good company, love, sex, good exercise, engaging in favorite hobbies.
The emotion of pleasure seems associated with the dopaminergic activation of the
medial forebrain bundle, the ascending mesolimbic ventral tegmental pathway and
nucleus accumbens (see Chapter 12).
The dopaminergic and endorphinergic reward pathways of the brain are critical
for survival since they provide the pleasure drives for eating, love, and reproduction;
these are called “natural rewards” and involve the release of dopamine in the nucleus
accumbens and frontal lobes (Comings and Blum, 2000).
Dopamine D2 receptor especially has been implicated in pleasure and reward
mechanisms. Pleasure seems to be the net effect of neurotransmitter interaction at
the mesolimbic brain region when dopamine is released from the neuron at the
nucleus accumbens and interacts with a dopamine D2 receptor. “The reward cas-
cade” involves the release of serotonin, which in turn at the hypothalamus stimulates
enkephalin, which in turn inhibits GABA at the substantia nigra, which in turn fine
tunes the amount of dopamine released at the nucleus accumbens (“reward site”).
This normal mechanism of pleasure works well in most of us.
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When dopamine is released into the synapse, it stimulates a number of dopamine
receptors (D1–D5) which results in increased feelings of well-being and reduced
stress.
Release of dopamine and the sensations of pleasure can be produced by
“unnatural rewards” such as alcohol, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, nicotine,
marijuana, and other drugs, and by compulsive activities such as gambling, eating,
and sex, and by risk taking behaviors. Since only a minority of individuals become
addicted to these substances or behaviors, genetic and epigenetic factors play an
important role in such vulnerabilities (Margaron, 2004).
When there is a dysfunction of the brain reward cascade often as a result of
genetically influenced hypodopaminergic state, the brain may compensate for the
lack of pleasure by seeking an external source of dopaminergic stimulation – e.g.,
drugs. This may result in multiple drug-seeking behavior as alcohol, cocaine, heroin,
marijuana, nicotine, and glucose all cause activation and neuronal release of brain
dopamine. Carriers of the DRD2 receptor gene Taq I A1 allele have compro-
mised dopamine D2 receptors and a high risk for multiple addictive, impulsive,
and compulsive behavioral propensities, such as severe alcoholism, cocaine, heroin,
marijuana and nicotine use, glucose bingeing, pathological gambling, sex addic-
tion, ADHD, Tourette’s syndrome, autism, chronic violence, posttraumatic stress
disorder, schizoid/avoidant cluster, conduct disorder and antisocial behavior. Blum
proposed the term, “reward-deficiency syndrome,” to describe the hypodopamin-
ergic trait resulting in the breakdown of the reward cascade due to both multiple
genes and environmental stimuli and resultant aberrant behaviors (Blum et al., 2000;
Comings and Blum, 2000).
The pursuit of pleasure has obvious value to the organism, i.e., genes. When
memes arose, they provided a shortcut for pleasure as imitation of successful behav-
iors, such as cracking open a shell, was more efficient than trial and error. As
memes evolved, they tended to attach themselves to the pleasure-reward mecha-
nism as this is a sure way of ensuring replication. For example, one tends to dwell on
pleasant thoughts and memories, and tends to communicate (replicate and spread)
them. Eventually, some memes co-opted the pleasure mechanism for their own
propagation regardless of the welfare of the genes.
As memes in the brain are sophisticated neuronal connections, they are capable
of eliciting subtly different pleasures as in sophisticated cooking. Thus, certain types
of meditation or asceticism may produce a different kind of “high” while disavowing
ordinary pleasures of life.
Some memes became experts in creating dopamine “high’s” to the point of addic-
tion, often at the expense of the genetic needs of the individual, as in gambling and in
religious experiences (Comings et al., 2000; Previc, 2006). This may be particularly
facilitated in conditions of dissociation (see Chapter 23). In religious fanaticism, the
search for this dopamine high may result in killing of the self and/or others (e.g.,
suicide bombing). Religious memes also attached themselves to the fear-anxiety
system of the brain – fear of eternal damnation and suffering. Thus armed with the
brain mechanisms of ecstasy and terror, religions suppressed the memes geared to
the interests of genes, such as reasoning, and engaged in religious wars for centuries.
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Inability to feel pleasure, anhedonia, is often seen in depression and schizophre-
nia and represents a hypodopaminergic state, usually a result of gene × meme
interaction. Memes of painful experiences, fear and anxiety, hopelessness, etc., may
all contribute to the blockage of the reward-pleasure system.
In summary, pleasure spectrum disorders represent a dopamine system dysregu-
lation caused by gene × meme interaction. Addictions may occur in individuals with
a hypodopaminergic reward-deficiency syndrome. Imitating others getting high with
drugs (meme) may be an important component in addictions as well as in religious
fanaticism.
Syndromes. Why does the pursuit of pleasure (and reward) become problematic?
Is not everything we do for pursuit of pleasure?
We may say that if the pleasurable activity does not serve the long-term well-
being of the organism or of the society, then it is a problem. Obviously, this
statement is meme-driven. From the genetic point of view, any pleasurable activity is
evolutionarily driven to be adaptive. Considering whether an activity is good or bad
in the long run is a product of memetic processing as are considerations of whether
it is good or bad for the society. What I am saying here is that, unlike anxiety-
mood spectrum syndromes and attention-cognition spectrum syndromes, pleasure
spectrum disorders, with the exception of anhedonia, do not involve immediate
gene-mediated suffering but are defined as problematic memetically, i.e., meme-
defined disorders. We have seen, nevertheless, that gene × meme interaction is
important in causing the hypodopaminergic state that probably underlies many
serious addictions.
24.1.1 Substance Use/Abuse
We rely on substances for living – food, water, air. Substances derived from plants
and animals have been used since time immemorial in the hopes of relieving pain,
obtaining an energy boost, as an aphrodisiac, etc. Some of the substances used in
herbal medicine are poisonous in large quantities, but then all prescription drugs we
use are poisonous in large quantities. Indians in Peru have chewed on coca leaves for
centuries without any ill effects or social taboo, and smoking or ingesting marijuana
(bhang) has been widely accepted in India and other parts of Southeast Asia since
at least 2000 BCE.
Of course, cocaine and marijuana are illegal substances in the United States, and
thus their use is considered problematic though there is no evidence that moder-
ate use causes any harm to the adult organism. Alcohol and tobacco, on the other
hand, are legal, but they can be quite addicting, and tobacco in particular is not only
highly addicting but is known to be detrimental to physical health in a dose depen-
dent fashion. Caffeine is, of course, legal and widely used for its stimulant effect,
but can cause anxiety symptoms, insomnia, and sympathetic hyperarousal if used
excessively.
Psychotomemetic substances such as LSD and peyote, and designer drugs
such as MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methylamphetamine, “ecstasy”) are illegal
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substances and thus a problem even if used moderately. On the other hand, the “date
rape” drug GHB (gamma-hydroxybutyric acid, “liquid ecstasy,” “liquid G”) is ille-
gal (schedule I) except when prescribed for cataplexy and narcolepsy as xyrem
(schedule III). Prescription drugs are legal unless used illegally, i.e., without pre-
scription for the individual using it. All these substances have in common the fact
that they are defined as problems by the society memetically rather than because
they are inherently problematic.
24.1.2 Addictions to Substances and Beliefs, Fanaticism
Addiction can be to substances (e.g., alcohol, narcotics, stimulants) or memeplexes
that may combine belief and behavior, including rituals (e.g., artistic endeavor, gam-
bling, religion, fanaticism). Addiction represents an extreme of pleasure seeking
behavior where the degree of pleasure achieved through the substance or activity
(or the unpleasure without it) far outweighs considerations for other genetic and
memetic needs of the organism. If an addicted individual is deprived of the addictive
substance or activity, there results a state of severe unpleasure representing sud-
den dopamine withdrawal in the pleasure areas of the CNS discussed above. This
may be further augmented by the physiologic withdrawal reactions to the addictive
substances themselves, such as alcohol withdrawal and cocaine withdrawal.
As discussed earlier in the chapter, genetic polymorphisms interacting with
early environment may contribute to a hypodopaminergic CNS thus resulting in
a tendency to seek external augmentation of dopaminergic stimulation through
substances or activities. Repeated exposure to addictive agents including sub-
stances and belief systems provides the opportunity for the commencement of the
self-perpetuating addictive process.
Once established, addiction becomes a compulsion, and blends into obsessive–
compulsive disorder (OCD). As with OCD, the obsession and compulsion associ-
ated with addiction may be ego-alien and the individual may wish to “get over”
them, but find it impossible to do so. Environmental cues such as drinking bud-
dies, drug paraphernalia, and religious symbols and rituals are strong memeplexes
supporting and maintaining the addiction.
Are all addictions mental illness? Not necessarily. Some hobbies and even work
(workaholism) may be addicting but are hardly illnesses. As with other pleasure
spectrum conditions, addiction should be memetically considered a problem when
it results in a severe conflict between the genetic needs of the organism and the
addictive meme.
24.2 Treatment
Detailed descriptions of detoxification and treatment of specific substances includ-
ing alcohol, narcotics, stimulants, and other substances are available in appropriate
hoyle.leigh@gmail.com
References 265
textbooks and are beyond the scope of this book. We will discuss here briefly how
distortions of the pursuit of pleasure might be approached.
Memes first arose as they provided a shortcut from trial and error in attaining
pleasure first by forming memories of the location of food and the activities that
resulted in mating, and then by learning to imitate the behavior and/or appearance of
the successful ones. As memes evolved as information, and components of culture,
certain memes attached themselves to the pleasure apparatus of the brain regardless
of the welfare of the organism as a whole. Such memes, in the form of tradition
and religion, co-opted the brains to spread and perpetuate themselves often at the
expense of individual pursuit of pleasure.
In the meanwhile, for those with genetically influenced hypodopaminergic brain,
exogenous substances provided the needed “fix,” and drug use also spread as
memes.
Mild cases of both instances, such as coffee drinking and “spirituality”, are
instances of normal pursuit of pleasure.
We discussed that drug use per se is not an illness, but defined to be a prob-
lem by society arbitrarily only for certain substances. There are powerful irrational
memes that compete with substances for pleasure-giving potential, such as religions
and other ideologies and they actively seek to suppress the substances for the sake
of their own expansion of power and thus replication. It is such puritanical memes
that frown upon and criminalize most pleasure-giving activities including drugs.
As with the case of the Prohibition in the United States, crime syndicates pros-
per and countless violent and nonviolent crimes are committed because drugs are
illegal.
Education provides an individual with the ability to analyze and process memes
concerned with obtaining pleasure, which includes substances, behaviors, activities,
and ideals. An informed populace will choose not to use harmful substances even if
they are legal and even marketed. Such a populace will also not become addicted to
fanaticisms.
Addictions that are ego-alien and compulsive should properly be considered to
be an illness as the individual loses control over the activity even when it is obvi-
ously detrimental to his/her immediate health and well-being. The treatment for
such illness should be individualized, taking into account the genetic and memetic
constitution. It may involve detoxification and rehabilitation, controlled and regu-
lated maintenance of the addiction to avoid withdrawal, or substitutive substances
or activity to overcome the hypodopaminergic trait. In all these treatment strategies,
broad-spectrum anti-meme therapy and specific meme-oriented therapies may be
used to neutralize the strong addictive meme (see Chapters 17 and 18).
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25.1 Gene × Meme Interaction, Evolutionary Adaptation,
and Syndromes
The conditions in this category are characterized by a strong meme-driven quality.
As with any other human behavior and experience, early gene × meme interac-
tion determines the brain state that may be more or less receptive to infusion of
destructive memes and more or less vulnerable to a takeover by such memes.
Memetic infection is a normal physiologic process for which the human brain is
adapted, just as normal microbial flora take up residence in the human gut and serve
an essential function. It is only when there is a conflict between the gene-driven
needs of the human organism and the demands of the memes that problems arise.
Both genes and memes are replicators and their reproductive drive may be at odds
with each other. For example, a sexually repressive meme cannot hope to replicate
unless it replicates by infecting more and more brains as an infected person is less
likely to reproduce biologically. One solution for such a meme may be to accept
sexuality as a necessary sin, which persons are expected to commit, but can still be
“saved” if the person “repents” by following the rituals and showing other signs of
continuing dedication to the meme.
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The ability to process incoming memes rationally is an important task of human
education, and the more able a person is in this capacity, the less likely is the per-
son to be a victim of later infection by an epidemic meme. Nevertheless, as in
viral epidemics, there may be highly infectious memes that will infect even the
most immunologically competent individuals. And some such memes may be quite
innocuous despite their contagiousness, as in fashion or fads (like the hoola-hoop
of the 1950s). Yet, at times they may be quite detrimental to health, such as certain
dietary fads and drug use.
Endemic culture of violence in the ghettos is an example of an abundance of
toxic memes in geographically segregated areas.
25.1.1 Eating Disorders
Some conditions, such as eating disorders, may start as a mild meme infection, i.e.,
imitating others, but then may become a final common pathway syndrome in inter-
action with existing dormant memes (e.g., disparaging selfplex, low self-esteem)
and early gene × meme interaction (e.g., 5-HTTLPR s/s influenced by childhood
abuse – Chapter 14). Once the syndrome develops, the physiologic effects such as
of starvation may create or enhance psychiatric symptoms (Zandian et al., 2007).
In the case of anorexia nervosa, a strong distortion in body image coupled with
a relentless pursuit of thinness in turn causes metabolic and endocrine changes
that may result in further reduction in rational meme processing and perpetua-
tion of the self-destructive behavior. Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP) of
the brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) gene have been described in both
anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa (Dmitrzak-Weglarz et al., 2007; Rybakowski
et al., 2007; Sulek et al., 2007). The genetic polymorphism may be associated with
personality traits such as persistence and harm avoidance that may predispose the
individual to the meme takeover.
Altered pleasure mechanisms in the nucleus accumbens may also underlie eating
disorders. After all, eating should be pleasurable for all organisms, so eating disor-
ders may well be classified under pleasure spectrum disorders. The main reason I
am discussing them here is that they have an overwhelming memetic component –
deliberate pursuit of a distorted body image.
Direct stimulation of the serotonin receptor, 5-HT 4 in nucleus accum-
bens reduced the physiological drive to eat and increased CART (cocaine- and
amphetamine-regulated transcript) mRNA levels in mice. MDMA (ecstasy) seems
to stimulate the 5-HT 4 receptors in nucleus accumbens and release CART which
results in its appetite suppressant effect (Jean et al., 2007). Memes may also act like
MDMA, directly stimulating the serotonin receptors in nucleus accumbens causing
appetite suppression.
What is the evolutionary significance of eating disorders? Some have argued that
foregoing food and not feeling hungry (and even feeling pleasure without food),
coupled with hyperactivity, might have adaptive value at times of scarcity as well as
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potential competition for mate (Faer et al., 2005; Gatward, 2007; Guisinger, 2003).
Meme-induced pursuit of ideal body weight may trigger off an ancient adaptive
gene-derived neurobiologic mechanism to deal with food scarcity.
There may be differential genetic polymorphisms between restrictive type of
eating disorders and bulimia nervosa. The behaviors of bingeing and purging are
strongly memetic as are the perfectionism and body image distortions in anorexia
nervosa.
25.1.2 Destructive Meme Infections and Epidemics: Mass Hysteria,
Factitious Illness, Suicide, Suicide Bombing, Aggression
We already discussed in Chapter 24 how memes may attach themselves to the brain’s
pleasure mechanism in the service of their own replication and perpetuation. Memes
in the environment may at times acquire overwhelming power and infect the brain
massively and take over the meme-processing apparatus and co-opt it for their own
replication. Such memes may sweep through a whole population in a frenzy, as in
mobilizing for war, religious fanaticism, and mass hysteria. In less virulent form,
the memes may simply gain epidemic proportions as fads.
At the individual level, at times of stress, susceptible individuals may uncon-
sciously adopt behaviors, emotions, or symptoms of others to whom they were
exposed in earlier life. These may result in factitious symptoms or malingering
(Palmer, 2007).
In the case of suicide, there is clear evidence of an infectious nature of the
behavior on top of the often coexisting serious pathology such as depression and
psychosis. Suicide can thus be considered to be a final common behavior pathway
for various mental conditions, including depression, psychosis, neurotic distress,
and situational distress. Epidemics and clusters of suicides have been reported, par-
ticularly among adolescents. Imitation of suicide depicted in media has also been
reported (Gould, 1999, 2001; Gould and Shaffer, 1986; Gould et al., 1988; Phillips
and Paight, 1987). In a vulnerable individual, or at times of stress-induced vul-
nerability, suicide memes may take hold and proliferate, leading to the suicidal
behavior.
Suicide bombing is another example of memetic contagion. An upsurge of such
terrorist acts often follows another. A recent survey of general population con-
cerning suicide bombing revealed that Suni fundamentalism was associated with
increased support for suicide bombing (Kazim et al., 2008). Terrorist groups may
serve the function of a “family” for members of the society who lack a sense
of belonging. Acts of terrorism may be seen as “propaganda by deed” to recruit
members to the family and its beliefs. Terrorism is also instrumental in building a
counterterror industry that may have its own culture and pathology (Palmer, 2007).
Aggression is another evolutionarily adaptive neurophysiologic entity common
to all animals. Instrumental or purposeful aggression as in attacking a prey or
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in combat is different from affective or angry aggression in both behavior and
physiology.
Conspecific aggression is usually related to establishment of sexual and social
dominance and mostly exhibited by males. While physical aggression may have
been adaptive in the stone age in achieving social and sexual dominance, physi-
cal aggression is memetically suppressed in modern societies which value memetic
dominance over physical force. It should be noted, however, that such “civilized”
behavior of gentlemen is a recent memetic acquisition in Western societies, and that
there are still areas on the globe where physical violence and aggression are widely
accepted.
In memetically civilized societies, however, physical violence is often a man-
ifestation of mental retardation, low intelligence, brain damage, or other physical
conditions that reduce the effectiveness of the frontal lobes concerned with memetic
control of behavior. Certain memetic subcultures and meme infections, as with
media violence, may provide a more permissive state for physical violence in
susceptible individuals (Cantor, 2000; Mitrofan et al., 2008; Villani, 2001).
25.1.3 Irrational Beliefs and Delusions
Irrational beliefs and delusions may be shared memes within a subculture (e.g.,
religions, cults). Individuals with inadequate meme-processing abilities are likely
to accept irrational and often anti-gene memes (e.g., sexual repression, denial of
some forms of pleasure). Some, even though infected with such memes, may be
able to set aside the irrational memes, and recognize their irrationality and not allow
them to dominate their emotions and behavior. These are normal individuals who
recognize that some of their beliefs are irrational, but temporarily and sporadically
express allegiance to them for the sake of belonging to the communal activities that
are pleasurable. On the other hand, some of the infected individuals may be able to
derive pleasure only through means acceptable to the irrational memes, i.e., through
loyalty and blind obedience to the group that shares the memes whose only concern
is the propagation of the memes (religion, cult, -ism, etc.) themselves. This may lead
fanaticism, suicide bombing, etc., as discussed in Chapter 24.
25.2 Treatment
As we discussed earlier, meme infection is a normal and necessary part of human
development and acculturation. Only when there is conflict between gene-driven
needs and meme-driven needs, and/or when there is conflict among the memes
within the brain, including newly arrived ones, will there be symptoms and need
for intervention.
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As discussed in the previous section, education geared to evaluate and pro-
cess memes rationally, i.e., in a way compatible with the adaptive gene-driven
requirements, is essential for primary prevention.
Encouraging individuals to utilize critical thinking as opposed to blindly fol-
lowing what is fashionable or “group-think” may be sufficient in dealing with
fads – in fashion, food, religion, or ideology. Insofar as the fad is innocuous, nor-
mal individuals may decide that the pleasure it affords outweighs any potential
detriment.
For more chronic syndromes, such as epidemics of fibromyalgia, chemical
sensitivity, and hypoglycemia, the memetic diagnosis connects an internal sense
of distress to an explanatory concept (misattribution). For treatment of these
conditions, see Section 23.1.4.
Eating disorders are memetically driven physiologic aberrations primed by
gene × meme interaction in early life. The first order of business in symptomatic
anorexia nervosa and bulimia is restoration of normal weight and physiology
through tube feeding and medications. Genotyping may be useful as 5-HTTLPR
s/s may be at a higher risk for anorexia nervosa rather than bingeing. In those
with s/s, serotonin reuptake blockers, the usual treatment for anorexia nervosa (and
obsessive–compulsive syndrome), may not be effective (Gorwood, 2004; Murphy
et al., 2004). Olanzapine might be effective in such patients (Dunican and DelDotto,
2007). Bulimia nervosa tends to respond to antidepressants and mood stabilizers
(Berkman et al., 2006; Couturier and Lock, 2007; Ramoz et al., 2007; Reinblatt
et al., 2008; Stefano et al., 2008).
Meme-oriented therapies include various individual psychotherapies, group
therapy, family therapy, and milieu therapy, which have varying degrees of effi-
cacy (Guarda, 2008; Herpertz-Dahlmann, 2009; Herpertz-Dahlmann and Salbach-
Andrae, 2009; Keel and Haedt, 2008). Problems of mentalization, otherwise known
as theory of mind (see Chapters 8 and 11), have been postulated in anorexia ner-
vosa and treatment geared to an understanding of how the body or body image is
representing mental distress has been proposed (Skarderud, 2007a, b, c).
There is clearly a need for a more specific meme-oriented therapy in eating
disorders. Such therapy should first recognize the memetic content of the eating dis-
order – how the patient perceives herself physically and as a person. Her strivings
should be taken at face value and as belonging to a selfplex. Then, collaboratively
with the therapist, the patient should delineate other selfplexes that may exist, e.g.,
when she was younger, how she imagined herself to be when age X. Then a rational
strategy may be developed to attain the shape and character the patient would like
to be, i.e., a new memetic ego ideal. An avatar utilizing virtual reality may be par-
ticularly useful. An avatar is an image of oneself shaped like the person she wants
to be, and seeing herself eat, exercise, and socialize may be an excellent self-model
to imitate.
Malignant meme infections, such as fanaticism, religious or otherwise, are poten-
tially both self-destructive and other destructive, but as the affected are unwilling to
seek help, there is little psychiatry can do for them. Only when they are actually
attempting a criminal act, such as homicide or suicide bombing, could treatment
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be attempted. For such criminal acts, the first order of business would be to isolate
the fanatic memes from contaminating others, especially those who have not been
immunized. Then, isolating them from sources of supportive and sustaining memes,
i.e., the pleasure connection, should reduce the reproductive power of the malignant
memes. Then the educational process of identifying resident memes, and sorting
them to constructive and destructive memes could begin. When irrational memes
are deprived of their pleasure (dopamine) connection, they are likely to be discarded
or replaced with more constructive memes.
Adjunctive general and specific meme-oriented therapies discussed in Chapters
17 and 18 can be used in conjunction with any of the therapies discussed in this
chapter.
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26.1 Genes and Memes – How to Achieve a Peaceful Coexistence
Memes were created by genes in the service of better survival and replication of
the organism, i.e., genes. Once memes achieved widespread portability and repli-
cability, however, some memes evolved in a deviant path to come in conflict with
the survival and welfare interests of the individual genetic organism, i.e., irrational
memes, self-destructive memes.
Mental health may be achieved in a democracy of various memes in the brain
which is possible only if the brain possesses the capability to process and manip-
ulate memes in the service of the genetic organism (see Chapter 12). Education is
the means through which meme-processing ability is learned and strengthened. An
important challenge for the human race is then how to consciously design and imple-
ment educational methods specifically designed to enhance the meme-processing
ability. This involves exposure to a variety of both salutary and harmful memes and
teaching how to evaluate such memes and how to sort and filter incoming memes.
Specific techniques of dealing with environments that are flooded with memes detri-
mental to the interests of the organism must be developed and taught, which may
include both broad-spectrum anti-meme procedures such as relaxation and medita-
tion techniques as well as specific anti-meme procedures yet to be developed (see
Chapters 17 and 18).
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Identifying individuals who are vulnerable to infection by detrimental memes
through genetic testing and environmental evaluation is another important chal-
lenge. Once such individuals are identified in childhood, specific nurturing memetic
environments could be provided for them that would mitigate the vulnerability (see
Chapter 19).
Models of mental health that show how to deal with conflicting memes and
achieve a memetic democracy in the brain should be developed and made avail-
able. This could include actual scenarios of conflict resolution, both interpersonal
and intrapsychic. The use of avatars in virtual reality might be particularly useful in
this regard.
26.2 Need for New Diagnostic and Therapeutic Approaches
and Tools
It should be clear that new diagnostic and therapeutic approaches and tools must
be developed specifically designed for gene × meme interaction. For example, an
inventory of existing memes in the brain and their configuration, i.e., which meme-
plexes are dominant, and which are dormant, and which are in rebellion with the
dominant ones, would be a particularly useful diagnostic tool. For this purpose,
computerized meme scans might be developed utilizing such techniques as time-
limited free association and word association test. Existing projective tests, such as
the Rorschach might be reinterpreted in terms of memetic content and conflicts.
A reclassification of mental illness taking into account the gene × meme inter-
actions, as I have attempted to do in this book, would naturally lead to rational
treatment approaches that are both gene- and meme-oriented.
Broad-spectrum anti-meme therapies such as relaxation, massage, music therapy,
etc., should be emphasized and practiced more widely in psychiatric treatment set-
tings, not just as an adjunct but as a main procedure in combating noxious meme
infections just like broad-spectrum antibiotics in bacterial infections.
Specific meme-oriented therapies geared to neutralizing specific toxic memes
must be developed. Such therapies would include infusions of specific neutralizing
memes in the form of words, and/or sounds, and/or visual imagery, or combina-
tions thereof. Virtual reality and avatars may be of particular importance in specific
memetic therapies. For example, seeing oneself as an avatar with the ability to
solve specific memetic and/or meme × gene conflicts would empower the patient
to identify with the avatar and imitate it, resulting in the incorporation of the ability
meme.
26.3 Testable Hypotheses of Gene × Meme × Environment
Interaction
The essence of our model of mental health and illness is that genes do not interact
with environment directly, but through memes that enter the brain and are processed
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by the brain in interaction with and filtered by existing resident memes. The nature
and strength of the already existing memes, therefore, modify whether and how
environmental stresses are perceived and thus interact with the genes. Some testable
hypotheses that arise from this model would include:
1. Documentation of resident memes through meme scan or other means should
predict how a specific stressor such as childhood abuse may have resulted in
genetic change, i.e., which genes are turned on and off (epigenesis). This should
be testable through DNA analysis. For example, what specific memes are associ-
ated with methylation or acetylation of the serotonin transporter promoter gene
(SERT, 5-HTTLPR)? With MAOA? Does the proliferation of specific memes,
e.g., suicidal ideation, occur in the presence of specific gene configurations, such
as the activation of the 5-HTTLPR s?
2. The status of such genetic changes will be accompanied with differential brain
and physiologic arousal patterns to specific meme infusion. The brain function
should be measurable through imaging techniques such as PET and fMRI.
3. Evaluation of current status of memes in the brain, i.e., what the dominant
memeplexes are, how much conflict or harmony there is between the dominant
memeplexes and the nondominant ones, will predict the degree of mental health
or illness of the individual.
4. Meme-oriented therapies will result in changes in brain function. Broad-
spectrum anti-meme therapies should show a generalized change in the meme-
processing activity of the brain, while specific meme-oriented therapies will
show more specific and subtle changes. These should be demonstrable with
imaging techniques.
5. Immunization against toxic memes will result in measurable differences in the
susceptibility to later infusion of toxic memes.
6. There will be measurable differences in the state of mental health between those
with high levels of education and thus high levels of meme-processing ability
and those with low levels.
26.4 Memes, Social Sciences, and Neuroscience
The concept of memes received mixed, and often hostile, response from experts
in such social science disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology.
They claim, often rightly, that existing concepts in their disciplines are adequate in
explaining the phenomena at hand without invoking memes.
The hostile attitudes seem to be mostly determined by a sense of stepping on
the toes of the social scientists by biology as memes are ultimately based on bio-
logical replicators. The contribution of memetics to social sciences is not to usurp
existing concepts but to provide an underlying mechanism for them. Just as the
laws of physics are not nullified by the discovery of atoms or quantum mechan-
ics, existing concepts in social sciences are not damaged by the concept of memes.
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Rather, memes provide the basic mechanism of the interaction between culture and
human brains, i.e., how social milieu may affect brains and how brains may affect
social milieu.
It is in neuroscience that, I believe, the concept of memes can be most useful as
it provides a bridge that connects the perceived environment, memory, and genes.
As the quantum theory is most applicable and manifest in the microuniverse of
subatomic particles, memes as memory and brain code provide a powerful model of
gene × meme × environment interaction in the microcosm of the brain that results
in mental health and illness.
26.5 Ethical Considerations
Ethical considerations may arise concerning some of the diagnostic and therapeutic
techniques that are directed toward memes and memeplexes. For example, cer-
tain specific and general anti-meme therapies might incorporate “brainwashing”
techniques. Development of meme scans may be seen to be intrusions of privacy.
Just as cutting and excising tissue are intrusive but necessary parts of surgery,
some meme-oriented intrusive techniques may be useful provided informed con-
sent is obtained. An ethical dilemma may exist, however, when we posit competing
selfplexes, and some of the selfplexes (i.e., parts of the mind) may object to the
procedure while others consent. This would be particularly problematic in brains
in which memetic democracy, and thus mental health, has not been attained (see
Chapters 11 and 12). The solution to this problem may be found in the memetic
collaboration between the therapist and the patient that will enhance the selfplex(es)
geared toward the needs of the organism that is the individual patient.
Our model of the individual as a government of selfplexes is a deterministic
model with a large degree of freedom (see Chapter 11). Free will, to the extent that
it is the processing of memes representing choices important enough to reach con-
sciousness, is subject to how the selfplexes are configured. In a memetic democracy,
its exercise will be the result of a debate of conflicting sides. In an autocracy, free
will may not exist as choices may be automatic based on irrational dogmas.
Ethics is itself composed of memeplexes, derived from both genetic evolution
and memetic evolution. Unlike certain religious and cultural prescriptions and pro-
scriptions that are runaway proliferations of toxic memes, ethics is universally
accepted as serving the interests and needs of both genes and memes.
26.6 Post-human Evolution of Memes
It is with some wistfulness that we see memes, the offspring of our genes, have
achieved an evolutionary life of their own in artifacts and cyberspace. Indeed,
memes have flown away from the confines of the planet earth as in the voyager
interstellar record (see Chapters 8 and 10).
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Memes may have achieved, or will shortly achieve, the ability to replicate them-
selves and evolve independently of humans in both space and cyberspace. Memes
may be seen to be a paradigm-shifting evolution of the human race in which genetic
evolution, having reached a level of impasse (e.g., the birth canal is too narrow for
the increasing size of the head), yields to an alternative mode of evolution in the
form of memes. There is, after all, continuity in this as genes and memes are both
packets of information, and in a broader sense, genes may be seen to be a subset of
memes that are encoded in DNA.
Regardless of the evolutionary future of memes, they are currently mostly in a
symbiotic relationship with our genes, and our mental health depends on the suc-
cessful maintenance of the symbiosis through judicious processing of memes in
the interest of ourselves, the result of our individual gene × meme × environment
interaction.
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